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Anonymizers based on an intermediate computer (a set of them) located between the sender and 
the receiver of an e-mail message have been used for several years by senders of e-mail messages 
who do not wish to disclose their identity to the receivers. The job of the computer in the middle 
(the mediator) is to receive the message from the sender, delete the sender's address and other 
personal data from the header of the message, and forward the message to its final destination. 
In this paradigm, there are no means to hide the identity of the user from the mediator simple 
because the message sent arrives in the middle computer, with information that easily leads to the 
identity of the sender. 
The origin of this problem is that the sender uses a computer identified by an IP-address that 
unambiguously leads to the identity of its user. In fact, the sender discloses his identity to the 
mediator computer from the very moment lie sends his message in the hope that the mediator will 
protect it. 
Because of this, in this paradigm the strength of the system for protecting the identity of the 
sender depends on the ability and willingness of the mediator to keep the secret. 
In this dissertation we propose a novel approach to sending truly anonymous and confidential 
messages over the Internet which does not depend on a third party. Our idea departs from the 
mediator approach in that we do not use an IP-addressed computer to send anonymous messages, 
we use an IP-addressless computer instead, to be specific, we use a Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) which is IP-addresslessly connected to the Internet with the support of a Mobile Support 
Station (MSS). 
The PDA is identified by the MSS by a temporary, non-personal, random identifier (TmpId) 
which is assigned by the MSS and is valid only for one communication session. Thanks to the use 
of the TmpId, the sender of the anonymous messages does not need to disclose his identity to the 
MSS or to anybody else; thus, the strength of the system does not depend on any mediator. 
Having observed that a public telephone box provides complete anonymity when operated by 
coins, we took its functionality as a paradigm for our system. Thus, the main idea of our approach 
is to make the PDA, the MSS, and the Internet communication infrastructure imitate the work of 
a public telephone box connected to the telephone network. For this to be possible the PDA user 
uses anonymous electronic cash to pay for his anonymous message. 
To prove the feasibility of our approach and its correctness, the protocol of the proposed system 
was designed, specified in Promela specification language, and its basic safety properties and proper 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Recently, as the Internet and specially the World Wide Web, its most popular application, grows 
beyond academic and scientific environments to reach the masses (about 100 million hosts located 
in business and domestic buildings) concern about the use and abuse of the Internet information 
is growing. This issue is currently the subject of hot debates that involve academic, scientific, 
business, government, civil, and human rights organizations, and individuals. Several papers, books, 
and Web pages have been written to discuss this topic which is normally addressed as security, 
confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity in the Internet [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. Although there 
is still disagreement about the terminology, it is generally accepted that security is the concept 
that encompasses all the others. 
Due to space and time constraints in this work we will limit our ambitions to the study of 
confidentiality and anonymity only, yet the concept of security in the Internet will be always 
around. For this reason it makes sense to devote a few lines to this issue and to understand why 
the Internet is considered vulnerable to hackers' attacks. 
1.1 Internet security 
The design and creation of the Internet dates back to the late 1960s, when its purpose was research. 
At that time nobody could have predicted what the Internet would look like 30 years later and 
what applications would be running on top of it. Among other things, no concern was taken to 
protect Internet information as it relied on the trust, respect, lionour, and appropriate behaviour 
of its users (11]. Consequently, the original TCP/IP protocols have serious security flaws. The 
most obvious of them have been reported and countermeasures against potential attacks have been 
suggested [12]. 
Among the most serious problems concerning Internet security is the lack of protection for 
Internet communications lines. When a bit of information leaves the sender's computer and travels 
to its destination it travels through rather exposed channels (open backbones), consequently, the 
message itself is exposed to all the dangers (both unintentional and malicious) of the outside world. 
A message should be readable only to its sender and recipient. Yet because the Internet designers did 
not consider encryption an important part of the Internet protocols, most of information travelling 
through the Internet is not encrypted and readily available to hackers [13,14]. 
Besides the efforts to fix the problems, Internet applications still suffer from security flaws. 
Further, legal regulations to protect the personal data of Internet users are still in their infancy. 
By Internet information we have in mind every single bit stored on Internet files or travelling 
through Internet channels, for example, databases, electronic libraries, payroll and control systems, 
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electronic transactions, e-mail and so on. On the other hand, personal data is a subset of the 
whole of Internet information and encompasses only data related to individuals as human beings 
and members of the society, i. e. their personal information, for example, their electronic and post 
addresses; geographical location of their desktop personal computer, and their current locations; 
IP address, operating system, browser, and the hardware of their personal computers. Likewise, 
personal e-mail, shopping preferences, bank card numbers, medical records, etc. 
To see how the personal data of an Internet user might be abused, let us discuss how it is 
exposed in two of the currently most popular Internet application, namely, in the e-mail and the 
Web systems. 
In terms of security the e-mail system represents a high risk; it is very common to receive 
e-mails from people we have not heard of before and from people we do not want to hear from; 
without being asked for agreement our e-mail address may appear in an e-mail list or end up in the 
hands of a friend's friend just because our friend decided to send a group message to everybody in 
his or her addressbook. It may also travel around the whole world in the headers of a chain letter. 
Although most Web surfers ignore it, Web servers gather (for technical and commercial pur- 
poses) personal data about their visitors. As explained in [8,3] due to the nature of the HTTP 
protocols Web servers create log files where the name of the Web client, its IP address, operating 
system, and browser are stored as well as the day, month, year, minute and second of the visit; and 
the name of the files copied. 
1.1.1 Wireless computers and their vulnerability 
Although radio communication has been around for nearly 100 years, most remote communication 
is currently performed over wire lines. Tapping a wired communication line is relatively easy, to tap 
a telephone line for example is it sufficient to locate the line, then find or make a hole in the plastic 
shield and make direct contact or put in place an induction device for capture; in other cases, 
a micro-pastille is introduced in the capsule for the receiver handset. Having the line tapped, 
the conversation can be listened, recorded or broadcast with a quartz transmitter microphone 
over hundreds of meters. With the advent of wireless communications networks, the problem of 
information eavesdropping has become more serious since air tapping does not leave behind any 
trace of the crime as with wireline tapping. Also, to tap a wire the intruder has to make a Physical 
contact with the line which puts him at risk of being discovered, while with wireless tapping the 
tap can be performed at a distance; for example a conventional analog wireless telephone handset 
emits over a distance of 200 to 400 meters; to overhear a conversation the only thing an intruder 
needs is a receiver adapted to the wireless set frequency, for example a scanner able to work at 
410 to 520 MHz [15,14]. However, even with the increased security risks presented by wireless 
communications the use of wireless computers continues to develop. 
Taking into account the latest achievements in microelectronic, computer communication and 
wireless communication technology one can safely bet on two things. First, that today's poorly 
integrated wired and wireless communication networks like telephone, Internet, cableTV, cordless, 
cellular telephone, mobile data, satellite and wireless LAN networks are going to be interconnected 
and integrated into a single global, ubiquitous communication network. Second, that cheap pocket 
size wireless computers, will invade the whole world in the near future, there will be millions of 
them, nearly everybody will carry one in her pocket and use it as a personal day planner computer 
and pocket communicator to access the global communication network currently under development 
[16,17,18,19,20,21]. In fact a reasonable number of such computers are already around, the 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) being the most representative ones[22,23,24,25]. 
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1.2 Protection of identity and other personal data 
There are law abiding situations, where it is essential for an individual not to disclose his identity 
(for a while or forever) after interacting with somebody else, i. e. not to disclose a particular piece 
of personal data or none at all [26,27,28,29). Some health services, such as assistance with 
embarrassing diseases, do not work unless the identity of the caller is protected; in today's societies 
people need indentity protection to express something that, according to some groups, should not 
be illegal but it is; for example, in some countries expression of political and religion views are 
rather limited unless the identity of the speaker is not disclosed. 
As explained later in detail, this modus operandi is called anonymity. The early Internet did 
not provide this facility; for example, the recipient of an e-mail message can easily, by reading the 
e-mail headers, find out the sender's e-mail address; currently only with the help of non-standard 
e-mail services senders of messages can, with a certain degree of confidence, hide their identity. In 
the same way a facility to access and publish information anonymously is needed. 
The growing interest in personal data protection goes far beyond the academic community 
-the real pressure to find a solution to the problem comes from the business sector. It has 
been widely discussed and accepted that security and privacy are the most significant barriers 
to implementing electronic commerce in the Internet; concern about the collection and use of 
the personal data of Internet buyers disclosed during transactions has been expressed; experts in 
the field believe that electronic business in the Internet will not take-off unless personal data of 
customers is satisfactorily protected [30,31,32,33,34,35,9]. In this direction the anonymity of 
the buyer and the confidentiality of information she sends and receives during a transaction are 
two of the most important aspects of personal data protection. 
As the above discussed issues become more evident, projects are being launched to research the 
answer to the questions raised. For instance in the middle 90s Philip Zimmermann wrote the PGP 
program (Pretty Good Privacy) which allows people to exchange e-mail messages with privacy, 
authentication and digital signatures [36,37]. PGP is largely based on public key cryptography. 
An early attempt to protect the indentity of the senders of electronic messages over the Internet 
was the proliferation of free-of-cliarge electronic remailers in the middle of the 90's [38]. The basic 
principle of these systems was to hide the identity of the sender with the help of an intermediate 
computer which receives the e-mail, changes the headers of the message and forwards it to its final 
destination. 
With the advent of the Web, remailers evolved into anonymizers which attempt to protect not 
only the identity of e-mail senders but also the identity of Web surfers as well. On-going projects 
in this direction are The Anonymizer [39], The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant [40], and the 
Crowds project launched by AT&T [41]. More recent and ambitious is the work being carried on 
by the TRUSTe organization and the W3C consortium under the TRUSTe privacy programme [42] 
and the Privacy Preferences Project [43], respectively. TRUSTe and P3P are different from the first 
mentioned project in that they attempt to give a general solution to the issue by the introduction 
of standard protocols and practices. 
1.3 A new approach to protecting identity 
As can be seen from section 1.2, much work has been done to protect the personal data of Internet 
users and much work is still in progress; with different approaches and solutions being suggested. 
However, despite this massive amount of publication and implementation, the aim of protecting the 
identity of Internet e-mail senders and Web surfers has not been satisfactorily achieved. As will 
4 Introduction 
be discussed later in detail in chapter 3, the proposed solutions suffer from serious flaws that make 
them unsuitable for certain applications. The common, and weakest aspect of all the approaches 
suggested so far is their insistence on trusting a third party, i. e. somebody placed between the 
sender and the receiver. 
In this work, we propose a radically different approach to protecting the identity of the sender of 
an electronic message over the Internet. We argue that it is not possible to send a truly anonymous 
message through the Internet from a wired desktop computer unless the sender unconditionally 
trusts the Internet communication infrastructure (computers, software, and human beings) that 
work as a third party between him and the receiver. Strictly speaking there are no reasons to trust 
such a third party since computers and software might succumb to hackers' attacks and human 
beings might be bribed and forced by legal orders to disclose the vital information for tracing the 
sender of the supposedly anonymous message. 
Trying to send an anonymous message from a wired desktop computer with the help of an 
anonymizer based on the mediator approach is similar to making an anonymous telephone call 
from a home telephone using the well-known caller's number protected mechanisms. The degree 
of anonymity of his message heavily depends on the willingness of the communication network 
owner to keep it, and is reduced to zero if the latter fails to keep his promise. We claim that for an 
electronic message to be truly anonymous it has to be sent from a wireless IP-addressless computer, 
just as truly anonymous telephone calls are made from public telephone boxes or mobile phones 
that can be bought from electronic shops and are operated using pre-paid cards. 
Having in mind the arguments discussed above, we propose a novel approach for sending anony- 
mous and confidential messages which is inspired by the functionality of the coin operated public 
telephone box. A distinguishing characteristic of our approach is that we use a PDA to send the 
anonymous messages, which is connected to the Internet with the support of a Mobile Support Sta- 
tion (MSS) and without using any IP-address. Instead of using an IP-address to identified itself 
to the MSS, the PDA uses a temporary non-personal, random identifier (TmpId) which is assigned 
by the MSS and is valid only for the duration of a single communication session. To pay for the 
anonymous communication session the PDA uses anonymous electronic cash (e-cash). To prove 
that our novel approach is feasible, we design the system, specify it in the Promela specification 
language and validate its basic safety properties and proper end-states, by using the Spin validator. 
The reason why we use a PDA as a communicating device is that PDAs fit smoothly in our 
paradigm and because we believe PDAs (or something similar) will be the most popular computers 
in the years to come. This is briefly discussed in section 1.1.1 and in detail in chapter 2.8. 
The idea of considering a wireless IP-addressless computer as the ideal computer to make an 
anonymous call might sound rather unusual as normally computers connected to the Internet, both 
desktop and wireless, are assigned an Internet address which helps identify them within the Internet 
world and is used by them to send and receive messages [44,45,46]. 
However, it can be argued that a computer might not possess an Internet address and still be 
able to communicate with other Internet computers. Also, the assignment of an Internet address 
to a computer is a long and painful process as it involves registration with Internet authorities; this 
registration might takes days to complete. There are situations where the user does not want to 
go through a registration process because she does not know how to do it, she wants her computer 
to work immediately after purchasing it, or because what she has bought is a personal, small and 
cheap disposable one and it does not make sense to register it today and dispose of it three weeks 
later. 
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1.4 Understanding confidentiality, privacy and anonymity 
Up until now we have assumed that the reader's understanding of the legal concepts we are talking 
about matches ours. Frequently this assumption is false. To avoid making this mistake we will stop 
to define precisely what we have in mind when talking about the core concepts of our work. 
1.4.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a complex legal concept whose origins in Great Britain can be traced back at 
least to 1848 when the Prince Albert v. Strange case of breach of confidence was taken to court[47). 
Obviously, the definition of confidentiality has changed since it was first defined as the right to 
keep secrets. Because its main concern is information protection its definition has evolved to meet 
new developments in information technology. The intensive use of computer and communication 
technology for storing, processing and exchanging enormous amounts of information has changed 
not only the way confidentiality is protected but its definition as well. 
Confidentiality is a requirement aimed at keeping sensitive information stored in any form from 
being disclosed to an unauthorized recipient. 
It is noteworthy that by any form we mean any known form of storing information like the 
human brain, or mechanical, optical, magnetic and electronic media. Also, it is important to 
mention that a recipient may be an individual, a group, an institution or any combination of these. 
From the above definition of confidentiality it follows that information of a confidential nature 
should be kept secret. In fact the essence of confidentiality is to protect secrecy. Although the 
purists will argue that confidentiality and secrecy are two different concepts[48] we will take them as 
synonymous on the ground that for the purpose of this work the subtle differences are unimportant. 
So, for the rest of this work we will use confidential and secret as interchangeable terms. 
Confidentiality exists in everyday life. A society without any guarantee of confidentiality is 
difficult to think of. Confidentiality is necessary to protect secrets ranging from secrets of state to 
husband-wife relationships. 
It is perfectly understandable that ordinary people would like to keep information about their 
private life, political preferences, hobbies, spending habits and so on, under confidentiality. On the 
other hand business people would like to keep information away from the eyes of their competitors; 
of particular interest to others is information about new technological developments, manufacturing 
costs, bidding plans and so on. 
It follows that any innovative technology aimed at helping people with both everyday and busi- 
ness activities has to guarantee an acceptable level of confidentiality. Computer and communication 
technology is no exception. Confidentiality is a matter of major concern in the computer and com- 
munication world. Particularly interested in this problem are those whose services offer to the user 
exchange of confidential information over computer networks. 
1.4.2 Anonymity 
Anonymity is a condition in where an individual, group or institution interacts with others without 
disclosing his, her, or its identity. 
The right to confidentiality protects the individual (group or institution) and gives him the 
right to decide when and under what circumstances to disclose his identity. Another option is to 
remain anonymous forever. 
Anonymity plays an essential r6le in modern societies. There are many legitimate reasons, 
ranging from the trivial to business and political, why a law abiding individual, might wish to 
remain anonymous after interacting with a second party. 
6 Introduction 
Counselling services for people needing assistance with diseases such as alcoholism, drug 
addiction, AIDS, and so on are provided under anonymity, otherwise they would not be 
viable. Not surprisingly these services have been traditionally provided anonymously over 
telephone lines. The Alcoholics anonymous helpline may serve as a good example. 
Freedom of expression is greatly helped by anonymity. To feel free from any repression an 
individual may wish to express his personal convictions (political or religious views) against 
his employer or government under anonymity. 
Anonymous advertisements in the Internet are welcome by those who are seeking a new em- 
ployment or a new partner. In the first case anonymity protects the seeker from jeopardizing 
his current job. In the second it protects him from bothering his current wife. 
e Computerised voting would be useless without a guarantee of anonymity. 
1.4.3 Confidentiality and privacy 
It is worth noting that confidentiality and privacy are two concepts of major concern to those 
interested in computer and network security. Confidentiality and privacy protection have been 
addressed by several authors [49,27,28,29,50,26,10,51,52]. Unfortunately, most of them have 
failed to define clearly these two closely related concepts, to such an extent that they are used 
synonymously. 
According to Munro [48] confidentiality and privacy are distinct concepts and should be carefully 
distinguished. 
Privacy may be defined as a condition in which an individual can determine for himself when, 
how and to what extent information about his personal life, stored in any medium, is disclosed to 
others. 
Rom the above definition it follows that the right to privacy concerns the right to protect 
personal information, i. e. information about personal affairs of individuals. For example, about 
wife-husband relationship, romantic affairs, sexual preferences, diseases, and so on. 
On the other hand, as has been defined in 1.4.1, confidentiality encompasses any information 
an owner wants to keep secret whether it be about his personal life or not. One of the few author 
who has paid attention to the difference between confidentiality and privacy is Simson Garfinkel 
[53]. 
It follows that the right to confidentiality may apply to information of a private nature but not 
necessarily. 
To make it clearer, it is worth noting that information of private nature may or may not be 
confidential. 
For example, personal information like the age and marital status of an individual are tradi- 
tionally disclosed to the public. In the same way, at the individual's discretion, information about 
his sexual preferences may be disclosed to the public. Obviously any personal information disclosed 
to the public is no longer regarded as a subject of confidence. 
The above discussion gives rise to the following conclusion: Although confidentiality and privacy 
are not the same, they are strongly related. In fact, confidentiality is a wider concept than privacy; 
the first concept encompasses the latter, consequently, confidentiality is regarded as the first step 
towards privacy protection. Grounded on this understanding of concepts we have decided to address 
the issue of information protection from the view of confidentiality rather than privacy. Again, the 
reader has to keep in mind that most authors do not make a distinction between the two concepts 
and treat them as synonymous. 
1.5 Summary 
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Following the Janson [10] approach to confidentiality, we will consider that confidentiality in com- 
munication networks encompasses two aspects. 
Confidentiality of content of messages The content of a message travelling through the net- 
work must be protected against the threat of disclosure to unauthorized individuals. 
Traffic confidentiality The origin and the destination of a travelling message must be protected 
against the threat of unauthorized observers finding out between whom messages are ex- 
changed. 
It follows that there are three aspects in this game that may become a target of attack: the 
source of the message, the destination, and the content of the message. An Internet user may 
require protection for one only or for any sensible combination of all of them. 
Confidentiality in computer networks is not a new topic. Many works have been devoted to it, 
particularly to confidentiality of the content of messages. This level of confidentiality can usually 
be achieved by means of cryptographic mechanisms (see chapter 4). The introduction of wireless 
networks and its applications are demanding reconsideration of the issue about confidentiality 
not only because this new technology is more vulnerable to intruders (see section 1.1.1), but also 
because it opens possibilities for new applications not available with previous technologies. Needless 
to say many of these applications demand confidentiality of the content of messages and traffic 
confidentiality. 
Traffic confidentiality is of major concern, to such an extent that many emerging and potential 
applications will not find their way into practical use unless users are guaranteed a mechanism 
to keep their identities secret. Electronic commerce is perhaps one of the most appealing of the 
applications that are waiting for confidentiality, cashless payment, for example, is heavily dependent 
on anonymity. 
1.5 Summary 
The original Internet was designed for use in the academic field where users' behaviour is normally 
appropriate. Consequently, the original TCP/IP protocols suffer from serious security flaws. As 
growth of the Internet escalates and it reaches the masses, assumptions about users' appropriate 
behaviour becomes unrealistic. Thus, countermeasures to prevent or reduce the risk of abusing 
Internet information must be implemented. Information sent, received and stored on the Internet 
must be disclosed only to authorized parties. The issue of information protection is strongly related 
to the concepts of confidentiality, privacy, and anonymity. 
Confidentiality is a requirement whose aim is to keep sensitive information (personal, business, 
medical, etc. ) stored in any form, from being disclosed to an unauthorized recipient. Privacy is 
defined as a condition in which an individual can determine for himself when, how and to what 
extent, information about his personal life, stored in any medium, is disclosed to others. Anonymity 
is a condition in where an individual, group or institution interacts with others without disclosing 
his, her, or its identity. 
There are several applications (Alcoholics' Anonymous Internet helpline for example) whose 
success depends on the provision of a mechanism for sending and receiving confidential and anony- 
mous messages. Fortunately, thanks to cryptographic techniques and the use of mobile devices, it 
is possible to send confidential and anonymous messages over the Internet. 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Global, ubiquitous communication for 
the new millennium 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the invention of the commercial telegraph by Samuel Morse in the late 1830's it has been 
recognised that remote communication is one of the key factors in the development of modern 
societies. Nevertheless for many years, due to technological constraints, remote communication 
has been restricted to the use of stationary terminals (transmitters/receivers), i. e. to the use of 
equipment that works wire-tethered to a well-known and non-mobile physical location. To this 
category belong the today's mature and widely deployed wired telephone network and the wired 
Internet. 
It is true that for years airplane pilots have been using radio systems for communication with 
terrestrial control stations while in the air, however, these kind of systems serve specific purposes 
and are not available to the general public. Only recently (in the 80s) and thanks to the appearance 
in the commercial arena, cordless telephones, analogue and digital cellular telephones, mobile data 
networks, and satellite networks, and wireless LANs, mobile communication is becoming available 
to everybody. 
As can be seen several wired and wireless networks are widespread while others are emerging; 
unfortunately, they are not well integrated yet. In this chapter we study how these networks 
are being interconnected to each other (wireless LANs are discussed in section 2.8.7) to form a 
global ubiquitous communication infrastructure. Also discussed are existing and potential services 
provided by the interconnected network, and how they are going to be accessed. There are two 
crucial concepts we will use intensively in this chapter and in the rest of this work, namely user 
mobility and ubiquity; to avoid any confusion about what we mean, we start this chapter discussing 
them. 
2.2 User mobility and ubiquity 
A crucial question in the context of the global ubiquitous communication network is mobility. 
Mobility is important because it is the basis on which ubiquity is grounded. What follows is a 
definition and discussion of these two basic concepts. 
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2.2.1 Aspects of mobility 
Following Mohan's [54] approach, mobility involves two aspects: computer mobility and personal 
mobility. 
A mobile computer is one that, after being identified by the network, is capable of performing its 
everyday functions -hopefully without any substantial degradation- independently of the point 
of connection to the network and regardless of whether its user is static or on the move and inside 
the area of coverage. For example, e-mail messages can still be delivered to the computer regardless 
of where it happens to be connected to the network. It is worthwhile pointing out that connected 
to the network does not necessarily imply a wired connection, a mobile computer connects to the 
network through a wireless interface. In addition mobile computers are normally small and light, 
therefore, easy to carry. 
A closely related concept is that of personal mobility which implies that the user is provided 
with facilities for performing his computation and communication functions independently of both 
the terminal lie uses and the network point of connection. It is based upon a dynamic association 
between a user and his current terminal (the computer lie is using to get into the network). 
In the context of this work we assume that, while on the move, a network user always carries 
his mobile computer with him, consequently, he never uses other computers but his own; on this 
basis we do not consider aspects of personal mobility. 
2.2.2 Ubiquity 
One of the main advantages of having a globally integrated network with support for mobile users, 
is the possibility of ubiquitous communication; meaning that regardless of where geographically 
(within the area of coverage of the communication network) the communicating parts are located, 
they can exchange messages, even if the transmitter, the receiver or both are on the move. 
The notion of ubiquitous communication has generated a great excitement in the 1nternet 
community. Probably the most enthusiastic is the business community (banks and retailers for 
example) that see ubiquitous communication as an attractive complementing -and even alternative- 
platform to run their business on. 
2.3 Cordless telephone networks 
Cordless telephones were introduced in the late 1970s to allow users to roam around their houses 
while talking over the telephone. The first generation uses analogue technology and is known as 
the CT1 (Cordless Telephone) standard in the United States. In Europe it is known as the CEPT1 
standard because it is supported by the CEPT (Conference for European Post and telecommuni- 
cations). The system consist of a telephone handset and a base station, both of them equipped 
with a radio frequency communication interface (see section 2.8.5). The base station is connected 
to the wired telephone network and serves as a bridge between the cordless handset and the wire 
telephone network. Also the base station serves only a single telephone number. In the United 
States the base station transmits in the band of 46.6-47.0 MHz, and the handset in the 49.6-50.00 
MHz band. The coverage of the base station is typically 100 to 300 meters [55,56,21]. 
Because mobility is essential in several applications, the CT1 analogue cordless telephones 
evolved to the second generation cordless telephone standard known as the CT2 standard in 1985 
which works in the range of 864-868 Mliz and uses digital technology. This system was introduced 
in the United Kingdom for residential, business and Telepoint applications. The communication 
architecture is similar to that of CT1, but users had a wider area of mobility as Telepoint base 
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stations were deployed in railway stations, airports and shopping centers to provide cordless com- 
munication to users. A base station serves several handsets and supports the transmission of data 
up to 2.4 Kb/s. Unfortunately, user location was not implemented and Telepoint services were 
limited to outgoing calls only [13,55,56,21]. The system was quickly redesigned. 
To replace the CT2 standard the CT3 appeared in 1992. In Europe it is known as the DECT 
(Digital European Cordless Telecommunications Standard) and is supported by the ETSI (Euro- 
pean Telecommunication Standard Institute). The DECT standard is digital and works in the 
1880-199OMHz. It was designed to work inside buildings and campuses. In a way it resembles 
a PBAX (Private Branch Exchange) network but with a wireless interface, hence it is sometimes 
regarded as a wireless PBAX. Communication support to cordless handsets is provided by a set 
of base stations which are connected to each other and to the wired telephone network; each base 
station is responsible for one communication cell. Since the base stations offer user location and 
handoff, consequently the user has full mobility among the area of coverage. DECT was designed 
to handle high capacity, it can transmit voice and data up to 1.152 Kbs. Although the mobility it 
offers is limited to a relatively small area, it is suitable for a great deal of applications; certainly it 
cannot compete with cellular systems outside its area of coverage but it is cheaper in applications 
inside buildings. On the other hand the DECT standard specifies the requirements for interconnec- 
tion with ISDN and GSM networks. In this way a DECT user located inside his company building 
may route a call through the local DECT network if the recipient is within the area of coverage 
or through the GSM network if the latter is outside, in both cases dialing the same number. This 
result in greater economy and efficiency as most of the calls made from a business company target 
numbers inside the company building. Similarly, the same DECT handset is used a communicator 
device to gain access to the local DECT network, to ISDN and to GMS, in other words, the DECT 
handset is a sort of universal communicator. 
2.4 The Personal Communication Networks and its evolution 
The Personal Communication Network(PCN) is known as the Personal Communication Services 
(PCS) in North America[57] and is the result of the evolution of a mobile phone system whose first 
deployments can be traced back to the early 1980s. In order to understand why the PCN is now 
emerging it is worth going through the different stages of its evolution. 
2.4.1 First-generation mobile phone systems 
Tile first-generation of mobile wireless phone systems were analogue and invented by Bell Labora- 
tories about 1982. They were deployed in several countries: in the USA AMPS (Advanced Mobile 
Phone Systems) standardized was widely used; in England TACS (Total Access Communication 
System) was deployed; while in Japan the NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) was used [13]. 
It is worth mentioning that although the voice channels were analogue, these systems used digital 
control links between tile mobile phone and tile base stations. 
The only service provided by these system was voice communication transmitted using frequency 
modulation techniques using two bands of frequencies; one for base station to mobile phone and 
another for mobile phone to base station transmission. The AMPS used tile 870-890 and 825-845 
MHz bands, TACS transmitted at 935-960 and 890-915 MHz, and NNT at 870-825 and 925-940 
MHz. 
In tile late 1980s these systems evolved to use digital technology for both control and voice 
channels; as a result of this, the second-generation of mobile phone systems came to the scene. 
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2.4.2 Second-generation mobile phone systems 
The second-generation of mobile phone systems is characterized by the use of digital technology. 
They have been in use in several countries since the early 1980s. Currently there are three inter- 
national standards [131: 
GSM The Global System for Mobile Communications used in European countries. 
IS-54 The North American Electronic Industry Association system used in the USA, Canada and 
Mexico. In contrast with the GSM and Japanese Personal Digital Cellular (PDC) systems 
which are fully digital, this system is digital-analogue, i. e. it enhances rather than replaces 
the old AMPS analogue system. 
PDC The Personal Digital Cellular system used in Japan. 
Second-generation systems offer advanced transmission techniques like speech coding, error 
correcting channel codes, and bandwidth modulation techniques. As with the first-generation 
systems, they use one band of frequency for transmission from the base station and another for 
transmission from the mobile phones. Another goal of these systems was provision of roaming 
and handoff capabilities across several countries; GSM for example supports roaming and handoff 
in most European countries; while 1S-54 supports roaming and handoff across the three North 
American countries (USA, Canada and Mexico); unfortunately they only cover a limited region of 
the world, none of them supports these facilities worldwide; and none of them is recognized as a 
worldwide standard. 
The three standards use TDMA/FDMA transmission techniques but they differ in the trans- 
mission bands: 935-960 and 890-915 MHz for the GSM, 869-894 and 824-849 MHz for the IS-54 
and 810-826 and 940-956 MHz for the PDC. The PDC has also been assigned the bands 1429-1453 
and 1477-1501 MHz for future use [13,55]. 
Although these system were mainly designed for voice communication they also offer data 
communication facilities. For example the European GSM offers a transparent data service at 9.6 
kbits/s [58]. The GSM system is considered one of the most advanced of its generation and better 
documented; hence we will discuss it further. 
The Global System for Mobile Communication 
The Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) is the European mobile telephone system. 
It was developed by the ETSI (European Telecommunication Standard Institute). Having been 
designed from scratch it is a fully digital transmission system based on cellular infrastructure. The 
first GSM specification was finished in 1990 and joined by 17 Western European countries. 
The current version of the standard is called The Digital Cellular System 1800 (DCS1800) [59] 
and is considered a successful attempt of of the ETSI toward the standardization of mobile com- 
munication systems. It is currently a working technology in use in over 50 countries, both inside 
and outside Europe (in Africa, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand). 
Thanks to a successful standardization, a GSM subscriber can travel to any of the GSM countries 
with his GSM terminal in his pockets enjoying continuity of communication; regardless of where 
he goes his GSM terminal responds to the same number with a single bill to be paid at home. 
Being a digital system, it belongs to the so called second generation of communication systems 
together with the Americans IS-54 and Qualcomm CDMA and the Japanese TDMA systems. 
The DCS800 provides telecommunication voice, data (9.6 kbit/s) and a message service for 
delivering messages (up to 160 characters) both to and from a mobile device in a connectionless 
mode (while the mobile device is unavailable). 
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GSM radio channel structure 
In GSM a geographical region is divided up into cells (I to several kilometers). Each cell is served 
by a base station. Mobile terminals communicate with their current base stations through radio 
frequency waves. For this to happen the GSM has been allocated two frequency bands: 890- 
915MHz for transmission from mobile terminals to base stations and; 935-960 for transmission 
from the base stations to the mobile terminals. These bands are divided into 124 pairs of carriers 
spaced by 200 KHz. For example, the first pair of carriers consists of the frequency channels 890.2 
and 935.2 MHz (for communication from the mobile terminal to the base station, and from the 
base station to the mobile terminal, respectively) [60,61]. Each cell is assigned from one to 15 pairs 
of carriers. 
The medium access scheme used by the GSM is based on a Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA) protocol. On this account the assigned spectrum to each channel is segmented in eight 
time slots of 0.577 ms to be shared by eight mobile terminals, this means that eight mobile terminals 
may be connected to the base station through each channel (one in each slot). Since each time 
slot is 0.577 ms the duration of a frame is 4.615 ms, consequently, a transmitter may transmit 
once every 4.615 ms. In terms of bps, each transmitter may send 9600 bps of data[61]. The reader 
interested in TDMA in wireless LANs should refers to [62]. 
Identification in the GSM 
The Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) uses smart cards for subscriber identification. 
The smart card serves as a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and is plugged into the GMS device 
(a mobile or fixed one) to associate the user with the latter [63]. It contains a serial number and 
the telephone number. The subscriber is identified through the information stored in his smart 
card. This means that the smart card is strictly personal, while the GSM device is not. Therefore, 
the subscriber can take his smart card from the GSM device he is using and insert it into another 
one that offers GSM services (in taxis, and airplanes for example). 
When the card is inserted and the GSM device turned on, the system ask for a PIN number. 
Provided that he types the PIN number that the system expects (in agreement with the information 
stored in the smart card), the system identifies the current device as being used by a subscriber it 
recognizes who is then identified by an international subscriber identity. 
The international subscriber identity is used for forwarding calls to the subscriber's current 
geographical location and also for billing him. 
Subscribers and users in the GSM 
Before going further it is useful mentioning that when it comes to talking about identification in 
mobile communication systems some authors make a distinction between subscribers and users [64]. 
In these terms a subscriber is an organization or a person that has a contact with the service 
provider, with a telephone service provider for example, for use of the service. A user is the person 
that uses the service on behalf of the subscriber. It is commonplace that a big company has a 
contract with the telephone service provider for use of several lines. In this case the company is the 
subscriber and its employees -the users of the lines- are the users. Needless to say the telephone 
service provider makes business with the subscriber, it does not care about the users. It is up to 
the subscriber to set internal policies about the use of the lines. To the telephone service provider 
this situation looks like a single person, to whom several lines have been assigned. 
To make our discussion simple we will, assume that each subscriber has only one subscriber 
identity module. On this account from now on we will not make any distinction between subscribers 
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and users and will use these two concepts as synonymous. 
2.4.3 Third-generation mobile phone systems 
As second-generation mobile phone networks are still being deployed a third generation is emerging. 
This system is a digital one and expected to integrate existing and future wire and wireless phone 
systems and called the PCN (Personal Communication Network) in Europe and PCS (Personal 
Communication Systems) in North America. Briefly, the PCN can be described as a system with 
enhanced capabilities for worldwide ubiquitous multimedia communication. 
The PCN 
The PCN is aimed not only at supporting the existing services provided by existing second- 
generation mobile systems but also to provide services not previously implemented [13]. 
ubiquitous communication: based on personal and terminal mobility the PCS will provide 
facilities for communication between two parties anywhere at any time i. e. regardless of the 
terminal they use two parties will be able to communicate at any time independently of their 
geographical location even when one of the or both are on the move. 
single universal phone number: Users will have a mobile handset which will respond to the 
same number regardless of where in the world the user is located; naturally, users will get a 
single bill. 
customized set of services: independent of location a user will have the services she is used 
to. 
high-functionality handset: The mobile user handset is expected to evolve towards a mobile 
device with multimedia data communication and computation capabilities; among those ca- 
pabilities are: voice telephony, voice e-mail, fax, video telephony, teleconferences, database 
access, navigation, location, etc. 
As can be appreciated most of the services are wireless version of today's services offered by 
wired networks (PSTN, Internet) while others come from existing wireless isolated networks like 
paging systems and GPS (General Positioning System). The PCN is envisioned as a system that 
will integrate all these wire and wireless networks. 
In a system like this it certainly hard to tell whether the handset will be a mobile phone or a mo- 
bile computer of the size of a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant). Not surprisingly the PCS is being 
leveraged by both communication and computer companies among them AT&T, Motorola, IBM, 
Apple and DEC. It follows that the development of any wire or wireless computer expected to oper- 
ate beyond 2000 has to match the goals of the PCN. Thanks to this leverage in 1992 the WARC-92 
(World Administrative radio Conference 1992) of the ITU identified global bands 1885-2025 MHZ 
and 1210-2200 MHz for the PCN under the banner of International Mobile Telecommunications- 
2000 (IMT-2000) -formerly known as Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunication Systems 
(FPLMTS), those bands include 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz for satellite communica- 
tions [65]. In response in 1995 the FCC of the USA allocated the band 1700-2300 MHz to the PCN 
under the name of Personal Communication Systems [61]. 
The development of a standard for this system is at its early stage, however, more than one 
proposal has been made [13]: 
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Internationally the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is currently developing 
standards for wireless personal communications under the name of Universal Personal Telecom- 
munication (UPT). The task has been assigned to the Radio communication Sector (ITU-R) 
-formerly known as the CCIR (Comit6 Consultatif International des Radio-Communications)- 
supported by the Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) -formerly known as 
the CCITT (Comit6 Consultatif International des T61egraphes et T616phones [65]. 
In Europe the ETSI (European Telecommunications Standard Institute) has created a spe- 
cial group to prepare standards for what they call the Universal Mobile Telecommunication 
System (UMTS). 
In the USA the ATIS (Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions) has assigned the 
task of developing standards for PCS to its subcommittees T1E1, TIM1, and TISL The 
same task is being done by the committee TR46 of the TIA (Telecommunications Industry 
Association) and by the committee 802 of the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers). 
2.5 Mobile data networks 
Mobile cellular phone networks like the European GPS, the North American IS-54, ýand the 
Japanese PDC were designed mainly for voice communication [55,13]. Although they can also 
transmit data messages at 9.6 Kbps, they have to compete against mobile data networks in this 
field. 
Mobile data networks have been designed specifically to provide data services in urban regions 
and offer data rates of 8 to 19.2 kbps. They offer wireless data transmission upon which several 
applications can be built; among the most important are: Internet access, e-mail, remote database 
and file access, wireless bank card verification, and real time vehicle (taxis, trucks) location. 
Currently MOBITEX (developed by Ericsson), ARDIS (developed and run by Motorola), and 
CDPD (the Cellular Digital Packet Network introduced by IBM) dominate the market. 
In an attempt to reduce implementation costs, CDPD shares base stations with the existing 
analogue AMPS cellular phone network; it has been designed as an overlay to the cellular phone 
network and uses idle voice channels of the latter [66,13,67]. 
In contrast, MOBITEX and ARDIS have deployed their own dedicated networks using the SMR 
(Specialized Mobile Radio) frequency near 800-900 MHz [13]. 
So far, the mobile data network that has been widely accepted all over the world and considered 
the de facto standard is MOBITEX. 
2.5.1 Advantages of mobile data networks 
In contrast with cellular networks which use circuit-switching mode, mobile data networks are de- 
signed for packet switching mode. This approach gives mobile data networks remarkable advantages 
in data transmission; which explains their wide acceptance in certain applications [68]. 
For the transmission of small quantities of data, a mobile data network offers higher perfor- 
mance and lower cost than a cellular network. 
A mobile data network provides its users with store-and-forward capabilities. This helps the 
mobile terminal save energy since the user may switch off his mobile terminal knowing that 
any message that might come during the so called saving-power mode will be stored by the 
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MOBITEX system in a mailbox until he switches his mobile terminal on and connects to 
the system to open his mailbox. Similarly messages are stored when the user is unreachable 
(perhaps going through a tunnel). 
2.5.2 MOBITEX 
In the USA MOBITEX has been deployed in 7700 cities and towns covering over 90 % of the USA 
business population and about 17600 Km of interstate highways with roaming support across all 
covered areas; also, MOBITEX networks have been deployed in 16 countries including Canada, 
United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and Australia [68). 
The radio frequencies used depend on the country. Yet in North America it operates at 900 MHz 
using a bandwidth of 935 to 940 for downlink channels and 896 to 901 KHz for uplink channels. 
In other countries it normally operates in the 450 MHz band [68]. Although currently MOBITEX 
transmits at 8 kbps, it is expected to be increased to 19.2 kbps in the near future [56]. 
The mobile terminal the user uses to connect to the MOBITEX network consists of a portable 
computer and a radio modem. Physically the radio modem interfaces with the portable computer 
through an RS-232 interface at one side and with the MOBITEX network at the other using an air 
interface protocol. Optionally the portable computer and the radio modem may be implemented 
in the same physical unit [68]. 
2.6 - Satellite networks 
It is believed that personal communications are going to evolve from location-dependent into uni- 
versally ubiquitous in the first decade of the 21st century [211. 
Pocked-sized personal electronic devices with communication and computational power (similar 
to mobile phone handset and PDAs) will be used to access remote information over a web of wire and 
wireless networks. It's expected that those devices will be able to send/receive real time multimedia 
information retrived with the help of software tools similar to current World-Wide-Web browsers. 
To be able to provide those services a wire and a wireless communication infrastructure is 
needed. Besides their current bandwidth limitations the already deployed PSTN and Internet 
network can serve as wire backbones for many of the potential applications. The issue about a 
similar worldwide wireless communication infrastructure remains open. It's true that present-time 
cellular telephone and paging companies offer rather useful services, yet their systems are far fron, 
having a worldwide coverage; at the most, they offer continental coverage. Another limitation of 
these systems is that they are economically attractive for crowded urban areas only; lience they 
normally do not cover rural communities; nor do they cover deserted areas where occasionally 
someone might appear to carry on a research, to have a holiday, be lost, or for some other reason. 
It seems obvious that a worldwide wireless network infrastructure is needed to complement the 
wired one and to interconnect the already deployed and emerging wireless systems; also, such a 
network has to cater for currently uncovered services like worldwide message (paging and telephone, 
for example) and data services for mobile users. A possible answer to this question is the use of 
satellite communication systems. 
2.6.1 Satellite communications 
Thanks to their high location (thousands of kilometres up in the sky) and their wireless commu- 
nication medium satellites can offer unique features that can certainly complement both wire and 
wireless terrestrial communications [69,70,61]. 
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Wide coverage A single geostationary satellite (see 2.6.2) can cover 1/3 of the earth's surface. 
In other words, a constellation (a group of satellites working for the same purpose) of three 
of them can cover the whole surface of the earth (the polar regions excluded). Needless to 
say, communication takes place regardless ofthe distance and obstacles between the commu- 
nicating points. 
Wide mobility support Worldwide communication is guaranteed for everyone located under the 
satellite communication umbrella, even for users on the move walking, driving, sailing and 
flying. 
Independence of geographical impediments A satellite communication infrastructure is a suit- 
able solution for hostile terrains (archipelagos for example). 
Flexibility Having the satellite in orbit it is relatively easy and quick to deploy a communication 
network over a wide geographical area and to reconfigure it according to changes in user 
location and traffic requirements; this facility could be the answer to the problem of casual 
concentrations of mobile users for short periods of time (at football stadiums for example); 
moreover, in cases of terrestrial catastrophes when terrestrial networks are normally damaged 
a satellite link might be of great use. 
Broadcast capability A satellite beam is inherently a broadcast medium; for applications of 
broadcast nature like remote conferences satellite communications might offer advantages 
over terrestrial ones. 
The use of satellite in commercial communications has experienced substantial progress since 
the morning bird (the first commercial communication satellite) was launched by INTELSAL (Inter- 
national Telecommunications Satellite Organization) in 1965 [69,71]; based on analogue techniques 
it was capable of carrying a total of 240 telephone circuits or one television channel between Europe 
and North America. Since then, satellite communications have evolved in different directions; of 
special interest for the designer of mobile computer applications is the evolution in satellite orbits 
and in on-board processing power. 
2.6.2 Satellite altitudes 
The capabilities and limitations of communication satellites heavily depend on the altitude of their 
orbits; on this basis they are grouped into geostationary and non-stationary satellites. 
Geostationary 
The first commercial satellites orbit the earth at an altitude of about 36000 Km; at that altitude and 
being the orbit in the equatorial plane the satellite looks to a terrestrial observer like a motionless 
point in the sky; i. e. the satellite period is equal to one sideral day; consequently they are known 
as geostationary equatorial orbit (GEO) satellites. Geostationary satellites usually operate at the 
4/6 GHz frequency band for some applications, like TV broadcasting, geostationary satellites are 
attractive because they cover large geographical areas and -thanks to their fixed position relative 
to their terrestrial stations- they do not need additional tracking equipment; unfortunately due 
to their high position they suffer for serious drawbacks: 
For transmissions of the order of 19.2 kbps, they require terrestrial stations with high transmit- 
ting power (about 1 W) and large antennas (of the order of 1-2.4 m of diameter) [72,61,73). 
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Rotating in an orbit located in the equatorial plane they cannot cover high latitude regions 
of the earth. 
Again, due to the altitude it takes a half-second to transmit a data packet between two 
terrestrial point. such a delay is too long and rather annoying for voice communications [74]. 
On this account it follows that GEO satellites are unsuitable for personal communication appli- 
cations to be run in small pocket-size devices like current PDAs and mobile phone handsets which 
have strong constraints on power consumption and antenna size. 
A possible answer to this question is bringing the satellite closer to the terrestrial terminals. 
This approach is taken in the so called Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites and by the Medium Earth 
Orbits (MEO) satellites. 
Non-stationary satellites 
LEOs and MEOs orbit the earth at about 200-3000 Km and 18500 Km respectively. Being out of 
the equatorial orbit both LEOs and MEOs are non-stationary. At the price of additional tracking 
equipment and by deploying them in constellations (dozens of satellites) to cover the whole earth 
surface they can overcome the problem of propagation delay inherent in GEOs. Also, some of 
them operate at frequencies between I and 3 GHz (at 1.6 GHz for example 1) making it Possible 
to communicate with cheap (hundreds of dollars) battery-powered handset devices with small 
antennas (similar to those used by current mobile phone handsets). 
2.6.3 Transparent repeaters and on-board processing 
The on-board communication subsystem of satellites consists of a number (12 for example) of 
transponders (receiver-to-transmitter). The job of a transponder is to receive the uplink signal sent 
by the terrestrial station, convert it, and transmit it on the downlink to the terrestrial recipient 
station. Depending on the converting operation performed on the signal, transponders are divided 
into transparent repeaters and on-board processing. 
Mransparent repeaters 
aansparent repeaters are also known as non-regenerative and bent-pipe repeaters [69]. As their 
name implies, a transponder of this type is basically a repeater which receives the uplink signal fron, 
the emitter terrestrial station (in the uplink frequency), translates it into the down-link frequency 
(to avoid possible uplink/downlink interference), amplifies it, and sends the amplified signal back 
to the recipient workstation (one or many). In terms of the OSI reference model, transparent 
repeaters focus on the physical and data-link layers (73]. The main advantage of transparent 
repeaters is that they offer a high degree of flexibility when it comes to integrating the satellite 
into a wide communication network; for example, they are transparent to different modulation 
methods, whether they be analogue or digital like FM (frequency modulation) and M-PSK (M- 
Phase Shift Key) respectively [69] (modulation methods are described in [75,62]); however, they 
cannot perform any processing on the received signal. 
'The FCC has allocated the so called L-band (1.6465-1.66 GHz for uplink and 1.545-1.5585 GHz for downlink 
communications [75]. 
2.6 Satellite networks 
On-board processing satellites 
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Thanks to technology innovations satellites with on-board processing transponders are becoming 
popular. Having more sophisticated electronics, these transponders are able to perform opera- 
tions on the received signal like demodulation, decoding, error correction on bit-streams, recoding, 
remodulation, and retransmission; also on-board processing may include buffering, compression, 
transponder and beam switching, routing, intersatellite traffic, and so on [76]; as can be seen, these 
transponders are suitable for digital communication techniques. 
The result of this is that new satellites will support a variety of packet-oriented services similar 
to those available at terrestrial computers connected to networks. In other words, satellites with 
on-board processing transponders will perform functions belonging to layers 1,2 and higher, of 
the OSI reference model [73]. However, these on-board processing facilities do not come for free. 
The on-board protocols place a rigid constraints on the terrestrial stations in terms of bit rates, 
packet formats, communication protocols, and so on; consequently, satellite access is restricted to 
those terrestrial stations that understand the satellite protocols; these constraints lead to difficulties 
in integrating satellites into large internetworks. Nevertheless, since digital communication is the 
communication technology of the future, new satellites are currently being designed with processing 
transponders on board [73]. 
Satellite-based personal communication services 
Satellite communication systems will certainly play a fundamental r6le as platform for the personal 
communication services (PCS) of the 21st century; LEOs, MEOs and GEOs are expected to be 
integrated into the global communication network; hence, work is being carried on to test their 
suitability, and towards their standarization [77,201. Besides the advantages mentioned in section 
2.6.1, satellites will not come to conquer the whole communication market; if they dared, they 
would face strong competition offered by terrestrial communication systems; it is unlikely that 
satellites will compete favourably against optical fibre networks and cellular phones in big cities 
since in populated regions-these systems offer better parameters in terms of costs and performance. 
Because of this, it should be understood that satellites will enter the communication business not to 
compete against but to complement the existing terrestrial communication systems in those regions 
where the latter are technically or economically unsuitable. At the risk of being proven mistaken 
by practice; we guess that terrestrial and satellite communication networks will be integrated into 
a universal one where populated regions will be dominated by terrestrial networks and satellite 
networks will cover the rest. Additionally satellites may take advantage of their broadcast inherent 
facility to provide broadcast-natured services in populated regions; emergency and advertising 
messages, and time setting are just two examples of services suitables for satellite transmission. 
Bearing this in mind investors in the PCS are currently designing satellite communication 
networks of LEOs in the hope of attracting the attention of mobile phones and mobile computer 
users. Perhaps the best known technology in this direction is the Iridium headed by Motorola 
[78,61,73,79]. The Iridium satellite system has been operational since November 1998 and 
consists of 66 LEOs with on-board processing functions and is integrated into a constellation to 
provide worldwide coverage of communication services to mobile users in possession of handset 
devices with communication and computation abilities. Among the services provided are global 
voice phone messages, fax and paging [80). 
Another promising satellite network offering similar services is the Teledesic constellation [73] 
which will consist of 840 LEOs orbiting the earth at 700 Km of altitude and with powerful on-board 
processing functions to support packet-switching asynchronous transfer mode communications. 
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Teledesic will support a wide variety of terrestrial terminals and bit rates ranging from 16 kbps to 
2.048 Mbps. 
Based on the previous facts, it makes sense to speculate that for PDA (and other personal 
communicators) to be fully integrated into the ubiquitous universal communication network, they 
have to be able to interact with both terrestrial and satellite communication networks. 
2.7 Integration of wired and wireless networks 
In most industrialized countries people are familiar with services provided by the communication 
networks we have studied. 
In the future the number of these communication networks and their services is expected to be 
even larger. If this is true, we are on the way to ending up with a mess of incompatible networks 
offering similar services unless some work is conducted toward their integration. The purpose 
of this integration is to ensure that a user, be he indoors or on the move, is provided with the 
communication services he demands, no matter what terminal he is using or what computers or 
networks his information travels through on its way to its final destination. 
For this to be possible it is necessary to integrate all the individual networks together into what 
we foresee as a global ubiquitous communication network (we will call it a global Communication 
network for short) i. e. a network made up of multiple interconnected local and wide area networks 
with the already well established wired telephone and Internet networks serving as backbones. 
Projects aimed at the integration of these networks are currently under way. The International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) is supporting the so-called Future Public Mobile Land Telecom- 
munication System (FPLMTS) project that will provide a world-wide Personal Communication 
Network (PCN). In Europe The RACE programme was lunched in 1987 and include projects to 
identify the enabling techniques for what would be the Universal Mobile Telecommunication Sys- 
tem (UMTS)[81]; it concluded its activities in 1995; more exactly its activities were continued by 
the R&D into Advanced Communications Technologies and Services (ACTS) programme [16,19]. 
In the USA the Defence Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) initiated the Global Mobile Infor- 
mation System (GloMo) programme in 1994. The GloMo aimes to conduct research on new oppor- 
tunities for advancing the state of the art in mobile, wireless, multimedia system technologies [20]. 
The essential goals of FPLMTS[65], UMTS[59], and GloMo[20] are the same. The system 
everybody has in mind is in fact the global worldwide universal ubiquitous communication 
network expected to be at least partially operational in 2000. In order that this goal be met the 
following must be achieved: 
Integration of existing wired and wireless networks. The PSTN, ISDN, B-ISDN, Internet and 
cellular telephone network to mention some of them. 
Deployment of services for delivering voice, video, and data communication between ubiq- 
uitous communicating counterparts, be they people or computers. Among these services 
are[57]: 
- dialogue (eg., speech, video telephony) 
- messaging (email, fax, paging voice) 
- information retrieval (eg., multimedia WWW documents, voice, music, video on demand, 
newspapers) 
- access to electronic libraries 
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9 When applicable the quality of wireless services should match that of wired networks. 
9 Support of unlimited mobility for both computers and users. 
e Development of new computing techniques supporting mobile computing. 
A picture of how the global ubiquitous communication network will probably look in the near 
future in presented in figure 2.1. In this figure a computer equipped with a wireless antenna and 
called a mobile support station plays the r6le of a bridge between the wireless PDA and the wired 
world. This will be explained below in section 2.7.1. 
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Figure 2.1: The global ubiquitous communication network. 
As illustrated in figure 2.2 there are many existing and potential services that make our predic- 
tions appealing to both ordinary individuals and business oriented people, an individual will use 
this global ubiquitous communication network to access several facilities: 
4, to exchange information (e-mailing) with his wife who is home and with his son who is on 
his way to the cinema. 
4, to retrieve information from his office, from a central database for example. 
" to access publicly available databases; for example, databases of job vacancies, tourist attrac- 
tions, etc. 
" to access remote available services like bank transactions, Internet shopping, train booking, 
weather forecasts, financial news, and so on. 
2.7.1 WAP protocol 
An essential component of the global ubiquitous communication network is the mobile computer 
represented in figures 2.1 and 2.2 by Bob's PDA. Although in the figure is called a PDA, it can be 
any electronic device equipped with a wireless antenna to send and receive messages and, in most 
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Figure 2.2: The global ubiquitous communication network and its services. 
cases, with computational power to process information. Good examples of such electronic device 
are: PDAs, mobile telephones, pagers, and other handlield communicators. 
The question about how a mobile computer like a PDA may be connected to the Internet has 
been the subject of several papers published in the early 90s [46,82,83,84]. A paradigm that 
became widely accepted was proposed by Ioannidis [46] in 1991. In this paradigm the mobile 
support stations depicted in figures 2.1 and 2.2 are ancillary computers whose work is to receive 
messages originated at PDAs, locate the recipients (one or many) of the message either in the 
wired or wireless network, and route the message to its final destination. Similarly, a MSS delivers 
messages addressed to PDAs currently located within its area of coverage. Needless to say such 
messages may be originated at the MSS itself or come from a remote computer. A critical issue of 
mobile networking is that of mobile host location and routing of messages to them. This issue has 
received attention in published papers [85,86]. 
The idea of using MSS to connect wireless devices to the Internet has found an application ii, 
the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) which was proposed by the WAP ForUM2 in April 1998 
[87,88]. 
As its name and the name of its promoters imply, the WAP protocol is an industrial standard 
for integrating mobile communicators and the Internet. It primarily aims at providing access to 
Web information and services to mobile telephone users. Consequently, it is designed to run on top 
of already deployed wireless transports (called bearers) like GSM, IS-54, PDC, CDPD, MOBITEX, 
DECT, etc. ). The WAP designers decided to include IP as a separate bearer to leave room for 
integrating wireless devices with any IP-based network, for example a wireless LAN. 
Rather than inventing new technology, the designer of the WAP protocol made intensive use 
of already proven technology, in particular, they based their design on the Web technologies and 
philosophies. To gain access to the large amount of information stored on Web pages from a device 
with power, energy, communication bandwidth, and screen-size limitations they proposed a proxy 
architecture shown in figure 2.3 [89,90]. 
The WAE User Agent that runs on the wireless client on top of its WAP protocol stack is a 
micro browser specially designed to run on a small screen and manipulated by a mobile telephone 
notepad. The Gateway is a proxy server that translates requests from the WAP protocol stack to 
2 Founded by Ericsson, Nokia, Motorola, and Unwired Planet in mid-1997. 
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the WWW protocol stack. To reduce the size of data over the network and the size of the data 
received from a Web server (Origin Server in WAP terminology) Encoders and Decoders are used 
in the gateway. The latest news about the WAP protocol and complete specification of each layer 
of its protocol stack can be found in the Web page Forum [88]. 
Based on the latest tendencies in wireless communications we are positive that the WAP protocol 
will be well established in the market in about three to five years time. 
If our prognosis about the WAP success and the massive proliferation of PDAs in'the future is 
correct, PDAs and similar devices will serve as the most popular outdoor interface to gain access 
to the global ubiquitous communication network. For this to be possible, MSS have to be widely 
geographically available and handy. 
We assume that in the near future the earth will be crowded by thousands of MSS; some of 
them will belong to private LANs and be located indoors; others will belong to communication 
providers (WAP bearers for example) and be located outdoors. 
A private MSS will be run by a private company and provide access solely to PDAs belonging 
to its company. 
A public MSS will be run by a public communication provider and serve any PDA user willing 
to pay for the communication service. 
* Optionally, a private MSS may serve visitors. 
If the above assumption proves to be true in the future, a PDA user located inside a building will 
gain access to network services through his MAN mobile support stations, if he decides to leave 
the building then his connection will switch to a public mobile support station, then if lie drives his 
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car to an area of sparse population where no public MSSs are available, his mobile terminal should 
be able to switch to a satellite network and remain connected to the world. 
2.8 Personal Digital Assistants 
A Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) is a pocket-size computer belonging to the generation of so- 
called mobile wireless computers. There is not yet an agreement on terms; other authors call them 
portable, nomadic, untethered, and roaming computers. We call them mobile wireless computers 
to emphasize that they are able to communicate while on the move. For this to be possible, these 
computer are equipped with a wireless communication interface based on radio frequency or infrared 
technology. 
2.8.1 Technical specifications 
There is a growing range of mobile wireless computers, however, among them PDAs are special ill 
that they are cheap and tiny. Their low prices make them accessible to a great number of people. 
Being tiny means being more portable (than a laptop for example). It is true that a laptop is more 
powerful, however, computational power is not always a need, while on the move most of the time a 
computer user needs only to send/receive email; to take notes and telephone numbers at meetings 
or conferences, and to edit, send or receive short documents. In situations like these a Powerful 
laptop would be a hassle while a PDA a plus. In other words, a PDA is a personal computer for 
storing personal temporary information and for interfacing to the communication world. 
Todays commercial PDAs looks as follows: 
e 400-500 USA dollars 
4, pocket-size dimension 
* about 5x2 inclies screen 
ip about 10-30 ounces 
o 5-7 Mliz CPU 
* no disks 
e about 1-2 Mbyte of RAM and slots for SRAM and flash memory cards. 
9 10-100 hours of battery life 
9 radio frequency or Infrared transmitter/receiver 
For concrete examples of commercial PDAs refer to [23,24], where the Magic Link, the Psion 
3A, the ZR-5800 and the Z-7000 PDAs are described. 
The first five entries in the above list should be self-explanatory. However, the last four probably 
need further discussion. We will come back to them later, after discussing the most important 
software component of any computer, the operating system. 
2.8 Personal Digital Assistants - 
2.8.2 Operating system 
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The functions performed by a mobile operating systems (OS) and a desktop one are rather similar. 
Yet the environments where they operate are significantly different. The need to economise in 
storage and electric power consumption makes the design and implementation of an operating 
system for a mobile device like a PDA a challenging experience. 
At the moment, there is not a well-established standard operating system for PDAs, but there 
are several ones struggling for dominance in the market, the most popular being: Palm Computing's 
PalmOS, Microsoft's Windows CE, Microware's OS-9 and Symbian's Epoch. 
So far the leader is PalmOS which has managed to gain about two-thirds of handlield devices 
currently on the market [91]. The strongest competitor of PalmOS is Windows CE which is a version 
of the standard desktop Windows. A promising alternative is Epoch which is being commercialised 
by Symbian which is a joint venture formed by Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia and Psion [92,93]. The 
potential commercial impact of Epoch is rather promising if one takes into account that Ericsson, 
Motorola and Nokia are the owners of 60% of the worldwide market for GSM-based smart phones 
and similar communicators. 
1 2.8.3 Storage 
M-aditionally, thanks to their high storage capacity and low media cost, magnetic disks have been 
used as the standard read-write permanent (non-volatile) memory in notebooks and bigger com- 
puters. However, the mechanical nature of magnetic disks makes them unsuitable for PDAs, even 
though there are disks of 1.3-in diameter holding 40 Mb available in the market. 
Due to the rotational inertia of the disk-platter, its spindle motor dissipates a great deal of 
power (2.2 W for a 2.3-in disk) at start-up (acceleration from rest to rated speed). 
Disk access time is low compared against the speeds achieved by non-mechanical components 
like CPUs. 
* Disks are bulky, and'sensitive to mechanical disturbances. 
Based on the aboveTactors, disks have not been used in PDAs. PDA designers have opted to 
use semiconductor memories not only for read-only and volatile read-write but for non-volatile 
read-write. 
Because non-volatile read-write memories are a relatively new technology it might be helpful 
to discuss it further. Currently, they come in two technologies, namely, NV-SRAM and flash: 
NV-SRAM A NV-SRAM is a Non- Volatile SRAM. A SRAM chip is provided with a battery to 
preserve the data stored in it after the main energy supply is switched off. In practice, Nv- 
RAM comes in PCMCIA memory cards with a dual battery design (a self-contained battery 
system) to ensure data integrity and to avoid drain on the computer's main battery. It is 
worth mentioning that a PCMCIA card is approximately the size of a bank card (85.6 long, 
54 mm wide, 3.3 mm heigh and about 40 g); likewise, NV-SRAM cards come in 641(b up to 
4Mb at approximately 35 and 300 USA dollars respectively. Data retention is in the range of 
one to two years and the backup battery is either disposable or rechargeable; a rechargeable 
one lasts about 10 years. 
Flash Flash memory is made up of solid-state chips that store data that can be read and written 
during normal operation and do not need backup batteries to keep the data valid when the 
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main computer power is switched offi In other words, Flash memory is a read-write, non- 
volatile, low-power memory. Unfortunately, because of the flash technology, flash chips do 
not support writing of individual addresses. This means that to update the contents of a cell a 
whole block of cells (around 64 Kb) must be updated (erased and re-written). Also, althougil 
the number of times a cell can be read is unlimited, the number of writings is not. When the 
limit is reached the chip becomes slower to write operations till eventually it refuses to update 
the required address. However, the existing data remains readable [94]. Flash memories are 
becoming popular in applications where power is at a premium, and access speed and high 
density is required. In practice they are used to emulate magnetic disks in portable computers. 
In the market it is presented as PCMCIA cards of 4 up to 16 Mb at approximately 50 and 
157 USA dollars, and with a write cycle of 1 million times. 
2.8.4 Power consumption and management 
There is no doubt that the number of portable computer-like devices will increase dramatically 
in the years to come. There will be a great number of them ranging from the familiar notebooks 
to tiny ones tile size of a wrist-watch, all of them powered by batteries. Besides the significalit 
advances in battery technology tile time scale for battery improvements is long compared to the 
doubling time of computer microelectronics [95]. Lifetime of batteries is expected to increase only 
20% between 1994 and 2004 [96,25]. It follows that the success of portable computers, PDAS 
included, heavily depends on tile economy, in terms of energy dissipation, of tile hardware of these 
computers and their applications [25,97,22]. According to [98], power dissipation is affected by 
both hardware and software design. 
Hardware reduction of power dissipation can be approached at microelectronic and system 
levels. In the former case the designer can either reduce tile voltage that feeds'the chip (from 5.0 
V to 3.3 V for example) or decrease the switching frequency of the circuit. In the latter case, tile 
computer works in five different modes of operation: full-on, standby, suspend, hibernation, and 
off [25]. 
Power. optimization by means of software is a topic still under exploration, yet some techniques 
have already been proposed; in [98] these techniques are grouped into three categories: minimizatioll 
of RAM access, optimal selection of and sequencing of machine instructions, and exploitation ()f low power features of some processors. The reader interested in a real life implementation of these 
techniques is advised to refer to [99]. 
2.8.5 Wireless communication interface 
PDAs use a wireless communication interface to exchange information with the external world. 
Through their wireless antenna PDAs send and receive messages to and from other computers ill 
possession of a wireless communication interface. Having a wireless communication interface is 
necessary but not enough for two computers to talk to each other directly. For this to happens it is 
essential that the communicating parties follow the same wireless communication protocol. TO find 
somebody who speaks the same communication protocol is a simple task when a standard protocol 
is widely accepted and deployed. Unfortunately this is not yet the case for wireless LANs. At 
the time of writing no consensus on wireless protocols exist in the market, different vendors offer 
different products based on different technologies. However, it seems that two technologies, namely 
radio frequency and infrared technologies, will dominate the market. The reason for this is that 
both of them have proved to be the most suitable for transmitting data at high speed in indoor 
wireless local networks (WLANs). 
2.8 Personal Pigital Assistants 
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Radio frequency (RF) systems present four important problems that must be solved, namely fre- 
quency allocation, interference, security, and bandwidth. 
FYequency allocation Frequencies are regulated by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC). There are not too many frequencies free for developing RF WLAMs. High-speed 
data communication is a newcomer to the radio spectrum market, so it has to use spectra 
that other, older applications are not using. 
Interference If several WLANs are working in the same building, interference must be avoided. 
RF signals can penetrate walls, so a data cell is not restricted to a single room, however, this 
can cause problems if the neighbouring offices have their own networks that perhaps belong 
to other companies. 
Security As RF signals propagate through walls, data security is an important subject to be 
considered, and so encryption is mandatory to avoid information linkage. 
Bandwidth Modern RF technology has managed to transmit data at a rate of 2 Mbps. Unfortu- 
nately RIF equipment is more expensive than IR equipment. 
Infrared Technology 
As a medium to short-range, indoor communication, infraxed (IR) offers several significant ad- 
vantages over radio frequency. The behaviour of IR signals is similar to that of visible light. IR 
signals are absorbed by dark objects, diffusely reflected by light-coloured objects and directionally 
reflected from shiny surfaces. IR signals penetrate through glass but not through walls or other 
opaque barriers. In other words, IR signals are restricted to a room. Thus, there is less problem 
with data eavesdropping and several IR WLANs can be placed in neighbouring offices without 
interference among them. A frequency assignment plan to avoid crosstalk is not needed, so IR 
wireless transmission is free from the FCC and other regulations, that means that a virtually un- 
limited spectral region is available. IR WLANs are recommended for those environments with a 
high degree of electromagnetic interference. 
IR medium is not without drawbacks. The main problem that arises with IR WLANs is how 
to get enough power to the receivers scattered around the room. The power consumption of IR 
transmitters can be rather high [100]. Another problem is that in many indoor environments there 
exists an intense infrared ambient background, arising from sunlight, incandescent lighting, and 
fluorescent lighting, and shadows from moving people, which induces noise in an infrared receiver. 
Modern IR technology allows build WLANs that transmit at 1 Mps composed of portable base 
terminals (Palmtops computers for example) served by wired based stations. Small rooms are 
served by a single base station, while rooms larger than about lOxIO m may require more than one 
base station. 
An example of a wireless network that transmits over an IR medium at 9.6kbps and 19.2kbps 
is described in [101]. A deep theoretical analysis of wireless LAN systems is given in [102]. The 
advantages of IR technology over RF are described in [103]. 
2.8.6 Comparison of infrared and radio communications 
A comparison of the most important properties and technical parameters of radio frequency tech- 
nology against infrared is presented in table 2.1 
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Property Radio Frequency Infrared 
recommedable env. outdoors indoors 
interferences with other WLANs high low 
security low high 
dominant noise interference from other users ambient light and shadows 
bandwidth limitation regulatory light-emitting diode Power 
bandwidth transmission 2 Mbps 1 Mbps 
price high low 
Table 2.1: Comparison of infrared and radio frequency communications 
2.8.7 WLANs standards 
WLANs have evolved from laboratory implementation to commercial products; at present a great 
variety of WLANs are offered in the market [56,104]. Yet none of them has gained the status of de facto international standard. Hence, each vendor designs and implements its proprietary staii- 
dard. Although nearly all the existing WLANs operate at the ISM (Industrial Scientific Medical) 
frequency bands (2400-2484 MHz anywhere in the world and 902-928 MHz, 2400-2484 MHz, and 
5725-5850 MHz in the USA) WLANs from different vendors are incompatible; for example, data. 
rates range from 34.8 kbps to 10 Mbps (and even more) transmitted either over infrared or radio 
frequency technology. Soncerning WLAN topology, there are those vendors that support or do not 
support ad-hoc infrastructured networks; also, some of them use the CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense 
Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance) as access control protocol but others do not. 
In order to help the evolution process towards an international standard, international standard 
organizations are currently working on the specification of what will be an international standard 
for WLANs. So far it seams that two standards will set order in the market: One of then is the 
IEEE 802.11 being developed by the (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) and the 
other is the HIPERLAN (High Performance Radio Local Area Network) being developed by tile 
ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute). 
Although there are some differences between the IEEE 802.11 and the HIPERLAN proposals 
there are many similarities. The two of them address the issues a user would expect from his 
wireless WLAN outlined in [105]. 
The protocols completely define the physical layer and partly -up to the MAC (Medium 
Access Control) sublayer- the data link one (see figure 2.4). 
In terms of IEEE 802 standards a WLAN should appear to the logical link control and above 
protocols just like another 802. x protocol (see figure 2.5). 
e As illustrated in figure 2.5 infrared and radio frequency transmission are supported. 
In addition to ordinary data services, time-bounded services for multimedia applications 
(voice, video, etc. ) are available. 
9 To economize energy in battery-powered mobile terminals sleep mode is considered. 
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4, Both, WLANs with an infrastructure and ad lioc connections are supported. 
However, tliere are substantial differences between tlic protocols IEEE 802.11 and HIPERLAN, 
ainong the most iinportant are: 
" The initial focus of the standard IEEE 802.11 is to operate in the ISM band (2400 to 2483.5 
MHz for example) and to provide data rates of I to 10 Mbps. 
" The HIPERLAN standard is focusing higher data rates. For this purpose, it is expected 
to operate out of the ISM band, namely at 5150 to 5300 MHz and at 17.1 to 17.3 C'Hz. 
Operating in the first band it expects to provide data rates of 1 to 25 Mbps. In the future it 
might provide data rates comparable to wired ATM networks (100 to 150 Mbps) operating 
in the second band. 
" Support of forwarding mechanisms for ad hoc networks has been envisioned in HIPERLAN 
but not in IEEE 802.11. 
41 Generally speaking HIPERLAN basically covers the functionalities of IEEE 802.11. 
Additional details about the IEEE 802.11 and HIPERLAN protocols are described in [105,106] 
and [107] respectively. A comparative description of thern is provided in (102,55,56,21]. 
2.9 Summary 
Currently effort put into network development focuses not only on the development of new network 
technology (WLANs, home LANs, body LANs, etc. ) but on the integration of existing networks 
(phone, Internet, mobile phone, cordless, satellite and mobile data) as well. 
To ensure that the existing network infrastructure is used efficiently, all networks should be 
reachable regardless of the user's terminal and his geographical location. For this to be possi- 
ble, existing and future networks must be integrated into a single, global, universal, ubiquitous 
communication network. 
At present, this global network is already partially operational. Thanks to the integration of 
the Internet and cellular networks, mobile phone users can send/receive e-mail messages from their 
mobile handsets. It is expected that in the next five years most networks will be integrated; thus, all 
services offered in the integrated network will be reachable by thousands of users of fixed terminals 
and by millions of users equipped with mobile, pocket-size and cheap devices with computational 
and wireless communication power. A good example of these devices is the PDA. Because of its 
low price, it is expected that in five years time everybody will be in possession of a PDA. PDAs 
and similar devices will be used to send voice and data and, of course, to retrieve Web pages. 
Chapter 3 
Anonymity in the World Wide Web 
3.1 Introduction 
The World Wide Web is one of the most useful applications available in the Internet. But it has 
been categorized as one of the most potentially dangerous in terms of confidentiality and anonymity 
protection. 
Million of users surf the thousands of Web pages available on hundreds of Web servers every 
day, however, the vast majority of them are unaware that their actions are being monitored and 
consequently, their right to confidentiality and anonymity are at risk. How and why Web servers 
collect personal data from their visitors is discussed in this chapter. Later a review of policies, 
working software and on-going projects concerning protection of surfers' personal data is presented. 
Special attention is paid to the limitations of the different proposals. 
3.2 Web servers and personal data collection 
As explained in [8,3] due to the nature of the HTTP protocols Web servers normally create log files 
that record (for technical and commercial purposes) considerable amounts of information that may 
be examined with the help of standard free software (getstats for example) to reveal the identity of 
users visiting their pages. A typical Web server keeps an access-log file which can store the following 
fields: 
Name or address of the client's host, i. e. the name of the computer where the user is logged 
in running his browser. 
If supplied by the browser, the login name and the actual name of the user. 
" The time (day, month, year, hour, minute, second, and time zone offset) that the transfer 
was initiated. 
" The HTTP command that was executed (get filename for example). 
" The status code that was returned. 
0 The number of bytes that were transferred. 
Additionally, Web servers normally keep an agent-log file which lists the programs that have 
been used to access the server; from this file the Web server can learn about the operating system 
and the Window interface of the client and the browser. 
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As if the access-log and agent-log files would not be enough to violate the right to anonymity 
and confidentiality of the users, Web servers keep a refer-log file which tells the last place (URL 
address) the browser previously visited and the URL that it is currently viewing. 
Since it is commonplace for users to browse the Web from single-users computers, the above 
information with or without the user's login and real names, is enough to associate a download with 
an individual. If the login and real names are not provided by the browser they can still be found 
out by using the finger command provided it has not been disallowed by the system administrator. 
Simply put, Web servers, most of the time without the surfer's consent, collect enough infor- 
ination to learn, who is your Internet Service Provider (ISP), where are you, what hardware and 
software you use, the name of your computer, what sort of information you are after, your login 
and real name and even your e-mail address. Once the information is in the hard disk of the owner 
of the Web server, it is no longer under the surfer's control; hence the former might use it at his 
own discretion. This issue gives room for several questions: 
What information the Web server owner gathers about the Web surfer with and without the 
surfer's consent? 
" What does lie or she does with this information? 
" Does lie have the right to store (how long for? ), read, and update the information? 
" Who does this information belong to? 
With whom does lie share the information? 
Is the Web server owner entitled to use it? 
* Can the surfers stop Web servers from gathering information they do not want to give away? 
Should governments appear on the scene to bring order or should we rely on self-regulation 
leveraged by technology vendors? 
So far none of the above questions has been given a definitive answer, the issue isýstill not well 
understood and under debate. This list of questions is by no means exhaustive, without any doubt 
other similar questions not envisaged yet are still to come. 
Based on the universally accepted fact that Web surfing puts the right to anonymity and 
confidentiality of the surfers at high risk, several academic, business, technology, Political and 
government organizations have launched efforts to develop software products, strategies, laws and 
recommendations to address this issue. The result of this is that recently several publications and 
implemented software products have appeared in papers and on the Web itself According to their 
approach and without taking into account their particularities these proposals may be divided into 
two groups 
9 enforcement of regulations 
o technical solutions 
As can be guessed, the first approach to protecting the right to anonymity and confidentiality 
of Web surfers is to force things to happen either by ethical rules or legal actions. In its turn) the 
second approach relies on technology rather than human interaction. 
3.3 Enforcement of regulations 
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The most recent work in this direction is currently being carried on by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) and the TRUSTe organization. 
It is perhaps worth diverting from the main discussion to mention that the W3C consortium is 
an international organization founded in October 1994 with the intention to lead the Web to its full 
potential by developing common protocols that promote its evolution and ensure its interoperability 
[43,108]; it is hosted by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Institut National de 
Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (INRIA), and the Keio University. Its members 
are only companies (currently over 230) the size of AT&T, British Telecom, Boeing, Citibank, 
Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Matsushita, Siemens-Nixdorf, Sun Microsystems, Xerox, Microsoft and 
Netscape. On the other hand TRUSTe promotes itself as an independent, non-profit privacy 
initiative created with the intention of accelerating the growth of the Internet Industry by building 
trust and confidence among Internet users[109]. Currently it has 121 members, among them IBM, 
Tandem, Lycos, Yahoo, American Online, The Anonymizer and TRUSTO itself. 
Currently the W3C consortium is working on the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project 
(P3P) while TRUSTe is involved on what is known as the privacy programme. The goal of both 
projects is to develop strategies and software products to force Web servers to observe confidentiality 
practices; in contrast with technical solution approaches (see 3.4) the P3P project and TRUSTe 
rely on regulations and their approaches are similar to the one followed by traditional legal systems: 
there are participants, rules to be observed, a police body, and punishments. By signing the rules, 
the participants promise not to do something unless they want to be punished; however, if somebody 
breachs his promise, he can still get away with it so long as neither the victim nor the police detects 
him. A system like this is corrective rather than preventive, i. e. it reacts only when the damage is 
already done, certainly, in some cases, the damage can be repaired in others it is too late. 
The P3P project and TRUSTe fall into this category of systems and they might complement 
each other. Tile main idea of both of them is for a Web server to publish the rules of the game 
about their privacy policies and for the Web surfer to read them before downloading any page from 
the Web server and proceed only if the privacy policies offered suit him. 
A privacy pledge is expected to contain sentences like the following: 
4, This site will NEVER sell or exchange your name, e-mail and post address to anyone 
" This site does not use cookies to monitor surfers' activities 
" We do not monitor 1P address activity for Web site 
" This Web server will not share information collected from our site with any other individuals, 
companies or organizations 
" Information collected at this site will be shared only with member companies 
" If you would like to delete the data we have collected about you please contact our Web master, 
we will delete it in less than 48 hours 
3.3.1 The P3P project 
The first public working draft of the P31? protocols was released in May 1998 and the last one in 
February 2000 [110]. According to its specifications a Web browser is equipped with a facility to 
set its user preferences over privacy practices; while Web servers come with their own to express 
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their privacy practices [1,2,111]. Both facilities are able to talk and negotiate so that a Web 
server provides access to its files only after a mutual agreement is reached between itself and the 
surfer. The Web browser performs negotiation automatically and on the fly; in this manner, if a 
negotiation with a Web server fails, it moves away and tries another one. 
3.3.2 TRUSTe privacy programme 
As with the P31? project, the TRUSTe privacy programme encourages Web servers to make their 
privacy policies available to their surfers; however, instead of relying on Web browsers to find out 
about the privacy policies of Web servers and negotiating about them, the TRUSTe organization 
encourage its members to make their privacy policies available at the click of the mouse in Web pages 
so that the surfer can read them before downloading any page [42,111]. Members of TRUSTe are 
easily identified by the TRUSTe logo. The TRUSTe logo is a green rectangle (3xI cm approximately) 
with the word TRUSTe inside it. By clicking on the logo, the surfer is taken to a privacy pledge 
text file where she can read all about the risks of downloading further information from the Web 
server. 
3.3.3 Limitations of P3P and TRUSTe 
Without any doubts P3P and TRUSTe help to fill tile gap in Internet confidentiality and privacy; 
for applications where legal action may be taken and the damage repaired after a breach of promise 
they work fine; a Web surfer, for example, might sue a Web server after discovering that tile Web 
server owner has given away the surfer's home address to an ice-cream company. In this case, 
apart from being annoyed by junk mail advertisement and wasting time in her legal claim nothing 
serious happens to the surfer. However, there are many applications where the sole intention of 
downloading information from a server reveals a great deal of information about tile surfer; in other 
cases, taking legal actions does not make sense. For example, for a Web surfer in a country with 
a military regime it might be compromising to read tile privacy pledge of a Web server containing 
antigovernment information. Similarly, it is unthinkable that a married man will take legal action 
against a Web dating service after discovering that tile Web server has abused his personal data. 
In summary, the weak side of P31? and TRUSTe is that tile surfer has to give away his personal 
data before finding out if lie has hit tile right Web site. Next if lie accepts the privacy Policies 
of the Web site, lie will give away even more information about himselL Not having the given 
information under his control tile surfer can do nothing but to trust the Web server owner and in 
cases where legal actions are suitable, hope that lie or the police body will detect the crime and 
punish the offender. Another limitation of this approach is that in case of a legal prosecution7 the 
court inenibers or its equivalent get to know everything about tile surfer and his Web preferences, 
so for the surfer they are just another body to be trusted no wonder tile TRUSTe home page bears 
the TRUSTe logo as well. A serious limitation of the TRUSTe privacy programme is that, at tile 
present stage of development, it expects the surfer to go beyond the green TRUSTe logo to read tile 
acknowledgement and acceptance of term of services file which might contain two or three pages of 
text full of not easy to understand (for a lay user) law terminology; except for few exceptions, it is 
unlikely that surfers will go through this painful, and timewasting task; it is clear that something 
must be done to relieve the surfer from this load, otherwise, tile TRUSTe programme will remain 
of little practical use; perhaps the P31? protocols might be a good complement. 
Rom this discussion it follows that neither P3P nor TRUSTe give a satisfactory answer to tile 
question; it seems that for some applications a different approach is needed. 
3.4 Technical solutions 
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Instead of relying on enforcement of regulations, technical solutions address the question about 
Web surfing security by relying only on technical strategies. In this approach, instead of giving 
away data about Web surfers, and believing in promises and police bodies, data is not given away 
to the Web server, it is hidden behind a wall, consequently the confidentiality and privacy of the 
surfer depend on the strength of the wall. If the Web server owner cannot see who is behind the 
wall it cannot know who is visiting his site, neither can he know to whom the requested pages 
are going. There are several systems available in the Internet that provide this kind of services 
and are known as anonymizers. All of them are based on a mediating computer (one of several) 
interposed between the sender and the receiver. The computers in the middle are called mixes and 
are there to process the message before it is delivered to another mix in the chain or to the receiver. 
Obviously, the aim of the process is to hide the sender's identity, her IP-address and e-mail address 
for example. 
3.4.1 The Anonymizer 
As advertised in its Web page [39] this system offers a set of services aimed at protecting the 
anonymity of the user while surfing and publishing Web pages. 
Anonymizer Surfing 
The anonymizer surfing is aimed at preventing Web servers from learning sensitive data about 
their visitors. The core of the service is a computer located somewhere in the Internet and called 
the anonymizer which acts as an agent between the Web surfer and the Web server and hides the 
identity of the former. In fact the anonymizer is a proxy server [1121 whose job is to receive requests 
from the Web surfer's browser, remove sensitive data (what a Web server would like to store in 
its log files) from them, forward them to the Web server, receive the reply and return them to the 
Web surfer. To the Web server, requests from a Web surfer coming from his office computer look 
as though they are coming from the anonymizer. 
To use anonymizer surfing the user can go either for free or paid accounts. In the first case 
the only thing the surfers have to do is to go with their browsers to the service address [113] and 
type the address of the Web server he wants to visit. After about 30 to 60 seconds of delay the 
anonymized page appears on screen. 
In terms of functionality the paid service is exactly the same as the free one, except that it 
works without delays and can be instructed not to display advertisements on the anonymized page. 
Before using it, the surfer must sign up for her account, where apart from $ 15.00 per three months 
she must give away her e-mail address. In return she receives a user identifier, and a password. 
Any time she wants to surf anonymously she connects to the service address [114] where she is 
asked for her user identifier and her password. 
Anonymizer servers and network licences 
This service works under the same principle as the anonymizer surfing but is intended to protect the 
anonymity of people belonging to a single organization (Internet Service Provider, Universities, and 
businesses organizations for example); thus, the anonymizer is a computer, sold by Anonymizer Inc. 
and under the control of the owner of the organization. Thanks to the anonymizer, the anonymity 
of Web surfers is protected against the Web servers. 
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This allows the sending of anonymous e-mail messages. Again, there is a computer, the e-mail 
anonymizer, between the sender and the receiver, which acts as an agent and hides the sender's 
name and address by changing the original ones for its own. To the receiver, an anonymous e-mail 
looks as though it is coming from the e-mail anonymizer. 
To send anonymous e-mail, connect to the Anonymizer Email page [115], type the destinatioll 
address, and the body of the message and send it. The anonymizer email hides your address frorn 
the receiver. Unfortunately, there is no way to receive a reply. 
Anonymous Web publishing 
As its name implies, anonymous Web publishing offers Web publishers anonymous Web publishilla 
accounts (also called Cyberpass accounts). Any individual interested in publishing anything (polit- 
ical and religion views, personal profiles, and others) on the Web without disclosing her identity 
may contact Infonex Internet, Inc. (the owner of this service) who for a charge will provide her with 
an anonymous Web publishing space. For this to be possible, first she submits a Web publisher 
name and a password to the Infonex's Web server (the one which stores the anonymous pages), 
and next she sends cash or a money order to Infonex in connection with her Cyberpass account; 
upon receiving the payment, Infonex activates the account. By means of the ftp command tile 
anonymous Web publisher can now upload her Web pages to the Infonex's Web server from her 
office computer. The readers of the anonymously published Web pages have no clue about the 
identity of the publishers. 
Limitations 
The main r6le in the Anonymizer Surfer, Anonymizer servers, network licences, and Anonymizer 
Email services offered by the anonymizer system is played by a third party (the anonymizer Web 
proxy in the first and second service and the anonymizer remailer in the last) which sits between 
the surfer and the Web server and works as a middlecomputer between the two interacting parties 
hiding the identity of the former. The problem with this approach is that the middlecomputer knows 
everything about the surfer; since in practice this computer is a standard one (a Unix Workstation 
for example), the information it receives, manipulate and stores is available to its manager. if 
for some reason (a liacker breaks the root password or the manager is bribed, for example) the 
iniddlecoinputer fails to bide the secret identity of the surfer, the whole system will collapse. In 
other words, the third computer is the most important one and the most vulnerable as well. only 
users who trust the third party (both computer and manager) will use this system. 
In the case of the Anonymous Web publishing service the dependence on the third party is even 
worse as the user now uses the middlecomputer to publish her own information; consequently she 
is completely exposed to public and * 
government censorship. In case of troubles her one and only 
hope is the iniddlecomputer and its manager. As stated by this service's owners [1161, "the content 
of anonymously published pages must be legal in California... " otherwise, they could receive a 
court order requesting the identity of the anonymous Web publisher, information from access log 
riles (her office computer IP address and timestamps of her ftp connections to the middlecomputer) 
will be revealed. In the same way a million dollars -and even a threat- might be offered to tile 
manager by anybody from the public. 
Another limitation of the whole system is that its services were conceived for a free Web, i. e. 
to surf and publish Web pages free of charge and to anonymously e-mail people or institutions 
from which no reply is expected, lience no charge is assumed. Although there are many sites in 
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the Internet that fall into this category, there are many others-those that provide serious and 
professional services- that do not. Moreover, it is expected that in the future when the Internet 
become more commercialized, the number of paid sites will increase. 
3.4.2 The Lucent Personalized Web Assistant 
Homed at [40) and owned by Lucent Technologies, the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant offers 
Web surfers with a service to prevent their sensitive data being given away by Web browsers and 
stored in the log files of Web servers. It was designed to serve those Web surfers who for any reason 
need to surf Web servers which require online registration before one can access their Web pages. 
In fact the core of the service is a computer called the LPWA server which acts as an anonymous 
proxy server located between the surfer's computer and the Web server she wants to visit. The job 
of the LPWA server is to hide the identity of the surfer by replacing the real identity of the surfer 
in the HTTP request with an alias identity computed as a function of a universal password (also 
called the secret), the surfer's e-mail address, and the Internet address of the Web server the surfer 
intends to visit. 
The LPWA server accepts three different configurations. In the so-called central proxy con- 
figuration the LPWA server is a computer at Lucent Technologies headquarters which works as a 
central LPWA server for anybody willing to use it. At the other extreme, the LPWA server can 
be run on a local computer, i. e. on the same one as the browser runs -local proxy configuration. 
Lastly, in a the firewall proxy configuration the LPWA server runs inside a corporate Intranet on a 
firewall computer. 
Thanks to the universal password which in fact is a key used as a parameter for a cryptographic 
function and the surfer's e-mail address, the LPWA computes a different, but consistent, alias 
identity for each visited Web server. Hence, all responses sent by a Web server to the alias identity 
are forwarded by the LPWA to the surfer. The LPWA keeps the surfer's data for the duration 
of a browsing session, consequently, the surfer provides her data only once (when the browser is 
started) regardless of the number of Web servers she visits during her browsing session. In order 
to be recognized as the same person by a Web server visited during different browsing sessions, the 
surfer must start all her browsing sessions with the same universal password. Briefly, the operation 
of this anonymizer can be described as follows. 
1. Configure your browser to use the LPWA as a proxy. 
2. Open a browsing session which takes you to LPWA login form. 
3. Fill up the login form by providing your universal password and e-mail address. 
4. Visit as many Web servers as you want, the LPWA server will hide your real identity by 
providing the Web servers you visit with alias identities. 
5. Log off from your LPWA after visiting your last Web server. If you start another browsing 
session in the future, make sure you fill up the LPWA login session with the same universal 
password and e-mail address. 
Limitations 
Since the LPWA is a system grounded on a proxy approach it suffers from the same limitations as 
the Anonymizer (see 3.4.1); its security heavily depends on the security of the proxy server. 
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Currently the central proxy configuration is the only one available. Regardless of their linji- 
tations, this configuration together with the firewall proxy configuration are the only ones which 
make sense in terms of anonymous surfing. The local proxy configuration is of dubious practical use 
as in this case there is a direct TCP connection between the surfer's office computer and the Web 
server, i. e. exactly what we are trying to avoid to stop the Web server identifying the identity of 
the surfer. 
Once again, the service is oriented to helping the surfer visit free Web pages. It does not work 
when the Web server asks for bank card numbers. 
3.4.3 Crowds 
Crowds is a system for protecting the privacy of Web surfers. It is currently being developed by 
AT&T and is available (beta release) in the Internet [41]. The main idea of the system is to blend 
the Web surfer into a crowd (a group of surfers) so that his requests are hidden among the requests 
of other members of tile crowd. Once the surfer is integrated into the crowd any request made by 
him is randomly submitted to tile Web server or to another member of tile crowd; in the latter case 
tile procedure is repeated until eventually the requests is submitted to tile Web server; tile result 
of this is that the Web server cannot tell if the party it received the request from is the initiator of 
the request or just the last member in tile chain. Even more, no member in the chain, except for 
the true initiator, can identify the initiator of tile request, since the initiator is indistinguishable 
from a member that simply forwards a request from another (117]. 
In the crowd a surfer is represented by a process on her local computer called a iondo. A jondo 
is a process started by the surfer or by the administrator of the surfer's computer which executes 
the crowd protocol and works (previous browser configuration) as a Web proxy for the local surfer. 
When the jondo is started it tries to join a crowd membership list by contacting a process called 
the blender. The blender is run by the crowd administrator somewhere in a computer connected to 
tile Internet. To be accepted as a member of the blender's crowd, a jondo must have an account 
with the blender, i. e. name and password stored by the blender and verified each time tile jondo 
tries to join the crowd. If the jondo is accepted tile blender adds the jondo's IP address, port 
number and account name to the membership list of jondos and reports tile updated list to all tile 
members of the crowd (the new member included). Needless to say, the membership list is updated 
and reported to tile jondos each time a jondo joins or leaves tile crowd. 
With the membership list of jondos in its hand a jondo is ready to accept requests from the 
browser it is working for as a Web proxy, and blend the surfer into the crowd by randomly forwarding 
her requests as explained above. Naturally, Web server replies traverse the same random path of 
jondos as tile requests, but in reverse. 
In few lines, the crowd anonymizer can be summarized as follows. 
1. Download and install the free beta version of crowd available at [41]. By default, your jondo 
will join a crowd whose blender is run by AT&T. You can run your own blender as well and 
instruct your jondo to join it. 
2. Run your jondo and open all account with the blender you want to use. 
3. Configure your browser so that it uses your running jondo as a Web proxy. 
4. Start your browser and wait until a message specifying that you are a member of tile crowd 
arrives. 
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5. From now on and till the end of your browsing session you can surfer the Web anonymously. 
Repeat the previous points any time you restart your browser. 
Limitations 
Crowds overcomes the drawbacks of the proxy oriented systems, however, it suffers from serious 
limitations as well. Instead of depending on a third party (the middle computer) it depends on the 
chain of jondos sitting between the surfer and the Web server. Depending on a single party is bad 
but depending on several of them might be even worse since this means that everybody must work 
properly. 
The updating of the membership list depends on the communication of the blender with the 
jondos, the longer the membership list the better in terms of anonymity but the more difficult to 
maintain it up-to-date. 
Another problem with the jondo list is that in may include jondos running on different hardware 
and with different communication links to each other (some of them might have high-speed con- 
nections and other modems), to the blender and to the Web server, this implies that the response 
time of a request no longer depends only on the resources of the initiator only but on the resources 
of the whole crowd. 
The main problem is that once a request is sent to the Web server through a chain of jondos, the 
reply must follow the same path (in reverse). Because the chain is composed of several computers, 
one or more of them might fail while the request or the reply is on its way, or any of their owners 
might decide to leave the membership list or just to break the chain (by intentionally killing his 
jondo process). 
Also it may sound unrealistic but possible that the Web server might offer a thousand dollars to 
each member of the crowd who proves (showing a copy of the answer or the reply) to be a member 
of a chain of jondos; this would lead to identifying the jondo that received the request from the 
initiator of the request and automatically to the initiator itself. 
Another problem with the crowd chains is that once a jondo becomes a member of a chain the 
owner of the jondo becomes involved in a sort of gossip; this means thai lie might be asked to 
forward a degrading, compromising, or dangerous request; if lie forwards it, lie becomes a potential 
initiator of the request. This might encourage a member of the chain to drop the request instead 
of forwarding it; and discourage him from joining the Crowd in the future. 
Another serious limitation of crowds is that its chain of jondos makes it difficult to be used to 
surf paid Web servers. The breaking of the chain might imply losing the request, the payment for 
the service or the purchase. In any way the initiator has no way to complain to the Web server 
unless he is supported by the whole chain of jondos. 
3.5 Summary 
Current Web protocols do not protect Web surfers' personal data from the Web servers. It is 
common practice for Web servers to keep records about their visitors. Thanks to the information 
given away by browsers a Web server can extract the personal data of the surfer, the software 
and hardware of his computer and the Web pages lie is downloading. This information can have 
commercial, political, or personal value and can be used locally or sold to third parties without the 
surfer being aware of it. 
To alleviate this situation, two approaches have been proposed: enforcement of regulations and 
technical solutions. 
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The P3P project and the TRUSTe program are well-known examples of the first approach. The 
goal of both projects is to develop strategies and software products to force Web servers to observe 
confidentiality regulations. 
Technical solutions are based on the use of anonymizers. To prevent Web servers from extracting 
sensitive data about their visitors and to help Internet users sending e-mail messages anonymously, 
anonymizers have been deployed in the Internet. There are several anonymizers available in the 
Internet (The anonymizer, The lucent personalized Web Assistant, Crowds and other) that offer 
anonyinizing services for free or for a fee. However, all of them are based on the use of mixes, 
i. e. computers (one or several) interposed between the sender and the receiver. Consequently, the 
anonymity provided by them is fragile and depends on the ability and willingness of the 'nixes 
to keep the secret. Likewise, the degree of anonymity is limited since one of the mixes, at least, 
will always know the sender's identity. For applications requiring true anonymity, mixes-based 
anonyinizers are unsuitable. Hence, a different approach must be taken. 
Chapter 4 
Cryptography and message encryption 
4.1 Introduction 
If Alice and Bob are two people separated by some distance but linked together by a computer 
communication network, they can send information to each other by means of messages that travel 
through the network. 
The usual assumption made in computer networks is that anybody might read and copy (either 
accidentally or deliberately) any message that passes between any pair of nodes. In other words, 
the risk of being overheard or caught when talking over a network is high, and inherent in the 
system. 
Because of this the mere fact that a message is sent by Alice and received by Bob reveals 
several things about the communicating parties to those who accidentally or maliciously overheard 
the transmitted message. As discussed later, an intruder might find out about whom Alice is 
communicating with, the contents of the message, and even change the message, or impersonate 
Alice or Bob. Most of the time, this is not exactly what the communicating parties want, hence 
protection against these threats has to be implemented and made available so that a user can use 
it in accordance with the nature of his messages. In other words, a mechanism is needed to provide 
the user with the following facilities: 
confidentiality the data cannot be read by unintended recipients. 
authenticity the data is attributed to the correct originator, who cannot disown it. 
anonymity the recipient has no way to identify the sender of the message. 
pseudonymity the sender has a way to sign two or more messages with the same pen name. 
integrity after being signed, nobody, the receiver included, can alter the contents of the document. 
So far the most successful approaches to addressing these issues come from Cryptography. 
Cryptography is a science with a wide range of topics for study and research with a variety of 
., applications in computer science[118,119]. A deep discussion of cryptography is beyond the scope 
of this work, however, a brief introduction to its basic principles is given in this chapter with the 
intention that it will lielp to understand the cryptographic techniques used in chapter 5. 
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4.1.1 Message encryption 
Message encryption is the cornerstone of Cryptography and it helps to address the issues mentioned 
above about the risk of giving away information a communicating party does not want to when 
sending or receiving messages over insecure channels. 
Encryption involves the scrambling of a message by applying a key-driven algorithm to the 
message, so that it can only be understood after decrypting it. The message decryption involves 
a dcscranibling process and can be performed by someone who knows both the key and the al- 
gorithin. Before going further it is worth noting that some authors prefer the terms encypher- 
7nent/Acypherment instead of encryptionldecryption and that the terms encodingldecoding are 
frequently misused as synonymous with encryption/decryption. The difference between them is 
that encoding/decoding may or may not involve a scrambling process while encryption/decryption 
always does. 
Mathematically an encrypted message is the result of applying to the original message (usually 
a plaintext message) an encrypting function parametrized by a key. 
E(ki, M) 
where C is the encrypted message; E is the encrypting function; ki is the encrypting key, and 
Al is the plaintext message. 
Likewise, the original message can be recovered by applying to the encrypted message a de- 
crypting function parameterized by a decrypting key. 
M= D(k27 C) (4-2) 
where Al is the original message (usually a plain text message); D is the decrypting function; and 
k2 is the decrypting key. 
It then follows that 
D(k2) E(ki, M)) =M (4.3) 
Rom equation 4.3 it follows that a pair of keys is involved in the encryption/decryption process. 
If ki ---ý k2 or if one 
key is easily derived from the other, tile cryptosystem is called symmetric and 
ki and k2 are called symmetric keys, otherwise it is called asymmetric and k, and k2 are called 
asymmetric keys [119]. 
Since it syninietric key must be kept secret from everybody else except tile sender and tile 
receiver of the message, symmetric cryptosystems are also known as secret-key cryptosystems. 
Conversely, asymmetric cryptosystems are called public-key cryptosystems because in these cases 
one of the keys is kept secret by his owner while the other one is known by the public. 
Both secret-key and public-key cryptosystenis are grounded on the use of tile so-called trapdoor 
one-way functions. 
A one-way function is one that maps a domain into a range such that every function value lias 
one and only one inverse. Also, it should be feasible to compute f (x) for any x ill the domain of f 
while, for almost all y in the range of f it is computationally infeasible to compute f -1 (y) even if 
f is known. A one-way function is called a trapdoor one way function if it is feasible to coinputL, 
f -I (y) given certain additional information. This additional information is the decryption key. 
Given the decryption key f -I (y) call be computed in polynomial time. 
It follows that equation 4.1 is it trapdoor one-way function that can be computed in a Polynomial 
time and equation 4.2 -its inverse- can be computed in polynomial time as well when K2, tile 
decryption key, is known. 
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4.1.2 Secret-key cryptosystems 
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In secret-key cryptosystems the encryption and decryption processes involve the same key, i. e. 
they are symmetric. A single key, called the secret key, is shared and kept secret by the two parts 
involved in the encryption/decryption process (see figure 4.1). 





M=[X,,..., xm] algorithm C= 
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Figure 4.1: Secret-key encryption and decryption. 
The encryption and decryption algorithms are normally based on principles of modular arith- 
metic, in particular on properties of the operation called modulo 2 addition or Exclusive OR defined 
in the binary digits a and b as follows: 
(a + b) mod 2=a ED b0 
if a=b 
1 if a: A b 
. It can be proved that if a ED b=c, then a=c E) b. In other words, this means that XORing b 
twice to a restores the original value of a. In terms of Cryptography one can think of a as a plain 
text message, c as an encrypted message and, b as a secret-key. 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is the most widely used secret-key encryption system 
and is based on these properties of XOR arithmetic. It encrypts data in 64-bit blocks into 64-bit 
blocks of cyphertext under the control of a 56-bit secret-key, which is used to generate a series 
of other keys to be used during the encryption process. The algorithm is symmetric; the same 
algorithm and secret-key are used for encryption and decryption; however, during decryption the 
series of keys generated from the secret one are used in reverse order. Thanks to this symmetry, 
nothing distinguishes Alice from Bob, either of them can be a sender and a receiver, the same 
secret-key is used to encrypt messages in both directions. 
The DES algorithm is widely discussed in literature [120,118]. For those interested in exploring 
the DES weakness and cracking it, the book [121] recently written by the Electronic Rontier 
Foundation is a good reference. 
One of the most serious difficulties with secret-key cryptosystems -DES for instance-- is the 
distribution and sharing of the secret key. Before any secret-key encrypted communication can take 
place the secret key must be distributed to the sender and the receiver of the encrypted message, 
i. e. two individuals can exchange secret-key encrypted messages only if they have communicated 
, 
before. In practice the sender is normally the secret-key generator; hence a private courier or 
registered mail is used to carry the secret-key from the sender to the receiver. On the other hand, 
experience shows that keeping a secret is extremely difficult when more than one individual is 
involved, in secret-key cryptosystems at least two parties (one sender and one receiver) share the 
secret-key; however, there are situations where more people are entitled to know the secret key; 
then the chances of losing secrecy increase dramatically. 
_ 
Besides this notorious drawback secret-key cryptosystems provide for very fast (they are sig- 
nificantly faster than public-key algorithms) and efficient encryption. 
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4.1.3 Public-key cryptosystems 
As was stated in section 4.1.2 two of the major difficulties of secret-key cryptosystems are the 
distribution and sharing of the secret-key. To attack this problem Diffie and Hellman introduced 
what they called public-key cryptosystems in 1976 [122). In public-key cryptosystems encryp- 
tion/decryption of messages is performed using a pair of asymmetric keys, more exactly a key 
which is divided into two subkeys (counterparts). The first part of the key, called the private key, 
is known only to the receiver. While the second, called the public key, is know to the sender and to 
anybody else interested in sending messages to the receiver. The pair two keys are mutually depeii- 
dent, one is useless without the other. The public key is made available to the world by placing it ill 
a public directory, in a sort of public-key directory for example, similar to those used by telephone 
companies to make telephone numbers available to the public. Thanks to this revolutionary ap- 
proach Alice and Bob can swap encrypted messages over an insecure computer communication line 
from the very beginning of their interaction. The need to send or receive a confidential message, 
from somebody one has not had prior acquaintance with, is a common practice in modern societies, 
particularly in business. 
Public-key cryptosystems are asymmetric. The public key is used to encrypt messages to be sent 
to the receiver who decrypts the messages using his private key. Data encrypted with the public 
key can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. The encryption and decryptioll 
algorithms might be different, but it is possible that they are the same. 
A simplified diagram of public-key cryptosystem is shown in figure 4.2. 
Bob's public key Bob's private key Bob /s, ý PU Tv 
Plaintcxt: Encryption Ciphcrtcxt: Decryption Plaintext: 
if 
ec i o]n p 
M=Ixl...., xml algorithm C=EPýM)=[yl,..., yn, algorithm M= CS= 
!a 
gorithm DKPýC) =[xl,..., xml 
Figure 4.2: Public-key encryption and decryption. 
So far the best studied and widely accepted public-key algoritlim has been the one proposed 
by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleinan in 1978 [123). It is known simply as the RSA (Rivest-Slianiir- 
Adleinan) algorithin. 
4.1.4 The RSA algoritlim 
The RSA algorithin was conceived by its authors to solve the drawbacks of secret-key cryptosystenIs 
in the distribution and sharing of secret keys and for implementing digital signatures [123]. 
The security of public-key cryptosystems published so far relies on the difficulty of solving well_ 
known niatheniatic problems. The RSA is based on the fact that the factorization of composite 
numbers with large prime factors involves large computations. So far nobody has succeeded iii 
rinding in efficient algorithin to factor a 150-digit number in a reasonable amount of time; t1jus, 
factorization is considered a well-known intractable problem. As will be discussed later, a RSA key 
is derived from a large composite number, lience, in computational terms, breaking an RSA key is 
equivalent to finding the factors of a large composite number. 
The RSA encryption and decryption algorithms are based on exponentiation in modular arith- 
nietic. Given it plain text message Al the encrypting processes mentioned in equation 4.1 and 4.2 
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and shown in figure 4.2 are mathematically represented by equations 4.4 and 4.5 respectively, where 
C represents the result of encrypting M. 
M'mod n (4.4) 
M= Cd mod n= (M' mod n)d mod n= Med mod n (4.5) 
As can be appreciated from equations 4.4 and 4.5 both encrypter and decrypter must know the 
value of n. In addition, the encrypter must know the value of e and the decrypter the value of d. 
Thus, in terms of public-key cryptosystems, the pair je, n} can be thought of as the public key 
and the pair In, d} as the private key. e, d, and n are positive integers and are chosen as follows. 
Because in practical applications the encrypter and decrypter are geographically separated and 
linked by a computer communication line it is common to talk of a sender and a receiver in published 
works or to make it less technical, of Alice and Bob. 
The fact that the original plain text M can be recovered at the decrypter's side is based on e 
and d being multiplicative inverses and can be mathematically proved [123,124]. 
In practice the RSA cryptosystem works as follows: 
1. The sender generates two large prime numbers p and q and keep both of them private. 
2. The sender generates a composite large number n= pq. 
3. The sender chooses a large random integer d which is relative prime to (p - 1)(q - 1) ; i. e. 
ged (d, (p - 1) (q - 1)) = 1; gcd means greatest common divisor; d is kept private. 
4. The sender computes an integer e which is the multiplicative inverse of d. Thus, e and d 
satisfies the equation ed mod (p - 1)(q - 1) = 1. 
5. The pair In, e} is called the public key and is published in a well-known directory of public 
keys. I n, e} is used to encrypt messages (see equation 4.4). 
6. The pair In, d} is called the private key. In, d} is used to decrypt messages (see equation 
4.5). 
, Since e cannot be computed without knowing tile value of (p - 1)(q - 1) or what is equivalent, 
tile value of p and q, tile security of an RSA cryptosystem depends oil tile difficulty of factoring n 
into its two factors p and q. For real life applications it is suggested using 100-bit numbers for p 
and q so that n results in a 200-bit number. With numbers like these, it would take several million 
years at a rate of one step per microsecond to factor n using tile fastest known algorithms. 
Both encryption and decryption in RSA cryptosystems involve raising an integer to an integer 
power modulo n. These exponential operation call be performed using well-known fast expoilen- 
tiation algorithms [124]. Similarly, there are well-known algorithms to find large prime numbers 
which are obviously not based on factorization but on tests for primality [125,123,124,120]. 
4.1.5 Digital signatures 
As was mentioned at the beginning of the discussion of the RSA scheme, the RSA encrypting and 
decrypting algorithms were conceived for implementing digital signatures which are the basis for 
authentication of users, and the non-repudiation and integrity of messages. A digital signature is 
an electronic equivalent to a handwritten one. 
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To implement a digital signature with the RSA cryptosystem the encrypting and decryptina 
algorithins must satisfy the following property: 
(Md mod n)' mod n= Mde modn=M (4-6) 
What equations 4.6 and 4.5 state is that the encrypting and decrypting algorithms are comrnu- 
tative and mutual inverses. Because of this property, the algorithms can be applied in any order) 
the original plain text M is always recovered. This is what RSA signatures are grounded on, since 
Alice can sign a message M by decrypting it with her private key in, dj and then send it to Bob 
who, upon receiving it, encrypts the decrypted message with Alice's public key In, e} to recover 
M. Bob is sure the message comes from Alice as only Alice knows the pair In, d}. 
4.1.6 Blind signatures 
As with traditional cash money, e-cash money must bear tile signature of a financial authority 
to be accepted as a token in commercial transactions. In tile former case, a financial authority 
creates notes of given values, signs them, and somehow puts them in circulation. The acceptance 
of the notes by the public is backed up by tile signer, whose signature is well-known and in theory 
impossible to forge. Ill tile latter case, it is the user herself, Alice for example, who creates notes 
of given value and sends them to a financial authority to sign them; having tile signature of tile 
financial authority the note call be used to pay for commodities. In contrast with traditional cash, 
the physical appearance of a note and a coin are exactly the same in the electronic world, both are 
represented by electronic bits and are called e-notes and e-coins respectively. Thus, if we ignore tile 
monetary value of ail c-coin and e-ilote which normally is higher in notes, there is no substantial 
difference between them, consequently we will freely switch between the two terms. 
Current implementations represent ail e-note as a pair of integers; the first one is tile monetary 
value of the note and the second is an identity string, i. e. a sort of serial number that uniquely 
identifies the note and prevents users from spending it more than one time. 
The problem with bringing or sending an e-note to a bank and requesting a signature is that 
the bank call keep records that associate Alice with tile value and serial number of the e-note; and 
later when the e-note is brought back to the bank by a merchant, find out when, where, to wholn, 
and ]low tile note was spent, this possibility would reduce tile anonymity of tile e-note to nothing. 
Fortunately, several protocols have been devised to deal with the problem, although they differ ill 
details, all of them are centered around what is known as blind signatures. 
Tile main idea behind a blind signature is that the signer signs a document with a satisfactory 
degree of knowledge about the content of tile document but without knowing exactly what lie is 
signing. In the e-note case, tile banker knows that lie is signing a note of ýC5.00, for example, that 
belongs to Alice but does not know the identity string. Hence, the banker knows that lie has to 
deduct JC5.00 from Alice's account and deposit them into the merchant's account when the latter 
brings back the e-note. Yet since the name Alice is not written on the e-note and lie signs thousand 
of notes everyday, the banker lias no way of associating Alice with the note; tile Only thing lie call 
learn from the note lie is presented with is that it has his signature on it, has not been spent, 
and that it is worth C5.00. Rom this information lie deduces that its holder is entitled to Z5.00 
regardless of the origin of the e-note, it might come from Pat, Ted, Katy, Alice or somebody else, 
in terins of nioney transfer it does not make any difference to tile bank. 
As explained in detail by Bruce Sclincier [118] the blind signature protocol is based on a tecil- 
nique called cut-and-choose which relies oil probability to ensure that a blindly signed document 
contains what its signer expects. The protocol works as follows: 
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1. Alice makes n copies of the document, an e-note for example, she wants signed. 
2. She blinds each of the n copies by multiplying each of them by a different integer called a 
blinding factor. 
3. She puts each copy inside an envelope and brings the n envelopes to the signer. 
4. The signer chooses and opens n-1 documents at random and asks Alice for the blinding 
factors to verify that each of the chosen n-I documents contain what Alice claims. 
5. If the signer is satisfied with the contents of the n-I documents, he signs the only document 
left unopened by writing on the unopened envelope. 
6. Alice goes home and there she removes the blinding factor from the signed document by 
dividing its contents by the blinding factor. 
Mathematically, in an RSA cryptosystem where e is Alice's private key and d the private key of 
Alice's banker, Alice can make the banker blindly sign a document whose contents is x, as follows: 
1. Alice chooses a blinding factor r and blinds x by computing 
xr' mod n (4.7) 
2. The banker signs the blind document by computing 
(xr' )d mod n (4.8) 
3. Alice removes the blinding factor by dividing equation 4.8 by r 
td (Xre)d Xdred Xdr d s=-modn=-modn=-modn=-modn=x modn (4.9) 
rrrr 
4. Alice has her document S= Xd mod n signed. 
There are a few things that merit additional comments. Since r is random, the banker can 
never determine x -the contents of the document. If s is an e-note, now Alice has a valuable 
e-note she can use to anonymously buy a box of chocolates or anything else. 
This protocol is a simplified version of the one presented by Sclineier [118] where additional 
data is included in the e-note to discover Alice's identity in case she cheats by spending her e-note 
more than one time, and to catch the chocolate seller if lie intends to present Alice's e-note twice 
to the banker. An overview of blind signature protocols is presented in [126,127); for a detailed 
discussion we encourage the reader to refer to [118]. 
4.2 Combination of secret-key and public-key cryptosystems 
, The drawback of public-key cryptosystems is that they are significantly slower (about 100 to 1000 
times) in comparison with secret-key ones [61,128]. For this reason they are not suitable for 
encrypting large amounts of data (files and pictures for example). Another drawback of a public 
, 
key is that since it is managed by key infrastructure its renewal is a comparatively cumbersome 
process; hence it is meant to be a long term key; incidentally, the more it is used and exposed the 
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higher the risk of being caught by a meddler. Because of these reasons, experts in CryptograpIly 
recommend using a public key as little as possible. 
In practice, cryptographic systems are based on a combination of secret and public-key cryp- tosystems, so they combine the speed of the first with the key management conveniences of tlie 
second. 
The main idea is to encrypt large amount of data with a secret-key algorithm and then encrypt 
only the secret key with a public-key one. Assuming that the receiver Bob and the originator Alice 
of a message are in possession of a pair of keys (private and public keys) the following procedure 
takes place. 
1. Alice has a large inessage (several Mbytes for example) to send to Bob. 
2. Alice generates a secret key. 
3. Alice encrypts the secret key with his public key and sends it to Bob. 
4. Bob receives and decrypts the secret key using his private key. 
5. Alice encrypts a message slie. wants to send to Bob with the secret key and sends it to Bob. 
6. Bob decrypts the inessage using the secret key. 
7. The shared secret key remains valid for the duration of the session. 
A well-known implementation that follows this approach is the Pretty Good Privacy (PCp) 
software for secure c-inai][128]. 
4.2.1 Key management 
Key management is the hardest part of any cryptosystem. This comes from the fact that in moderil 
Cryptology the tendency is to open to the public all components of a cryptosystem (encrypting 
and decrypting algorithms included) but the keys, so they rely on the infeasibility of breaking til, 
system without knowing a key. The result of this is that if the key management fails, tile, w1lole 
cryptosystein is down regardless of how secure the encrypting algorithms is and Ilow long the keys 
are. 
Key management is similar to bank card management. Somebody (a trusted authority) is ill 
charge for issuing cards to users, recognizing the user's handwritten signature, assigning, renewing 
and cancelling personal identification numbers, and in some cases renewing and cancelling cards. 
Key management has to do with a set of key management procedure. 
key space management if keys are integer nunibers, what is the range of valid keys? 
key generation are keys generated from scratch or froin previous ones (updating)? 
weak key exclusimi if there is a key that is easy to guess, it should not be used. 
key renewal to reduce the risk of key compromising, keys should expire and be renewed regularly. 
key invaliclation compromised and stolen keys inust be invalidated as soon as possible. 
news propagation news about invalid keys and new ones should be spread widely and as soon 
as possible. 
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key storage where are secret and private keys to be safely kept? In the owner's brain?, on a piece 
of papers? on disk?, on a card with read only memory? 
key usage policies how many sessions or how long is a key valid? How many keys can a user 
have? On what computer is a key to be used? 
old keys storage expired and cancelled keys cannot be shredded and send to a dustbin. How 
long must they be kept for and who will store them? 
authentication of key holders how does Bob know the holder of Alice's key is the Alice lie 
thinks she is. 
key escrow should my neighbour keep a copy of my private key in case I lose it or the government 
needsit? 
As can be seen from the issues raised above, though public-key cryptosystems give an elegant 
answer to the question about key distribution and sharing in secret-key cryptosystems, management 
of public keys is not an easy task at all. It encompasses several issues ranging from technical to 
political ones. To a great extent the standardization of public-key cryptosystems in public networks 
like the Internet, much depends on the solution to these questions. So far the most difficult 
ones, due to their political and social implications, have been the last two in the list, namely, 
user authentication, and key escrow. These two issues have been the objects of discussion in one 
of the hottest and longest debates ever witnessed in the field of computer science. The debate 
started in 1993 with the government proposal to introduce the now infamous Clipper chip as a 
government standard for encrypting unclassified communications [52,118]; and nobody knows when 
a consensus is going to be reached. Without any intention of joining this debate, a brief discussion 
on authentication of key holders and key escrow is presented in the following sections. The reader 
interested in more details about this debate should refer to [129,130,118,131,132,52,133,134,135]. 
4.2.2 Authentication of key owners 
The question to answer here is, when Bob receives Alice's public key from a public key directory 
or from somebody else, how does he knows that the key is definitely Alice's public key and not 
somebody's else? It seems logical that Bob will be reluctant to encrypt messages using Alice's 
public key unless lie is completely sure about the authenticity of the key. For this to be true, Bob 
must receive Alice's public key directly from Alice or indirectly from somebody Bob trusts. In 
either case the key must be handed in person or sent over a secure medium, an encrypted channel 
for example or a private courier. 
In practice two different approaches have been taken to addressing this issue: the distributed 
and the centralized authentication of key holders. 
Distributed and centralized user authentication 
In the distributed approach there is no central key distribution center, there is no need for it 
since every user generates and distributes his own public key. There is no central key certification 
authority either. Key certificates are issued by the users themselves by signing each other's public 
keys [118,61]. The meaning and contents of key certificates and the r6le key certification authorities 
play are discussed below in this section. 
A well-known example of cryptosystem that follows the distributed approach is the Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP)-an e-mail security programme designed by Philip Zimmermann [118] to provide 
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privacy, user authentication, digital signatures and compression. However, in practice most Pep 
users rely oil trusted PGP Internet servers (see [136] for example) to advertise their public keys and 
obtain others. It is worth mentioning that the PGP cryptosystem is considered to be a de facto 
standard among the Internet community. 
The centralized approach to key authentication has been supported by the Internet Architecture 
Board (IAB). It is based oil a protocol known as tile X. 509 where a trusted body, called the 
Certification Authority or just CA [137] assigns a unique name to each key user and issues a digital signed certificate containing tile user's public key and user's name and additional personal 
data (to be discussed below). Certification authorities are also called trusted third parties and 
are organized in a hierarchical tree rooted by tile Internet Policy Registration Authority (IPRA) 
-whom everybody has to trust. 
Ali implementation that supports the centralized key authentication approach is the Privacy- 
Enhanced Mail (PEM). The PEM is tile official Internet standard for private e-mails over tile 
Internet. It provides confidentiality, user authentication, and message integrity (138,118,61,139]. 
It is worth pointing out that at the moment of this writing, version X. 509 v3 is considered the 
Web standard, and is being used by popular applications like tile Netscape Communication Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL) [53,140,141] and PEM [138]. 
Several schemes for distribution of public-keys are presented by Stallings [142]. 
Certification authorities and public-key certificates 
A public-key certificate is a digital document issued and signed by a certification authority that 
binds a public key to its owner. The certificate attests that a particular public-key belongs to a 
particular individual. A Certification Authority (CA) is a trusted authority that issues public-key 
certificates and whose digital signature is recognized among the community where the public-key 
certificate is valid. 
A publie-key certificate contains data about the public key owner, the key distribution center (if any) that issued the public key and about the key certification authority itself, It also contains 
control information. 
The actual content of the public-key certificate depends on the issuer's taste, but in general it 
has the following fields [141,118,139]. 
9 key owner's data: name, address, age, sex, and so on. 
a the public key being certified. 
41 validity period (interval over which the certificate is valid). 
e naine of the key distribution center that issued the public key. 
4, name of the key certification authority. 
a control information concerning the certificate (version, serial number, and so on) 
* digital signature of the certification authority 
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The controversial differences between the distributed and centralized approaches become ap- 
parent when one takes into account that the distributed approach based purely on trust and it has 
a flat structure where everybody is equal. It is feasible for friendly communications, say within 
the academic environment, but infeasible for more sensitive applications where legal issues and 
money are involved. It seems that for these applications the centralized approach is more realistic. 
The problem with this is that the body on top of the hierarchy of certificate authorities is given 
absolute power and is indeed converted into a sort of guard. Critics of the centralized approach 
have raised the question about who can be trusted to be the maximum trusted entity at the top of 
the certification chain. Another way of putting it is to say, who will guard the guard himself? The 
government is the right body for those who trust the government, yet not everybody does. 
4.2.3 Key escrow 
The central idea of encrypting data is to make it available to the body entitled to read it; normally 
this person is the owner of the encrypting key. The owner of the data might encrypt all the 
electronic documents she has collected through her entire life (school homeworks, personal letters, 
books and poems, address book, jotters, e-mails, medical records, financial records, and other legal 
documents) and rest assured that nobody else but her can read her files. However, the person in 
this example would not sleep at all knowing that her life story depends only on the availability of 
an electronic key that might be lost. Likewise, she might unexpectedly die and leave her family 
without the key to open relevant information such as her last will and testament for example; a 
similar problem would face the company where she was employed as she might be the holder of 
the key for decrypting important information. One might argue that the death of a person is an 
extreme case, yet the same problems would appear if the person is unconscious or away and not 
reachable from her company. 
It seems that there are personal and business reasons for given a copy of our private key to 
our neighbour or somebody we trust, i. e. for using a sort of key backup. The idea behind a key 
back up does not necessarily mean keeping a real copy of the key, a mechanism to recover the lost 
key would serve the same purpose. In the literature the terms key recove'ry, key backup, and key 
archive are used to refer to the same concept. 
At first glance key escrow looks like a sensible service to have, however, the questions about 
whether it will be voluntary or compulsory may be raised; and about who is honest enough to be 
trusted as a key escrower. 
Under the cover that it needs a key escrow mechanism to catch drug dealers, terrorists and 
similar criminals, the US government has proposed that key escrow should be compulsory; it claims 
the right to have access to encrypted information without the knowledge or consent -just after 
the release of a court order- of the owner of the encrypted data. . In this direction, government 
supporters have proposed several ideas for building key escrow mechanisms [131,143,144,145,146, 
1471. 
Critics of the government scheme claim that key escrow has serious disadvantages, the main 
one being that cryptousers have to trust the key escrower and his escrowing procedures. Strong 
arguments have been made against the government proposal [132,133,52,118] by those who do 
not trust the government and who are well aware that the security of the key escrow mechanism 
might be broken and then the whole escrow cryptosystem will fail. They claim that key escrow is a 
threat to privacy, that it is expensive and difficult to deploy, less secure, and that it puts into risk 
the acceptance of digital signatures. Unfortunately no acceptable solutions to this issue have been 
proposed yet. 
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4.3 Cryptographic co-processors and smart cards 
One of the concerns when designing a cryptosystem is the speed loss due to the time wasted during 
the encryption and decryption of messages sent over the communication lines and encryption and 
decryption of files before storing them on disk and before bringing them back to main memory. Re- 
gardless of the encryption/decryption algorithms used, the speed loss of a system with cryptographic 
facilities may be significant compared to a plain-text one. Most of the time in a cryptosystern is 
spent performing modular arithmetic operations. If this is true, one can dramatically reduce this 
time by using specialized hardware to perform modular arithmetic operations. This hardware is 
known as a cryptographic co-processor and is normally a card attached to the main CPU. A simple 
way of providing a computer (a PDA for example) with a powerful cryptographic co-processor is 
the insertion of a smart card equipped with an embedded cryptographic co-processor. 
A smart card is a plastic card quite similar in size and shape to the familiar bank card witil 
a magnetic stripe. The main distinction between a smart card and a magnetic stripe one is that 
the former has an integrated circuit (often called the smart card microcontroller or just controller) 
inserted in the plastic that pr ovides the card with computation capabilities. Thanks to this new 
feature it is capable of performing digital signatures, user authentication, message encryption and 
inside data protection. The physical and electric characteristics of a smart card are specified by 
the 7816 ISO standard. The smart card controller is a single chip computer without keyboard 
and display embedded in a piece of plastic. It has, like any other computer, a CPU, memory, 
and input/output interface. The type of smart card controllers we are interested in here are the 
cryptology oriented ones which come with an arithmetic coprocessor. 
4.4 Summary 
Cryptographic techniques have been extensively used to protect both data stored in Internet conj- 
puters and messages travelling through Internet channels. To prevent un-authorized parties fro, n 
understanding the content of a message sent from Bob to Alice, the message is encrypted at Bob's 
computer and decrypted at Alice's computer. A message is encrypted by using an encryption key 
and decrypted by using a decryption key. In accordance with the keys used, cryptographic systems 
fall into two classes: secret-key (e. g., DES) and public-key (e. g., RSA). 
Secret-key cryptosystenis use the same key for encryption and decryption and are also called 
symmetric cryptosysteins. Conversely, in public-key cryptosystems the keys used for encryption 
and decryption are different. Thus, these cryptosystems are called asymmetric. 
One of the main attractions of public key crypto-systems is that they can be used to implement 
digital signatures. Digital signatures are necessary to sign electronic money and other documents. 
Public-key cryptosysteins are significantly slower (about 100 to 1000 times) compared to secret- 
key ones. Because of this, practical cryptosystems use both public and secret keys. 
Key management is the hardest part of any cryptosystem. It has been recognised that among 
the issues that key management has to address, key escrow is the most difficult and controversial. 
Chapter 5 
A new approach to confidentiality and 
anonymity protection 
5.1 Introduction 
Although it is certainly risky to bet on how computer and communication technologies are going to 
develop in the future, in tile previous chapters we dared, based on recent tendencies and on-going 
research projects, to predict that a global ubiquitous communication network will be deployed in 
the years to come. We also studied the main components of such a network, identified some of 
its services and stated that PDAs will be tile most popular communication devices used to gain 
access to these services. Similarly, we introduced the concepts of confidentiality and anonymity 
and have identified them as one of tile main lacks in tile current Internet infrastructure and as one 
of the main issues to be addressed to make tile ubiquitous communication network of tile future 
commercially successful. We also explored recently deployed systems aimed at protecting tile right 
to confidentiality and anonymity of Internet users, and identified their limitations. Finally we 
introduced some concepts of cryptography in tile belief that they would serve as a background for 
the discussion of this chapter. 
It is time now to put all the pieces together and present the main object of our research, i. e. 
our proposal for sending truly anonymous and confidential Internet messages which we believe 
addresses the flaws identified in the anonymizers reported so far in tile literature. 
5.2 Design characteristics 
Our system is based on end-to-end encryption. In end-to-end encryption systems encryption and 
decryption are performed by the applications; data never appears in clear at intermediate nodes. 
Each user of a node has one or more encryption and decryption keys; let us say one key for each 
application or session. When Alice's application wants to send an encrypted message to Bob, it 
selects the proper key, encrypts the message body, leaving the message header in clear format, and 
sends it to Bob through the communication networks. The message travels from node to node till 
eventually it reaches Bob's computer, only at that end is Alice's message body decrypted. 
The only part of Alice's message intermediate nodes between Alice and Bob need to read and 
understand is the message header; it contains the final destination address and other relevant 
information; the contents of its body is irrelevant, consequently, intermediate nodes do not need to 
know about encryption matters between Alice and Bob [148,1201. 
54 A new approach to confidentiality and anonymity protectiox, 
Public phone box 
123 
. 156 
Fixed home phone 
Bob 799 




Figure 5.1: An anonymous call made from a public telephone box. 
It is widely accepted that for a system to be successfully designed, implemented, understood, 
debugged, and extended it has to be based on simple ideas. The explanation for this is that simple 
designs are easier to understand and verify than complex ones. In computer literature this is know,, 
as the principle of simplicity and is highly recommended for cryptosystem implementations where 
a single flaw renders the whole system useless. Hence, to reduce the risk of having a hidden flaw 
in the design or implementation and to increase the chance that a cryptosystem can be verified 
and correctly implemented complicated ideas and large codes have to be avoided. Being aware of this, we have made a special effort to present a simple solution to the problem of anonymous and 
confidential communications and to keep our design as simple as possible under the assumption 
that it can be easily extended and used in real life applications. 
5.3 Anonymous calls from a public telephone box 
As was stated ill section 1.4.2, anonymity is a necessary condition for several services to work it, 
modern societies; it is used in everyday life intensively, most of the time unconsciously. yet in 
certain cases it is used deliberately. In tile latter case there are only a few mechanisms providing 
true anonymous communication, specially when on-line two-way communication is needed. So far, 
the only one readily available in most urbanized areas is tile public telephone box. 
As simple as it is, a public telephone box provides for true anonymity when operated by coil-, 
prepaid telephone cards or when the user dials a free of charge number. Tile only thing a person 
has to do to initiate all anonymous telephone call is to go to tile public telephone box7 make tile 
call and fade away from tile site immediately, i. e. before the telephone company may trace tile call 
back, flnd out where tile telephone box is located and send someone there to identify tile caller. 
It might also be that all the public telephone boxes the user might use are continuously under 
surveillance by satellite cameras, so that pictures of all callers are taken to associate them witll 
the anonymous call made at a given time. Although in theory this is possible, currently deployed 
technology cannot afford it, consequently, we will not consider this as a serious threat in tile near 
future. The use of a public telephone box is illustrated in figure 5.1 where an unknown Person 
makes in anonymous call to Alice. 
In addition to its unbreakable anonymity, tile public telephone box possesses another essential 
characteristic that makes it suitable for making an anonymous call; namely its simplicity. The 
mechanisms operating a public telephone box are rather simple, familiar to everybody who lives ill 
it urbanized area and well understood by both designers and users. 
This observation has inspired us to take it as a paradigm for designing a mechanisin for making 
5.4 Concealment of identity behind a public terminal 55 
anonymous calls from PDAs. The basic idea is to equip a PDA with all the necessary compo- 
nents present in a public telephone box that make anonymous calls feasible. How many and what 
components are they? Fortunately, there are only two of them: 
e the public telephone box is a public terminal 
* the caller uses an anonymous method of payment to operate it 
5.4 Concealment of identity behind a public terminal 
Because a public telephone box belongs to a telephone company and not to its users, there is no 
connection between the number of the public telephone box (its identifier) and the caller. Likewise, 
since it is there to be used by anybody, a call coming from it, could be initiated by any member of the 
public. Consequently, the identity of the actual caller is blended into the crowd and automatically 
hidden. Needless to say, for an anonymous call to be successful the caller has to use a public 
telephone which is handily available to as many passers-by as possible. In brief, the incognito 
caller hides himself in the crowd and not from the crowd. 
5.5 Anonymous payment 
While paying for an anonymous phone call made from a public telephone box the caller uses coins 
to pay anonymously for his call. Anonymous payments are performed not only in public telephone 
boxes but in several other situations as well. Because anonymous payment is a crucial concept in 
our approach to confidentiality and anonymity protection we will devote a considerable amount of 
space to discussing how it works and what risks it exposes the participating parties to. 
5.5.1 Anonymity in cash payments 
As metallic coins and prepaid telephone cards are the most common method of payment for oper- 
ating public telephone box they were mentioned in section 5.3 to pay for an anonymous call. It is 
time to generalize and discuss what is behind this concepts. 
Following Camp's terminology [149] the most common form of money that modern societies use 
at present time can be classified into two categories: physical token money and notational money. 
physical token money at present time it is represented as bank notes and metallic coins (coins for 
short) issued by a central financial authority, the Bank of England for example, and recognized 
as a legal document (at least within the limits of a country) for performing payments. It is 
also called cash and token currency. 
notational money it is money represented as notations (numbers) in the ledgers of financial in- 
stitutions such as banks. Notational money does not have a three-dimensional representation 
unless it is converted into physical token money. 
The particularity of cash money is that unlike, cheques and bank cards the name of the payer is 
never written on it. In addition, when a transaction paid by cash is completed there are no bank or 
law enforcement records left in the hands of the merchant where the buyer's name appears. Thanks 
to this practice the buyer's identity is not disclosed. It is worth anticipating that there are some 
exceptions to this assumption, which are discussed in section 5.5.5. 
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Take a one pound coin for example (or a one dollar note if you prefer) and use it to pay for 
a newspaper, the payment is performed under strict anonymity as the coin left in the newspaper 
seller's hands does not contain any information that can be used to determine its transaction history, 
nobody can find out what goods were given in exchange for the coin. Obviously, the newsagency 
is just an example of several business that accept physical token money as a method of Payment, 
many others work in a similar way, supermarkets, book stores, hardware stores, etc. 
nýom the above definition and discussion it follows that the coins we use to operate a public 
telephone box belong to the physical token money category; consequently, they provide anonymity. 
In fact bank notes may be used for the same purpose but it is not very practical as bank notes are 
normally of higher value than the cost of a telephone call. 
On the other hand a prepaid telephone card may be regarded as a special kind of physical tokell 
money, one that is issued by the telephone company and accepted as a method of payment only 
within its organization. For the purposes of telephone calls coins and prepaid telephone cards are functionally equivalent. For a person willing to make a telephone call from a public telephone box 
there is no difference between finding three coins of one pound each and an unused three-pound 
prepaid telephone card. 
Although cash money is widely accepted as an anonymous method of payment in numerous 
applications, it has serious drawbacks that make it unsuitable in many cases. We will discuss the 
drawbacks relevant to our system in the following section. 
5.5.2 Physical surveillance 
The prospect of complete anonymity provided by physical token money is limited by the Potential 
of physical observation i. e. by the possibility of somebody (an accidental or malicious observer) 
observing revealing details of the transaction. In this case tile observer may be anybody located 
at a privileged location with respect to tile place of the transaction. Any shop assistant, bank 
employee or officer is a potential observer. 
This issue is an inherent weakness of physical token money transactions as the buyer has 110 
choice but to expose herself to the public nearby tile place of purchase to hand the payment in and 
to collect her goods. Put in cryptographic terms, in traditional commercial transactions paid by 
physical token money information travels in plain text format and is exposed to tile public (to well_ 
located observers); consequently, an observer can learn both about tile identity of tile buyer and tile 
details of the transaction. Consequently, not only anonymity is at risk but also confidentiality. It 
seems that if we need a higher degree of anonymity and confidentiality in commercial transactions, 
a different way of performing commercial transactions has to be devised. 
5.5.3 Anonymity from the merchants and the buyer's side 
One of the limitations of cash money is that it provides anonymity to the buyer but not to tile 
seller. This is due to the fact that merchants usually give away a printed statement (a receipt) 
where the name and address of the shop, tile date and time, the name of tile purchased goods, tileir 
quantities and prices appear; hence, the buyer has full evidence in written form of the transaction 
that might be used at tile buyer's discretion, to complain in case of dissatisfaction with tile purchase 
for example. 
For a commercial transaction to be truly anonymous from both the seller's and tile buyer's side 
it is necessary that cash is used as a inetbod of payment but it is not sufficient; it is also necessary 
that the merchant does not hand receipt to the buyer. The problem with this approach is that 
most of buyers will feel unprotected against potential dishonest retailers. In this scheme tile buyer 
ý 
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has no choice but to take the merchant on trust about the quality of his service and goods. It 
might happen for example that the can delivered by a vending machine is half-empty, that it is 
not delivered by the machine or even worse, that it does not comply with the best before date; in 
any case, the buyer simply loses his money. 
This is not as dramatic as it sounds at first glance, after all, in a similar way, merchants have 
to trust buyers about the genuineness of the physical token money used as a payment (see section 
5.5.4). 
Besides this risk, this approach works in traditional commerce and works pretty well for low- 
value (few pennies to a few pounds) commercial transactions. There are thousands of goods and 
services that fall in this category (newspapers, video games, vending machines, telephone calls, 
etc. )- 
, Another way to provide total anonymity is by introducing a third party into the scenario 
through which the merchant and the buyer interact; although this approach might be suitable for 
some applications it falls outside our interest as its level of anonymity entirely depends on the 
trustworthiness of the third party to keep it. 
5.5.4 Counterfeits 
One of the major problems faced by merchants who accept anonymous payments performed by 
physical token money is the risk of counterfeit. The merchant is at high risk of receiving counterfeit 
notes, foreign coins, old notes whose printed-on value has been changed by the issuing financial 
authority; and old coins and notes declared out of circulation. 
While accepting anonymous payments the merchant relies on his ability to detect and refuse 
fake physical token money by a quick visual inspection. Because most merchants are not experts in 
forgery detection the acceptance of this method of payment is grounded on trust from the side of 
the merchant. If lie fails to detect a forgery at the moment the transaction takes place, his failure 
is not compensated. It might be possible to accurately verify coins and notes during transactions, 
yet this would dramatically slow down the speed of the transaction. After all, receiving counterfeit 
money is an exception rather than a norm since money forgery is an offense severely punished by 
governments. In addition, this method of payment is normally used for low-value transactions only. 
Hence in the case of receiving fake money the impact on the merchant's finances is not significant. 
5.5.5 Transaction reporting to governments 
In most countries governments enforce policies that require that financial transactions over a certain 
amount of money are recorded and documented to the government. In the USA for example, to 
discourage money laundering, the government requires reporting all cash transactions above $ 10 
000.00. It follows that cash money can provide anonymity only in low-value transactions. It is likely 
that when e-commerce becomes widely accepted a similar policy will be enforced by international 
organizations. 
- 
Rom the above discussion it can be concluded that though cash money suffers from several 
inconveniences, the degree of anonymity it guarantees is a highly valued property. This is why it 
is used as a method of payment to pay for anonymous calls in the public telephone box introduced 
in-section 5.3. 
. 
In the near future, it is likely that most payments in commercial transactions are going to be 
performed electronically; if our bet is correct and we agree that anonymous payments are essential 
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for certain transactions, it seems that the notion of traditional cash has to be extended to its 
electronic version. 
If fact, although still in its infancy, this kind of money is already circulating the Internet and is known as electronic token money, digital cash, electronic currency, electronic cash and e-cash. 
5.6 Anonymity in e-cash payments 
E-cash is regarded as an extension of traditional cash, the main idea behind it is to have all 
electronic equivalent of traditional cash that preserves all the valuable properties of its ancestor, 
anonymity for instance; and if possible that solve or improve at least some of the drawbacks inherent 
in traditional cash due to its physical nature; namely, the risk of physical surveillance, anonymity 
from the merchant's side and risk of counterfeiting. 
Although the use of e-cash as a method of payment is not widespread yet in real life, theoretical 
results converted into working products prove that it is perfectly feasible to do business with support 
for anonymous e-cash as a method of payment. 
A payment system that accepts e-cash as a method of payment is called an anonymous Payment 
system. Ail anonymous payment system brings together a spender, a merchant, and a bank where 
both the spender and the merchant are account-holders; its aim is to help the spender to pay the 
merchant for services or goods without disclosing her identity to the latter and without leaving 
any tracks at the bank to find out how and where the spender spends his money. A well-known 
implementation of an anonymous payment system is DigiCash [149,127,150,1511. Anonymous 
payment systems (DigiCasli for instance) are based on the use of a technique known as blind 
signatures where the spender uses a sort of electronic notes validated by the blind signature of his 
bank to pay the merchant (see 4.1-6). 
As a side comment it is worth mentioning that e-cash is not tile only method of payment 
proposed for electronic commerce transactions. Other mechanisms are currently being tested in 
the Internet. 
According to tile mechanism by which money goes from the buyer to the merchant, tile different 
proposals can be grouped into five broad models: system supporting secure presentation of credit 
card numbers, e-cash, credit-debit systems, direct transfer, and collection agents [152,150,9]. Each 
of the models has its own advantages and disadvantages and its suitability depends on the specific 
application, tile amount of money to be paid for example, may be determinant; for the particular 
case of our work, the e-cash model is tile most suitable, since it is tile only one that protects tile 
anonymity of the payer. 
5.6.1 Advantages of e-cash over cash payments 
The functional characteristics of e-cash are quite similar to those of its physical equivalent- cash 
money, tile most important to us being the support of anonymity. It is time now to study how 
e-cash inherits tile limitation of cash mentioned in section 5.5.1 and how to reduce their impact. 
Due to the fact that Internet commercial transactions can be performed remotely instead of face- 
to-face, electronic commerce transactions offer a stronger anonymity protection than traditional 
transactions paid by physical token money. In addition, as the information exchanged between tile 
inerchant and the buyer call be easily encrypted confidentiality protection can be improved a great 
deal. The potential risk of physical surveillance in this case is non-existent. 
ý, 
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In cases when the goods (electronic newspapers for example) can be digitized and sent over the 
communication links the level of anonymity and confidentiality offered by an electronic commerce 
system is nearly perfect, at least in theory, in practice it is limited by potential flaws in the design 
of the system and the risk of disclosing its security keys to the wrong person. 
If merchants and buyers are happy making business under the anonymity provided by cash 
money, there are good reasons to think that a similar approach can be used in Internet commerce 
where anonymity from both the merchant's and buyer's side is a requirement. For this to be 
possible, e-cash must be used as a method of payment. A mechanism like this may be suitable 
for implementing Internet vending machines to sell newspapers, documents and other pieces of 
information. 
Taking into account current social behaviour, it seems inevitable that counterfeit money will be 
present in electronic commerce as well; also it seems that for the sake of anonymity and simplicity 
it is worth following a similar approach as traditional commerce, i. e. the acceptance of anonymous 
electronic token money as a method of payment for low-value goods. However, as face-to-face 
shopping is no longer necessary, the inspection of the electronic money received as payment has to 
be performed more accurately than in traditional transactions, but at the same time it has to be 
light enough, at the price of some risk, to keep the efficiency of electronic commerce transactions 
acceptable. 
If by law cash transactions over certain amount of money have to be reported to the government, 
there are reasons to think that e-cash transactions will fall into the same scheme, except that in 
this case the government will need to improve its audit methods as e-cash opens new possibilities 
for 
, 
making fraudulent transactions appear legal; big transactions, for example might be divided 
into hundreds of small payments (performed at electronic speed) to comply with the government 
policies and mislead the government. 
5.6.2 DigiCash anonymous payment 
Digicash uses public-key cryptography to perform anonymous payments. Thanks to this mechanism 
it is impossible to link a payment to a payer. However, a payer can prove that lie or she did or did 
not make a particular payment. For anonymous payments to be possible, the DigiCash systems 
needs the help of a banker who hides the payer's identity by blindly signing e-notes. Obviously, 
both the payer and merchant are the banker's customers. Briefly the algorithm is as follows[153]: 
1. The bank, Bob (the buyer) and the merchant hold a private key and advertise their public 
counterparts. 
2. Messages encrypted with the bank's private key can come only from the bank. 
3. Similarly, messages encrypted with Bob's private key can come only from Bob. 
4. Again, messages encrypted with the merchant's private key can come only from the merchant. 
5. Whenever Bob wants to pay for something, lie generates a note for the due amount and blinds 
the note number with random number (a blinding factor). 
6. For the note to be accepted by the merchant it has to be signed by the bank, so Bob sends 
. the note to the bank in order to be blindly signed. 
I.; Knowing Bob's public key, the bank verifies that the note comes from Bob, signs it and 
returns it to Bob. 
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Figure 5.2: Anonymous call made from a public telephone box. 
8. Ail amount of money equivalent to the value of the signed note is transferred from I3ob7, s 
account into the bank's account. 
9. Bob divides out the blinding factor and sends the note to the merchant. 
10. Knowing the bank's public key, the merchant verifies that the note has been signed by t1le 
bank and accepts it as a payinent. 
11. Latter on (at the end of the day, for example) the merchant sends the note to the bank. 
12. Knowing the merchant's public key tile bank verifies that it comes from the merchant, tile,, 
ail amount of money equivalent to tile value of tile note is transferred from the bank accoullt 
into the merchant's account. 
5.7 The public telephone box paradigm 
The hardware components for making an anonymous call from a public telephone box were silowl, 
in figure 5.1; to make the discussion that follows easier, tile same figure appears in this section as figure 5.2. 
As briefly discussed in section 2.7.1 one of the most widely accepted approaclies for Supporting 
host mobility in the Internet is the Ioannidis paradigm [46]. 
In this paradigm a mobile host (while connected to tile network) is always located in Some cell 
controlled by a so-called Mobile Support Station (MSS). The MSS serves as tile current lionle for 
the mobile host and is responsible for communication between the mobile host and tile rest of tile 
network. 
loannidis' paradigm assumes that each mobile host owns a home IP address by wilicil it is 
identified within the Internet domain. This home IP address uniquely identifies the mobile llost, 
and remains constant regardless of the mobile host physical and logical location. In figure 5.3 
for example this is illustrated by Bob's PDA which has been registered to tile Internet witll tile 
132.248.51.6 IP address. 
By looking at figures 5.2 and 5.3 it is not difficult to realize that there are close similarities 
between them. For a start, both tile Internet and the telephone network are there to transnJit 
wessages between the communicating parties; to transmit messages from an anonymous caller to 
Alice, for instance. 
Secondly, one call think of the public telephone box depicted in figure 5.2 as tile MSS being 
used by Bob in figure 5.3; tile two of them play play a similar r8le. 
5.7 The public telephone, box paradigm 
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Finally, Alice's fixed home telephone in figure 5.2 is analogous to Alice's WS shown in figure 
5.3, they are there to be used by Alice to send and receive calls while she is home. 
If this analogy makes sense, then it is reasonable to take figure 5.2 as a paradigm for designing 
and implementing a system for making anonymous calls like the one shown in figure 5.4. 
An anonymous call initiated from a public telephone box is possible only if the caller uses cash 
to pay anonymously for the service and that caller uses a public terminal rather than a personal one. 
These two crucial components have to be present in figure 5.4 as well if we want the anonymous 
calls made from the incognito PDA holder to be truly anonymous. 
Suppose that the PDA user in figure 5.4 wants to make an anonymous call and that lie has 
some e-cash in his PDA memory to operate the MSS. The procedure for opening the anonymous 
session between the PDA and the MSS works as follows: 
1. Mirn on the PDA. 
2. Make contact with the MSS. 
3. Slip a couple of e-coins as an advance payment for a communication session of an agreed 
period. 
4. Tile MSS responds by creating a non-personal random temporary identifier for the incognito 
, PDA user and sends it to him. 
5. The PDA and the MSS use the temporary identifier as the PDA's address to talk to each 
other. Additionally the MSS uses it to time out the PDA session. 
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It is now time to study how the anonymous e-cash payment is performed and how the no,, - 
personal random temporary identifiers are created. 
5.8 E-cash payment for a MSS communication session 
While the market for ubiquitous communication services to PDA is still small, it is projected to 
increase dramatically in the years to come, hence it makes sense to assume that public MSSS will 
be widely deployed and run by communication companies on a free-for-service basis tile same way 
public telephone boxes are run by telephone companies; if this holds true, it is likely that, as Public 
telephone boxes do, MSS will offer free of charge services, that is, electronic address a PDA user will 
be allow to communicate with without any charge, example of these addresses might be Police, fire 
brigade, national drugs lielpline, and other services equivalent to the usual free-lielpline services 
offered by telephone companies. 
In terms of payment, there is nothing to discuss here if tile PDA user wants to anonymously call 
to one of tile free-of-cliarge services offered by tile MSS. In this case the MSS owner either does 
not got paid at all, or gets paid at the end of tile month by tile government; this is not relevant 
here; the PDA user call just take it as a free call. However, tile matter becomes more complicated 
when the PDA user wants to call a non-free address since this situation brings into the scene a 
bank or a similar financial body. Tile need to address this issue, motivated us to make figure 5.4 
slightly more complicated by bringing more players into the scene, tile result of this is show,, 
flgure 5.5. 
Now we have included Doug, the owner of tile MSS and who offers communication services 
return for a charge oil a pay-for-used-time basis. He is an account holder at Clare's bank and 
accepts electronic cash as long as it is signed by Clare. Obviously, Clare is a bank owner who is 
linked to the Internet through her bank workstation. Among other services, Clare offers support 
for anonymous electronic payments in transactions between her account holders. That is to say, oil 
request she writes blind signatures oil electronic notes presented by her account holders as long as 
the e-notes comply with the blind signature protocol discussed in section 4.1.6. 
Now we have all the participants that take part in the opening of an anonymous session with a 
MSS. Let us now see how they interact. 
For simplicity of exposition we assume that the anonymous caller knows what e-notes are 
accepted by the MSS as payment and tile minimum charge for opening an anonymous session. 
Assuming that the anonymous caller knows the cost of an anonymous call in his local tow,, 
seenis to be reasonable since we expect that ill the future MSS are likely to become all everyday 
', 
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public facility just as public telephone boxes are at present time. In any case, the anonymous caller 
can always inquire of the MSS about these details before the anonymous call transaction begins. 
The inquire process is not an essential part of the main protocol, thus, we will not discuss it here, 
but later in section 8. 
Again, to make a clear distinction between the main protocol for opening an anonymous session 
and other details, let us assume that prior to opening an anonymous session with the MSS, the 
anonymous caller ensures that he has e-coins in his PDA memory to pay for the service. To make 
the e-coins, the anonymous caller creates them and sends them to Clare for a blind signature. The 
routine for a blind signature is discussed in section 4.1.6. Therefore, we can assume that prior to 
requesting an anonymous session, the anonymous caller is in possession of enough e-coins to pay 
for it. 
The assumption about the endless supply of e-notes in the memory of the PDA is grounded on 
the fact that there is no price to pay for keeping e-cash in the memory of the PDA. Furthermore, 
unlike coins, e-coins are weightless and do not represent any physical burden to carry. After all, 
should the endless supply of e-coins come to an end in the middle of an anonymous session, the 
PDA user can always divert momentarily from the main protocol and contact his bank for more 
e-coins; the only thing lie has to do is'to follow exactly the same routine as lie did to obtain. the 
e-coins lie followed prior to the anonymous call. 
Taking into account the previous discussion we can now summarize how the anonymous caller, 
let us say Bob, opens an anonymous session with the MSS. The participants in the algorithm are 
the ones depicted in figure 5.5. 
Bob, the anonymous caller, turns on his PDA to contact the MSS. 
2. Bob sends an e-coin previously blindly signed by Clare to Doug as a payment for the service. 
3. Upon receiving the e-coin, Doug forwards it to Clare to verify that the e-coin is valid. 
4. Doug waits for Clare's response, if the response is satisfactory, lie opens the anonymous session 
for Bob. 
Note that the advantages of e-casli over traditional cash discussed in sections 5.5.1 and 5.6 
significantly strengthen the degree of anonymity of the caller. 
Firstly, since the PDA and the MSS communicate with each other at a certain distance ranging 
from several metres to few kilometres, nobody can learn what Bob is doing with his PDA and 
whom and under what conditions lie is communicating with; that is to say, the risks of physical 
surveillance is no longer a concern. 
Secondly, the anonymity of payment is guaranteed by Clare's blind signature. 
Thirdly, the risk of money counterfeiting is reduced by taking advantage of the speed of comput- 
ers to perform thousands of comparisons and looks-up to find out whether all e-coin is a forgery 
or has already been spent. This risk can be reduced as much as Possible by strengthening the 
validation algorithm, of course at the price of losing speed in the process. 
Finally, though it seems obvious, it is worth noting that we expect no government will be 
interested in receiving reports from commercial transactions involving small amounts of money as 
payment for communication services requested by a PDA. Hence, it is reasonable to take for granted 
that Doug will have no problems with the government from accepting anonymous e-cash. 
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5.9 Mobile hosts without home IP addresses 
The traditional Ioannidis paradigm for integrating mobile hosts into the Internet was shown ill 
figure 5.3. This paradigm is grounded on tile assumption that when a mobile host, a PDA for 
example, is away from its home network it still needs to access data (personal files, local data 
bases, local Web pages, etc. ) and services (name, file, Web, mail, billing servers, etc. ) normally 
used oil its ]ionic network. Consequently, a PDA must be assigned a permanent IP address in its 
local network which uniquely identifies it and remains constant regardless of current Physical and logical location of tile PDA. 
This assumption is certainly justifiably, however, there are applications where a PDA can work 
perfectly well without using its home data and services, i. e. without contacting its home network. 
For simplicity let us assume for the moment that a MSS offers free communication services to PDAs 
in its area. If this is true, a PDA does not need any support from its home network to download 
Web pages from a free Web server for example, nor to post information to an e-mail list or listen 
to the news. The main idea here is that a PDA can still use the Internet without using its home 
IP address. It might even not have any IP address nor a home network. 
Ill contrast with tile loannidis paradigm we suggest a new approach to integrating PDAs into 
the Internet where a PDA does not need a home IP address to send and receive information to and from other PDAs and computers reachable through tile Internet. 
Our IP addressless approach has two main advantages. First, by not using an IP address we 
are providing the basis for true anonymity as we will see later on. Second, a PDA is a tiny cheap 
computer for personal use. There will be millions of them carried by people who would like them 
to be operational as soon as they buy them. Also, they will be a kind of disposable computers-a 
user will buy a PDA, use it, and throw it away if it fails or change it for a new one if she is not 
satisfied with its performance. Because of this, it seems impractical to assign IP addresses to then,. 
What is needed is a simpler way of addressing them. 
Our approach is based oil tile assumption that in the future tile world will have many thousands 
of MSSs. Some of them will belong to private LANs and be located indoors; others will belolla 
to communication providers and be located outdoor and provide communication services to PDA 
users for a payment just as public telephone boxes do nowadays. PDAs will act as clients (to MSSs) 
for network services and never as servers. 
In this scheme, as illustrated in figure 5.6, a PDA user may have a home workstation (or all 
office one or both); just as a user of a public telephone box may have an office and home telephone 
number. PDA users are known to tile world by their home workstation address, this is where they 
normally receive messages; if a message arrives while a PDA user is roaming it is kept unread on a local disk until they come back or retrieve it remotely. Thinking of a home workstation as a home 
telephone equipped with all answering machine illustrates its r6le. 
Whilst oil the move, a PDA user call communicate with the world with tile help of a MSS. 11, 
order to send a niessage to a computer connected to tile Internet or to establish an on-line two-way 
communication the PDA user must first register with a MSS. After a successful registration tile 
MSS assigns the PDA a temporary, random identification number which is valid for tile duration of 
it session. We will call this number a TrnpId from now oil. Being a random and temporary number ' the Tinpld is non-personal, as a result it does not lead to the identity of tile anonymous caller. 
The TinpId call be any number, such as a dynamic and temporary IP address assigned by means 
of the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [154] for example. 
The combination of the PDA's Tnipld and the MSS's Internet address, gives the PDA user a 
unique non-personal identifier within the Internet, therefore, with tile help of this unique identifier 
, ille can exchange information with other PDA users and with any computer connected to the 








MSSI 'IS Internet N; IiSSn 192.100.158.254 132.248.51-5 
t'd slant Legend: PDA- Pers? nal Digital Ass istant 
. htss- Mobile Support Station g n 
WS- Work Station o 
L 




Figure 5.6: A PDA without a home IP address. 
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The MSS serves as a bridge between the PDA and its counterpart. Messages sent to the PDA 
user are addressed to the MSS which, upon receiving them forwards them to the PDA user identified 
by her TmpId within the MSS's domain. Needless to say, the MSS will only be able to deliver the 
message to the PDA user as long as she still is in session and within the area of coverage of the 
wireless communication device of the MSS. 
Once again, there is a close similarity between a PDA user and a user of the telephone system 
in the sense that while the latter is outdoors and near a public telephone box she can receive 
calls directly instead of through her answering machine, if she advertises to her potential callers 
the number of the public telephone box she is near. Similarly, a PDA user can receive Messages 
directly, instead of through her home work station, if she opens a session with a MSS and advertises 
the Internet address of her current MSS and her TmpId to her potential callers. 
If the session time runs out, the PDA user can either pay for an extension of the session or lose 
the TmpId and stop sending and receiving messages through the MSS. It may also happen that the 
PDA user moves to another MSS while a session is in progress (hand-off). Although interesting, 
this question falls in the field of host location and routing strategies [85,13], and we will not address 
the issue here. 
5.10 An algorithm for anonymous and confidential calls 
After learning how to open ail anonymous session with a MSS and how a non-personal identifier 
can be assigned to a PDA it is time to introduce more specific details of the main algoritlim to 
make an anonymous call and to present and discuss it. 
5.10.1 Learning the public key of the MSS 
So far we have been assuming that Bob, the anonymous caller, is the only PDA user at the MSS 
and that nobody but him and the MSS can read the contents of the messages sent to and received 
from the MSS. This might not be true because a MSS is a public facility, hence Bob might clash 
with Ebe, another PDA user whose PDA might overhear the conversation between Bob's PDA and 
the MSS. The answer to this problem comes from public-key cryptography. To prevent Ebe from 
reading the content of the message Bob sends to the MSS asking for an anonymous session, Bob 
66 A new approach to confidentiality and anonymity protectioya 
can encrypt it with the public key of the MSS, so that only the MSS can read it (see section 4.1-3). 
Yet this approach raises the question about how the PDA obtains the public key of the MSS. 
The crucial point here is to ensure that the public key the PDA user uses to encrypt the first 
message lie sends to the MSS belongs to the MSS and not to somebody else, to Ebe the intruder 
for example, who might be there to intercept the PDA message to impersonate the MSS. 
Possible solutions to this question were presented in section 4.2.2, namely the distributed and 
centralized approaches. It seems that for our system, the centralized approach is simpler than the 
distributed one; the only thing the MSS has to do is to advertise its public key upon detectilla 
the presence of the PDA within its area of coverage. Naturally, the MSS public key has to cOnie 
with its public-key certificate signed by a certification authority so that the PDA can verify the 
signature and be sure of the authenticity of the public key. 
Although with some extra hassle, the distributed approach might work as well, the trouble llqre 
is that the PDA user might receive from the MSS a public-key vouched by somebody unknowl, 
to him, so lie might refuse an authentic key advertised by the MSS. A possible solution to this 
problem is for the MSS to advertise several keys or the same key signed by as many well-know,, 
people as possible so that eventually the PDA user receives one that satisfies him. 
5.10.2 Session keys 
In section 4.2 some reasons not to use public and private keys intensively were pointed out; to 
comply with experts' recommendations, we use public keys only to exchange session keys, between 
the PDA and the MSS and between Bob, the anonymous caller, and Alice, the recipient of t1le 
anonymous message. 
A session key may be used to encrypt one message only or to encrypt messages for the wl, C)le 
session; the more frequently we renew them the more secure is the whole system, unfortunately, 
one pays for it in terms of speed and complexity. To keep the presentation of our system silnple 
we opted to go for the latter approach- one key for the whole session. 
It is worth recalling that private keys are used to digitally sign messages; in this case their use 
is unavoidable, hence when a message is digitally signed, the private key of the signer is always 
involved. 
The above procedure seems to work fine, but, it has two serious drawbacks. For a start, it does 
not protect the content of messages from being heard by unwanted recipients; messages betweell 
the PDA and MSS are plain text, that is to say, there is no confidentiality protection. 
5.10.3 The algoritlim 
Once again tile actors in our algoritlim are Bob, a PDA owner wishing to make an anonymous call 
to Alice; Alice, the recipient of the anonymous call who owns a desktop workstation; Doug, tile 
owner of the MSS; Clare tile bank owner; and Ebe, another PDA owner that happened to be at tile 
same MSS as Bob. All these actors and their computers are depicted in figure 5.7. Tile algorith for 
, sending anonymous and confidential messages ushig 
PDAs was first published in [155] and reads as 
follows: 
1. Bob turns on his the PDA. 
2. The PDA makes contact with the MSS and learns its public key by listening to its advertise- 
ment. It checks for the authenticity of the key by checking the digital signatures attached to 
the key. 
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Figure 5.7: Anonymous and confidential call from a PDA. 
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3. The PDA creates and sends the MSS a session secret key. 
4. The MSS checks that the session key suggested by Bob's PDA is not in use by another PDA 
and Bob's PDA waits for a reply for t units of time. The MSS replies by sending a Trnpjd 
only if the key is accepted otherwise if the suggested key is incorrect or already in use it does 
not reply. The MSS silence is taken by the PDA as an invitation to suggest another sessioll 
key. To ensure confidentiality, the PDA encrypts the message before sending it using t1le 
public key of the MSS. The MSS reply is encrypted with the suggested session key and sellt 
to the air. 
5. Roin now until the end of the session messages exchanged between the PDA and the MSS 
are encrypted and decrypted with the session key. Since only Bob and the MSS know the 
session key, only they can make a sense of them, other potential recipients, Ebe for example, 
ignore them. 
6. Bob sends an anonymous e-coin blindly signed by Clare, to Doug to pay for the communica- 
tion session. Doug contacts Clare to check that the e-coin is valid. The MSS responds witil 
a EcashAccepted message if Doug is satisfied or with a EcashRejected message in the Opposite 
case. 
7. Though not shown in picture 5.7 Bob attaclis his TmpId to the messages sent to the MSS, so that the latter can tell where a message is coming from. 
8. If Bob wishes to send an anonymous message, to Alice for example, he edits the body of the 
message, concatenates it with the recipient's address and sends it to the MSS. 
9. Upon receiving each message from the PDA the MSS decrypts it, finds out the intended 
final destination (Alice's address in this case) and forwards it to the specified address. The 
forwarded message contains Bob's TmpId. 
10. To Alice the received message appears as coming from the MSS. To be precise, from someone 
who identifies himself as TmpId within the MSS area of coverage. However, she has no way of discovering who is the original sender; nevertheless, if she wishes, she can reply by addressing 
her response to the MSS; the latter will forward the message to Bob. 
11. Bob's session ends when lie turns off his PDA, leaves his current MSS or his MSS times-out 
his session. 
5.10.4 Discussion of the algorithm 
In the algorithin just presented, we made a deliberate effort to keep the discussion as simple as 
possible at the price of omitting details of secondary importance, it is time now to discuss present 
these issues to the reader. 
Bob hits somebody's session key 
One of the crucial steps in the algorithin is that the MSS assigns a TmpId to Bob's PDA witliout 
knowing anything about it and about its owner except that it has succeeded in providing a correct 
session key which is not being used by anybody else. A correct session key is a key that is witl1in 
the doinain of the keys accepted by the MSS and has not been identified as a weak key [118j. If 
Bob's suggests in incorrect key the MSS does not reply. Nor does it reply if Bob's key is correct 
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but being used by somebody else, by Frank for example. In this case we say that Rank's session 
key has been hit and spoilt by Bob. Although the MSS says nothing to Bob, it has bad news to tell 
to Frank, namely that his current key has been ruined and that lie cannot continue his anonymous 
session till he gets a new session key. 
The reason for bothering Frank about this is to stop Bob using this strategy for finding other 
PDA user's session keys: if Bob knows that lie has suggested a correct key and no reply comes 
Bob knows that lie in possession of somebody's else session key and can abuse it unless the MSS 
informs Frank about it. 
Double encryption of Bob's messages 
As shown at the bottom of figure 5.7 upon the message received from the PDA, the MSS discovers 
Alice's address followed by the body of the message Bob wants to transmit to Alice; since both 
the address and the message are in plain text the MSS can read what Bob's is saying to Alice, 
consequently, Bob's right to confidentiality is not observed. The only thing the MSS needs to know 
to convey the message to Alice is Alice's address; if Bob wishes to stop the MSS from reading 
the body of his message, he may double encrypt it. First lie encrypts the body of his message lie 
is sending to Alice using Alice's public key. Secondly, lie appends the encrypted text to Alice's 
address. Finally, lie encrypts the result of his concatenation using the session secret key lie shares 
with the MSS. 
Again, Bob is faced with the question about how lie learns Alice's public key. 
Learning the recipient's public key 
In a centralized key management system Bob can contact a certification authority to obtain Alice's 
public key, to save anonymous session time, he should have the key in his PDA memory before 
opening the anonymous session. 
In a distributed key management system learning Alice's key may be slightly more complicated 
since there is no central authority who knows exactly where Alice's public key is, because of this, it is 
strongly recommended that Bob is in possession of Alice's public key before opening the anonymous 
session. Alice's public key can be obtained from a public key directory or Internet public key server 
as in the PGP system (see section 4.2.2). It is also possible that Bob obtains Alice's public key 
directly from her or from a common friend. However, this approach puts Bob at risk since Alice 
might guess who is anonymously e-mailing her by checking to whom she has given away her public 
key. 
Upon receiving the anonymous message Alice decrypts it using her private key, however, she 
does not know who is writing to her so she cannot encrypt her response with Bob's public key. A 
simple answer to this is that if Bob is expecting any reply from Alice lie must create a secret key 
and send it to Alice, attached to the end of the body of his message for example. If for some reason 
Bob does not send to Alice a session key, Alice have no choice but to encrypt her response with the 
public key of the MSS. However, the confidentiality of her response is broken at the MSS who can 
read her message before forwarding it to Bob. 
E-coin verification 
Before opening an anonymous session for Bob, Doug makes sure that the e-coin lie has received 
from Bob is a valid one. Put in other way, Doug has to send the e-coin to Clare for inspection. For 
the sake of confidentiality Doug has to encrypt his message with Clare public key. Clare responds 
with a message encrypted with the MSS public key or with a secret session key if Doug cared to 
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create and send it to her attached to the e-coin. The public keys used here can be obtained the 
same way Bob obtains Alice's (see the above discussion). 
5.10.5 Equipping a PDA with a smart card 
Message encryption and decryption as well as blind signatures depend heavily on CPU-consuinin, 
arithmetic operations (mainly modular arithmetic). Owing to this, they are normally performed oil dedicated hardware known as cryptographic controllers or cryptographic co-processors [156]. To 
improve the response time of PDAs expected to engage in these cryptographic operations, it seeins 
sensible to provide them with cryptographic co-processors. 
A practical solution for providing a PDA with a cryptographic co-processor is the insertion 
of smart cards into PDAs. A smart card is a tamp er-resistant single-chip microcomputer witl, 
CPU, 1/0 operations and memory, inserted in plastic tile size and shape of the familiar bank caýrd 
[1571. Depending oil the smart card model it may also contain, in tile same chip, a cryptographic 
co-processor and specialized algorithms to compute and manipulate any necessary keys [158,156]. 
More details about smart cards and their computational and storage capabilities were presented in 
section 4.3. 
Note that we are not arguing that the smart card is required for our algorithm to work. Yet it 
is recommended to increase the speed of tile system and strengthen its security [148]. Any cryp- 
tographic algorithm call be implemented in both hardware and software, ours is not an exception. 
However, a hardware implementation is always faster than a software one. To give an example) a 
software implementation of the DES algorithm is one thousand times slower than an implementa- 
tion in dedicated hardware. Concerning, security, software implementations are more vulnerable to 
intruders since, the encryption key might be retrieved from the disk where is it stored or fron, the 
main memory during execution time. This is significantly riskier than executing all computational 
operations inside a tamper-resistant module, where both tile cryptographic algorithm and the key 
are stored. 
Another advantage of having a smart card in a PDA is that the former can be used to store 
the private and public key of the user. So that tile former is never disclosed and the latter never 
forgotten. 
The best keys are those generated randomly (by a random key generator for example), Yet a 
truly random key is uneasy to remember, so it ought to be stored in some place other than tile 
owner's brain. This is where a smart card can offer a solution. The PDA user can command his 
random key generator to generate his pair of private and public key inside tile smart card chip, 
store the former inside tile chip, i. e. in the EEPROM and distribute tile latter. 
The great advantage of this approach is the private key never leaves tile smart card chip. It does 
need to, since cryptographic operations are performed inside the chip, exactly where tile private 
key is. 
It is worth observing that a good cryptosystem will provide its users with several keys[118]. 
IF-or instance, for reasons of security and key management a user should have one private key for 
encryption and another one for digital signatures. In addition, it is likely that if a person is involved 
in more that one activity, lie or she will be happy to use different digital signatures, one for signing 
documents at his workplace and another to sign documents at as a member of the antigovernment 
political party, to give one example. Because of this, it sounds unfeasible for tile PDA user to 




Mixes-based anonymizers assume that the anonymous message is sent from a computer which uses 
a permanent and personal IP-address to connect to the Internet. 
Anonymous messages sent by using anonymizers based on mixes are not truly anonymous but 
pseudo-anonymous because one of the mixes, at least, always know the sender's IP-address. Also, 
the anonymity offered by these anonymizers is fragile since it can always be broken by subversion 
or conspiracy of all mixes. 
Týying to send an anonymous message from an IP-addressed computer is analogous to trying 
to make an anonymous call from a home telephone line by using the Calling Line Identification 
Blocking service (the 141 number in the U. K. ), the calling number is hidden from the receiver by 
preceding the dialed number with the digits 141, but it is not hidden from the carrier, neither from 
anybody who has the means for persuading the carrier to disclose it nor from a miscreant with 
enough knowledge and resources to break the carrier's computer where the number is stored. 
auly anonymous calls cannot be made from home phone lines but only from public phone boxes 
operated by coins. The anonymity is guaranteed because the public phone box is a public terminal 
(not related to the caller) and because the caller uses anonymous payment to pay for the call. 
The idea of the public phone box can be implemented by using a PDA bridged to the Internet by 
a mobile support station. To communicate with the mobile support station the PDA does not use 
an IP-address but a non-personal, temporary, random identifier (TmpId) assigned by the MSS on 
a per-communication session basis. The caller pays for the call by anonymous e-cash. Confidential 
communication is ensured by the use of the public-key and secret-key cryptotechniques. 
To relieve the PDA from the burden of cryptographic operations it can be provided with a 
smart card. 
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Chapter 6 
Protocol specification of the system 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the protocol specification of our system, i. e. to the specification of an 
unambiguous set of rules to be strictly followed by the PDA and MSS during their interaction in 
order to initiate, maintain, and complete reliable information exchange. These rules govern the 
format, contents, order, and meaning of the messages exchanged between the PDA and MSS. 
According to [159] for a protocol specification to be complete it should explicitly specify five 
elements, namely: the service provided by the protocol, the assumptions about the environment 
where the protocol is used, the protocol vocabulary, the format of messages, and procedure rules. 
Each of these requirements is specified and discussed below. 
Our discussion is based on the algorithm introduced in chapter 5 and illustrated in figure 5.7 
where a PDA owner called Bob wishes to make an anonymous call to Alice, who owns a desktop 
workstation; Doug is the owner of the MSS; Clare the owner of a bank where Bob and Doug are 
account holders; and Ebe, another PDA owner that happened to be at the same MSS as Bob. ' 
6.2 Service specification 
The purpose of the protocol is to provide Bob's PDA, with a mechanism to send one or more e-mail 
messages to Alice's WS and to receive responses to his messages if Alice decides to reply; all of this 
without Bob disclosing his identity neither to Alice, nor to anybody else. 
, The protocol protects the contents of messages exchanged between Bob and Alice by encrypting 
them with a secret session key which is negotiated between the PDA and the MSS through messages 
encrypted with the public key of the MSS. Bob's PDA learns the public key by listening to the air 
where the MSS broadcasts its public key periodically. 
Messages from Bob to Alice and vice versa are sent through a MSS and from there to a com- 
munication network until they reach Alice's WS. The MSS charges the sender of the message for 
the use of the communication service. The protocol allows Bob to open an anonymous coinniuni- 
cation session for a certain amount of money, and then it deducts n units of money from the initial 
payment for each message sent by Bob. Bob is alerted by the MSS m units of money before his 
credit runs out; if he wishes, he can send additional payments to the MSS. The MSS finishes Bob's 
session when no money is left. To protect Bob's anonymity, the payment is made by anonymous 
e-cash. Before Bob's payment is accepted by the MSS, a bank is contacted to verify that the e-coin 
received from Bob is genuine. 
If not a single message is received from Bob after a certain period of time, either no message the 
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MSS aborts the PDA session under the assumption that PDA has abandoned its communicatic)II 
session without logging out properly or it has crashed. 
Oil the other hand, if no messages can be sent to the MSS (the channel is full) the PDA aborýs 
its session under the assumption that the MSS has aborted the session at the other end. 
Ali unexpected termination of a communication session raises the issue about what happens to 
the money that Bob has paid for his communication session. As discussed in section 8.8, this is a topic that needs to be studied. 
6.3 Assumptions about the environment 
The protocol is expected to work in tile Internet environment. It is assumed that Bob's PDA 
the MSS that supports Bob's wireless communication and Alice's computer are connected to the 
Internet and support standard TCP/IP protocols [154]. Likewise, we take for granted that tile mail 
server computer and Clare's bank work station which also participate in the system, run TCP/IP 
protocols and are Internet connected. 
A major issue of concern about the working environment of our protocol is the assumption ()f 
all open transmission channel. That is to say, all messages that leave a computer to travel to their 
final destination are at risk of being accidentally or maliciously overheard by anybody equipped 
with tile necessary hardware and software and legally or illegally connected to the channel. 
In figure 5.7 the risk of eavesdropping is represented by the presence of Ebe located in tile area 
of coverage of the MSS currently being used by Bob. Yet nothing prevents Ebe from appearilia 
connected to any other part of the network that links Bob and Alice. Similarly nothing stops the 
evil Ebe from having a gang of bad fellows', Mata-Hari and Tom for example, whose job or hobby 
is to meddle with the network. 
To cope with this hostile environment, messages exchanged between Bob's PDA and tile MSS 
tire protected by encrypting then with a session secret key known only to Bob and tile MSS. At his 
discretion Bob call either encrypt the messages lie sends to Alice with Alice's public key or send 
plain text. In the former case only Alice can understand the messages, while in the later, everybody 
call, the MSS included. 
The session key to encrypt messages is negotiated between the PDA and tile MSS. For this to be 
possible the PDA must learn first the public key of the MSS. This is done by tile MSS broadcasting 
its key and the PDA listening for it. 
The support of Internet protocols is of crucial importance for us because the protocol we are 
designing is mounted oil top of the services offered by the user datagram protocol (UDP) and tile 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). 
The UDP protocol and in particular its broadcast services are used by the MSS to advertise 
its public key to all PDA within the area of coverage of tile MSS. The fact that tile receiver of a datagrain message does not need to know the identity of the sender is crucial here since at this 
stage of the PDA-MSS interaction the PDA is not yet in possession yet of its TmpId. Similarly, 
the connectionless nature of the UDP and the property that an UDP server can accept messages 
tit a well-known port are used by tile PDA to negotiate its first session key (see below) with tile 
MSS. 
Once the public key of the MSS is known by tile PDA and a session key is agreed upon betweell 
'Ebe coines froin Ebenezer Scrooge, a inean character in A Christmas Carol by Charles Dickens. Mata-liari is 
probably the inost fainous feniale spy who worked as a double agent during the World War I. Toin coines frotu Ton, 
Quitro- the villain of El 17npostor inverosirril included in Historia Universal de to Infamia by Jorge Luis Borges. 
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the former and the latter, the services of the TCP protocol are used to establish a connection- 
oriented communication between the PDA and the MSS. 
-_ It is worth noting that our protocol is independent of the TCP/IP protocol; it can be built on 
top of any other protocol that offers similar services; we focus on the TCP/IP protocols because 
so far they are the most widely used. 
' 
Bob's PDA communicates over a wireless communication interface, lience to communicate with 
other computers (both wired and wireless) connected to the Internet, it needs the support of a 
mobile support station [46] (see sections 2.7.1 and 5.7). 
The MSS serves as a bridge between the PDA and the rest of the Internet and forms together 
with the PDA, a wireless LAN on which TCP/IP protocols are mounted. The bottom layers 
(Data Link and Physical) of the wireless LAN can be any international standard for wireless LANs, 
for example, the 802.11 of the IEEE or the HIPERLAND of the ETSI. Both the 802.11 and the 
HI PERLAND protocol are currently under the study of international stalidarizatioll bodies, with 
the intention of adopting them as international standards. 
For 
, more 
information about these protocols refer to section 2.8.7 and references [105,56,21, 
55,1061 160,161]. The place of the wireless standard within the ISO protocol stack is illustrated 
in figure 6.1. 
ýA 
MSS serves as the current home for the mobile host and is responsible for two jobs. It 
receives messages coming from Bob's PDA and routes them to their destination. Oil the other 
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hand, assuming that the PDA is switched on, it conveys to Bob's PDA, messages addressed to 
it. In this case, by messages, we have in mind both control messages exchanged between the 
communicating computers and e-mail messages exchanged between Bob and Alice. 
It is obvious that the problem can be divided into two subproblems or protocols and make it 
easier to attack. The first protocol has to do with the communication between Bob's PDA and the 
MSS and the second with the communication between the MSS and Alice's computer. The f1rSt 
part of the problem is the hardest one and the one we will concentrate on. Once Bob's e-niail 
messages are in the MSS, they are, after undergoing some local processing, delivered to its final 
destination by means of standard e-mail protocols. Thus, the second part is mainly a probleni ()f 
routing over the Internet, a topic which has been extensively studied (refer to [154,61] for exarnple 
and not to be addressed in this work. 
In this protocol we assume that Alice has a desktop e-mail address (Alice @ncl. ac. uk for exainple) 
in a desktop computer permanently connected to the Internet. Alice sends and receives e-niail 
messages in the traditional way, thus, we consider that the receiving peer of the protocol does not 
need further discussion. 
As an aside comment, it is worth mentioning that, apart from having a PDA, Bob can have 
a desktop e-mail address as well (Bobftoli. mx for example) and use it to send and receive noil- 
anonymous L-mail messages. Anybody interested in e-mailing Bob, sends their message to 
Bobftoli. mx, the message travels to Bob's mailbox computer where it is stored for later retrieval 
or automatically forwarded to Bob's current MSS. While at home or in office, Bob retrieves his 
messages with the help of his personal workstation, but when lie is outdoors he uses his PDA. 
6.4 Protocol vocabulary 
The protocol vocabulary defines wliat messages are used to implement tile protocol. It is importalit 
to mention that at this level of abstraction tile focus is on tile semantic of tile messages rather than 
on tlicir precise syntax. Tile inclusion of tiny details liere would make the model unnecessarily 
more complicated and would blur the semantics of tile protocol, i. e. the main target at t1lis stage. 
6.4.1 Basic components of the protocol 
According to the functions performed by the PDA and the MSS, and the messages exclianged 
between tlicin, the whole protocol call be represented by a set of processes linked by communicatioll 
cliannels as illustrated in figure 6.2. 
In tile figure tliere is a set of n PDAs currently located witliin the area of coverage of tile MSS 
and interested in sending anonymous messages. For simplicity at this stage we represent eacli PDA 
by a single process, later oil (see section 6.4.2) we will see t1lat tliere are more process involved ill 
eacii PDA. 
Tliere are two permanent processes at the MSS, namely, the KsTmpIdMan and the IýPuMall 
wliicli run permanently ill the MSS regardless of wliether there is a PDA in the area of coverage of 
the MSS or not. 
The licart of tlic protocol is the KsTmpldMan process. As its name implies its main task is to 
take care of the session keys used to encrypt messages exclianged between the PDAs and the MSS. 
Also, it is in cliarge of the TiiipId assigned to the PDAs. It guarantees that botli the session keys 
and tlie TinpId are correct and unique. Wlien the KsTmpldMan process is initiated, it comes witll 
well-known bidirectional cliannels wliicli are used during tile negotiation of session keys. 
Togetlier witli the KqTinpIdMan process works the IfpuMan. The latter is in charge of period- 
ically broadcasting the public key of the MSS to tile air (through a well-known broadcast cliaiiiiel) 
6.4 Protocol vocabulary 
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so that PDAs interested in, can read it. 
At a given moment there can be any number of PDAs from none to n. The value of n is limited 
by the resources (memory, bandwidth, etc. ) available in the MSS and depends on the specific 
hardware where the system is implemented. When a PDA arrives at the MSS it creates its PDAj 
process which will be in charge for communication with the MSS. 
Once a PDA opens an anonymous session in the MSS a MSSsesj process is created for it. The 
job of the MSSsesj process is to take care of the communication with its corresponding PDAj 
counterpart once a session and a Tmpld is assigned to PD& 
A PDAj and its corresponding MSSsesj process are linked by bidirectional communication chan- 
nels; so are the MSSses and the KsTmpIdMan processes. 
To do their jobs each MSSsesj process is linked by bidirectional communication channels to 
the bank and MailSvr processes. The bank process is contacted by the AnoSes processes through 
the' bidirectional channel that links them any time the latter wants to verify that an e-coin it has 
received as a payment is genuine. As can be seen from the figure, the bank is not in the MSS, it can 
'be 
in any computer connected to the Internet as long as it is reachable from the MSSses processes. 
The MailSvr process serves as a bridge between the MSSses process when it comes to exchanging 
e-mail messages between the MSS and other computers connected to the Internet. The Mailsvr 
process is linked to each of the MSSsesj processes by a bidirectional channel and is located either 
inside the MSS or in another computer provided it is reachable from the MSSses processes. 
6.4.2 Processes and messages 
A more detailed representation of the system is shown in figure 6.3, As can be appreciated from 
the figure, the whole system in composed of nine processes. The PDAuser, PDAses and PDAtcp 
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Figure 6.3: 'Protocol hierardly. 
form a layered hierarchy at tile PDA side. So do tile KsTmpIdMan, MSSses, and MSStcp at tile 
MSS side. For this reason we use the words process and layer interchangeably. A brief descriptiDll 
of each of tile nine processes of the system and the meaning of the messages they send each other 
are presented next. Ali extended discussion of them is presented in section 6.6. 
It is shown in tile figure that Bob's PDA process is divided into the PDAuser, PDAses alld 
PDAtcp layer which are defined as follows: 
PDAuser The PDA user represents the interface between the PDA user and the MSS. 
PDAses The PDA session is in charge of managing the anonymous communication session of t1le, 
PDA user. It is there to hide all details of little interest to the user. 
PDAtcp The PDA tcp layer is there to transmit messages from the PDA to the MSS and vice 
versa. It establishes a connection With its MSS peer and informs the PDAses layer if t1lis 
connection fails i. e. when it discovers that its MSS peer is not reading a message sent to it. 
On the other liand, the anonymous session in the MSS that serves Bob's PDA is divided into 
the MSSscs and the MSStcp layer. The functions performed by these layers are defined as follows: 
MSSses The main function of the MSS session layer is to manage the anonymous COMMunicatiol, 
at tli( ý MSS side. 
MSStcp The MSStcp layer is there to transmit message from the MSS to the PDA and vice 
versa. It establislies a connection with its peer (PDAtcP) and informs the MSSses layer if 
this connection fails i. e. if it discovers that its PDA peer is not reading messages sent to it. 
It can be seen froin the figure that the MSS session layer interacts with two processes, namely, 
with the batik and the MailSrv. The description of these processes is as follows: 
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bank This process runs in a bank WS where after several verification tests it is decided whether 
an e-coin sent by Bob to the MSS is genuine or a fake. 
MaiISrv The main function this process performs is to provide standard e-mail protocols to 
forward Bob's messages to Alice and to receive Alice's responses. 
6.4.3 Messages 
The layers of the system described in section 6.4 communicate with each other by means of sending 
and receiving messages. The protocol vocabulary is made up of 18 messages whose semantics are 
discussed next. 
Kpu A message broadcast by the KpuMan process. It contains the public key of the MSS. 
KpuRcvd A message sent from the PDAses to the PDAuser layer to indicate that the Kpu has 
been received. 
Ks A message sent by the PDAses to the KsTmpIdMan process. It contains a suggested Ks. If 
Ks is accepted by the KsTmpIdMan process the latter sends a Tmpld message and then the 
accepted Ks is used for the anonymous communication session between the PDA and the 
MSS. 
TmpIdRcvd A message sent from the PDAses to the PDAuser layer to indicate that the TmpId 
has been received. 
TmpId A message sent by the MSSses layer to the PDAses to indicate that the suggested session 
key has been accepted. 
Ecash A message sent by the PDAuser to the PDAses and from there to the PDAtcp until it 
reaches the MSSses layer. The contents of this message is irrelevant to the functionality of 
the protocol, thus, its is not reflected in the validation model. However, if the protocol is 
implementated this message contains a certain amount of electronic cash to pay for a new 
anonymous session or to extend an expiring one. Upon receiving this message, the MSSSes 
forwards the e-coin found in it to the bank. 
GenuineEcash A message sent by the bank to the MSSses to indicate that the e-coin just received 
ý, 
is genuine. 
FýakeEcash A message sent by the bank to the MSSses to indicate that the e-coin just received is 
a fake. 
EcashAccepted A message originated at the MSSses layer and sent to the PDAuser (through 
the stack of protocols) to indicate that the e-cash the user had sent to the MSS has been 
accepted as a payment to open an anonymous session or to extend one in progress. 
EcashRejected A message originated at the MSSses layer and sent to the PDAuser (through the 
stack of protocols) to indicate that the e-cash the user had sent to the MSS has been rejected. 
EaddrAndTxt A message originated at the PDAuser and containing an e-mail address (Alice's 
for example) and a text body. It travels from the PDAuser through the stack protocol until 
it reaches the MailSvr process from where it is forwarded to its final destination. 
80 Protocol specification of the systeri, 
YouHaveMail A message originated at the MailSvr as a result of receiving Alice's response to 
one of Bob's messages. This message is sent through the stack protocol until it eventually 
reaches tile PDAuser process. Upon the arrival of this message, Bob is signalled so that he 
can open from his mail box and read it. Next, Bob has the choice of deleting or saving it. 
How, and when all of this this happens is not a matter of concern to tile semantics of tile 
communication protocol. 
ChangeMyKs This message is originated at tile PDAuser and travels through the stack protocol 
until it reaches the KsTmpldMan. It indicates that the PDA user wishes to change his current 
session key, probably after suspecting that his current session key has been compromised. 
YourNewKs A message sent by tile Ks TmpIdMan to the PDA user as a response to a Changemws 
message. It contains a new Ks for tile PDA user. 
TirneExpAlert This message is originated at tile MSSses when N units of time before tile anony- 
mous session time the PDA user has paid for expires. It travels through tile protocol stack 
till eventually it reaches the PDAuser. It is intended to be an invitation for the user to send 
more e-cash to the MSS in order to extend his anonymous communication time. 
TirneFin The Timerin message is originated at tile MSSses and sent through tile protocol stack 
until eventually it reaches tile PDAuser. It is meant to interrupt tile communication session 
immediately after tile session time the PDA user has paid for expires. It is an informative 
message since by the time it reaches the PDA screen, everything related to the anonyinous 
session, both in tile MSS and tile PDA, is being cleared up. 
abort This message can be originated at any of thr processes in the system whenever there is a 
need to interrupt the anonymous communication session. It is always sent down the protocol 
stack till it reaches the corresponding tcp layer. From there, it is forwarded to the remote 
peer; at the same time tile message aborted is propagated up the protocol stacks at both tile 
PDA and MSS side. 
aborted A message originated at tile PDAtcp and MSStcp layer. The layer that receives it 
forwards it up the protocol stack and terminates. It causes a cascade abort starting at tile 
lowest layer. 
As can be appreciated from the figure, communication between neighbouring layers is achieved 
by sending/receiving messages through channels; in this way messages sent by the PDAuser layer 
to the PDAses layer travel through the PDAuser-to-ses channel and messages travelling in tile 
opposite direction go through the PDAses-to-user channel. Communication between other layers 
takes place in a similar way, and is self explanatory by reading the name of tile channels. 
6.5 Format of messages used 
For the purpose of the Promela specification of our system it is enough to represent a message witl, 
two fields: format= 1control lay, datal where the first field represents the type of message and 
the second one the data being transmitted. In a structure-like form, the messages we use look as 
follows: 
structj 
unsigned char typo; /* type of message 
unsigned char data[DATALENGTIII; /* data 
)message; 
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Note that to implement a flow control discipline (flow layer) it would be necessary to include two 
additional fields. One to determine the sequence number of the message and another to implement 
checksum field to detect possible transmission errors. 
6.6 Procedure rules 
A widely used and well-known model for protocol specification is the finite state machine [61,62, 
159]. Since its introduction in the early 1950s it has been used for modeling a great number of 
systems. Its analytical power and the ease with which the model can be loaded into a computer and 
manipulated automatically with the help of software tools makes this method attractive. Similarly, 
the graphical nature of this model makes it easy to read and understand the different stages that 
the protocol goes through during its execution. Unfortunately, this descriptive clarity holds true 
only for systems with a small number of states. For systems with more than 20 to 30 states and a 
similar number of transitions, the graphical representation on paper or a computer screen becomes 
difficult to follow and understand. 
For systems that exceed this limit, it is probably a good alternative to describe them in a 
formal or semiformal verification modeling language or to complement the finite state diagram 
representation with such code. 
While the conversion of a finite state machine into an implementation program is not straight- 
forward, a verification modeling program is. Because of this, it is usually helpful to have more 
than one representation of a system. On this account, we will present our system in both: its finite 
state machine and its verification modeling program. We have chosen Promela language [159] to 
represent our system and it will be introduced in section 6.6.2. 
6.6.1 Finite state machine 
As the finite state machine model-also known as state transition diagrams- is a familiar method, 
we will not discuss it in depth, but a few words concerning our particular protocol are worth 
mentioning. 
In the finite state machine, a state is represented by a circle or an oval, and a transition by a 
marked arc. `Iýansition between states take place as a result of an incoming event; for example, 
when a message is sent, when a message arrives, when a timer goes off, or when ail interruption 
occurs or the user presses a key on her keyboard. A label on the arc represents the name of the 
event that triggered the finite state machine. In our case most of the incoming events have to do 
with sending and receiving messages and are labeled by the marks ! and ? respectively. In addition 
we also have events that have nothing to do with sending and receiving messages but with certain 
local conditions. For examples, the waiting time for something to happens has expired, the user 
has pressed a key, the results of a computation are ready for use, etc. 
Because of their graphic nature, state transition diagrams are easy to read. Oil the other 
hand the mathematical theory behind them makes them useful for showing the correct operation 
of, a protocol. However, due to space limitations and the two-dimensional nature of paper, it is 
not, always easy and practicable to show all possible incoming event possibilities including error 
conditions, local state variables and predicates associated with a protocol. A possible way of 
simplifying state transition diagrams is by not representing transient states, Le those that lead to 
the main ones. 
Hence the state transition diagrams we present here, are incomplete specifications. They are 
meant to help the reader understand the protocol and make the reading of the Promela code easier. 
82 Protocol specification of the sYsterri. 
6.6.2 A brief introduction to Promela 
Even for relative simple communication system it is certainly difficult to design a correct protocol 
and even harder is tile task of validating the correctness its procedure rules. Because of this 
the use of verification languages to write the procedures rules and a software tool to verify the 
correctness of tile resulting code, called tile validation model, is highly recommended at this'stage 
of the development. 
So far the most successful software tool used to trace logical design errors in distributed systerns 
and in particular in communication protocols is Spin (Simple Promela INterpreter). Spin is a generic 
verification system that accepts design specifications written in the verification modeling language 
called Promela (PROcess MEta LAnguage) [162]. We will discuss here this modeling language and 
leave tile discussion of Spin until section 7. 
Promela is Spin's input language and provides a vehicle for making abstractions of protocols so 
that details that are unrelated to the communication processes are suppressed. A Promela prograrn 
consists of processes, message channels and variables. Tile state of the whole system depends oil 
the state of these three components. 
Motivated by Promela's power to describe process interactions, we have decided to describe 
our procedure rules in Promela. Although Promela is a simple language with a C-like syntax, a 
complete Promela code of a middle (more then 50 lines) or large size program is not easy to follolv. 
To help the reader not to get lost in dozens of Promela lines and to focus his attention on crucial 
aspects of the protocol only, we use a sort of Pseudo-Promela code to describe our procedure rules 
here and leave the full Promela code description until section 7. Complete Promela code can triple 
the size of tile pseudocode; hence it is significantly harder to read; moreover, the numerous and 
tiny details that it includes do not change tile main idea of tile algorithm in a fundamental way; 
therefore, we restrict tile discussion in this section mainly to the basic ideas of the algorithm. 
Before going further, it is worth mentioning that a validation model is a piece of code that de- 
scribes tile procedure rules, i. e. tile interaction between processes. Having the code and a simulator 
to execute it, tile verification of the completeness of the protocol and its logical consistency (free 
from deadlocks for example) is straightforward and furthermore, tile implementation of tile sYstein 
follows from converting the Promela code to a high-level one, C or C++ for example. Tile differ- 
ence between a Promela version of tile protocol and tile final high-level language implementation 
is that the former deliberately abstracts from issues of protocol design, such as message forinat, 
neither does it say how a message is to be transmitted, encoded, decoded, stored, etc. Moreover, 
it does not deal with details irrelevant to processes' interaction such as encryption and decryption 
of messages and implementation of timers. 
The syntax of Promela is described by Holzmann in the appendix C of his book [159], however 
to help the reader to understand our Promela code we introduce tile basic Promela statements, 
and their semantics here. Promela is a non-deterministic language, it is easy to realize that tile 
semantics of Proniela statements comes from Dijkstra's guarded commands introduced in his famous 
paper [163] and discussed further by Hoare in his classic article [164]. 
executability In Promela the execution of a statement is conditional on its executability, Le. at a 
given moment of time a statement is either executable or blocked depending on the state of a 
variable or channel. Executability is the basic mean of synchronization; hence, as shown below 
ill send/receive statements, input and output through a channel allows tllC Communication 
between two processes and synchronization as well. For example, the statement 
if (a -- b) an a+1 fi 
, 6.6 
Procedure rules 
either increments the value of a or blocks until the condition (a==b) holds. 
send The syntax of the send statement is 
channel ! msg 
where channel is the name of a channel and msg is a message. 
re ceive The syntax of the receive statement is 
channel ? msg 
where channel is the name of a channel and msg is a message. 
separators -> and ; are separators. 
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skip skip is a null statement. It is always executable and its execution has no effect. It is normally 
used to satisfy syntax requirements. 
goto The goto statement works as the infamous goto of high level languages, it transfers control 
to any labeled statement. Like the skip statement, goto is always executable. As Promela 
pays no attention to the problem of programming techniques it lacks most of the constructs 
for writing a well-structured code, as a result goto is intensively used. 
if-fi selection A selection statement begins with if and ends with the keyboard fi and contains 
a list of one or more options. Every option begins with the flag :: followed by a boolean 
expression (a guard). An option can be executed only if its guard is executable. Only one 
option from the list is executed. If more than one guard is executable, one of them is selected 
at random the corresponding option is executed. If all guards are unexecutable, the process 
blocks until at least one of them becomes executable. In the following example the variable 
counter is either incremented or decremented depending on the value of a and b 
if 
(a b) counter= counter +I 
(a b) counter= counter 
fi 
do-od repetition This statements works in a similar way as the if --f i one, but it is repeated 
until a break statement is encountered or an unconditional goto jump is performed. In the 
example shown the program loops until either the variable counter is decremented to zero 
or an error occurs. 
do 
(counter < 0) goto Error 
(counter == 0) break 
(counter > 0) counter= counter 
od 
timeout This statement represents a condition that becomes true is and only if no other statement 
in the block of commands is executable. Depending on the timer value, timeout becomes 
true sooner or later. 
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Process synchronization 
Promela supports synchronous and asynchronous communication between processes. Synchronous 
communication is achieved by conditioning the send and receive events to the states of the output 
and input channels. If an input channel is empty, no input messages are available from that queue 
and the receiving process cannot move to its next state. On the other hand, if an output channel 
is full, no messages can be sent to that channel and the sender process remains in the same state. 
In synchronous communication, the move of a process to a new state is conditioned to the state of its communicating peer. To make a move to a new state, both the sender's output queue and tlie 
receiver's input queue have to be selected simultaneously. Needless to say, the sender selects the 
output queue and the receiver the input one. Neither the sender nor the receiver can move to tlieiir 
new states until this match occurs. 
In both synchronous arid asynchronous communication the message is removed from the input 
channel by the receiver. Also a message can be read from an input channel for one process only. The 
argument for this is that most distributed systems can be modelled on this model. Unfortunately 
this restriction makes group communication (multicast and broadcast) more complicated to Model. 
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6. '6.3 The user layer 
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The user layer is the interface between the PDA user and the anonymizing system; its work consists 
in accepting commands from the user and transmitting them to the layer below it, i. e. the presen- 
tation layer. In addition, it receives response messages from the presentation layer and displays 
them on the PDA screen. In fact the user layer can be regarded as an application which runs in 
the PDA and uses the services offered by the session layer. 
Finite state diagram 
In accordance with the algorithm presented in section 5.10.3, the first thing that the PDA does 
upon being switched on is to learn the MSS public key (Ifpu). Since the value and the nature of 
this key is irrelevant to the user, this task is carried out by the session layer. The user layer just 
waits until the session layer informs it that the lfpu has been learnt. 
As illustrated in figure 6.4, when the PDA is activated it enters the KpuNegotiation state where 
it waits for the message KpuReceived from the session layer. Such a message indicates that the 
public key of the MSS has been successfully learnt, hence the finite state diagram can move to the 
KsNegotiation state to negotiate a session key (Ks). During the negotiation of the Ks (see section 
6.6.4), the PDA uses the public key of the MSS to encrypt messages sent to the MSS, which contain 
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Figure 6.5: Payment for an anonymous call. 
candidates for session keys. 
The negotiation of tile session key is another task irrelevant to the user, therefore, this task is 
included in the session layer as well. When tile session layer has a session key approved by the MSS 
it sends a TmpIdReceivcd message to tile user layer. This event, as depicted in tile state transitioll 
diagram, transfers the finite state machine from state KsNegotation to tile PaySes one. If, for aiiy 
reason, the session layer cannot negotiate a Ks key, it sends an abort message to tile user layer and 
the finite state diagram moves to the Aborted state. 
Tile PaySes state is where the PDA user performs his first payment for the anonymous sessioll 
which credits the PDA user with a certain amount of time of anonymous communication. In order 
to do that, the PDA user selects an e-note blindly signed by Clare from his PDA memory alld 
sends it to tile MSS. 
In both the finite state machine and the Promela code, we assume that tile PDA user has all 
endless supply of e-cash in his PDA memory to pay for tile anonymous communication session wit,, 
the MSS. This assumption is grounded on the fact that there is no price to pay for keeping e-casil 
in the memory of the PDA. Furthermore, unlike coins, e-coins are weightless and do not represent 
any physical burden to carry. 
The e-cash sent by Bob call be accepted or refused as a payment depending on whether tile 
bank declares it genuine or fake. If the e-coin is declared genuine by the bank, it can still be refused 
by the MSS if its value does not fall within the interval limited by tile minimum and maxinjuln 
amount of money accepted by the MSS as a payment for call. This is why tile MSS has to send 
Bob's e-cash to the bank before accepting it. The path Bob's e-coin follows before it is accepted 
as a payment by the MSS is shown in figure 6.5. Indepth discussion about tile validation of tile 
e-coin and the bank is presented later on in section 6.6.7. 
If tile e-casil sent to the MSS is accepted, the MSS opens an anonymous session for the PDA 
and replies with a EcashAccepted message and the finite state diagram moves to the AnoSes state. 
Otherwise, it replies with a EcashRejected message (not shown in the figure). When this Message 
is displayed oil the PDA screen the PDA user might wish to select a different e-coin and try agaill. 
To avoid the risk of being locked in this state forever, a timeout mechanism is activated after 
N number of attempts and the finite state diagram moves to the Aborted state where everything 
related to the current session key is cleared up. When everything is cleared up tile user can start 
a new anonymous session by negotiating a new Ks. 
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Once the anonymous session is opened with the PDA, the PDA user can send as many anony- 
mous messages as he wants simply by passing down the protocol stack the message EaddrAndTxt 
which contains the recipient's address and the body of the e-mail message. The user is notified of 
incoming e-mail messages by the message YbuHaveMail which appears on his PDA screen. The 
path Bob's e-mail messages and Alice's replies follow before reaching their destination is shown in 
figure 6.6 
After a certain amount of time in an anonymous session two things can happen. Either the user 
decides to leave his anonymous session or his prepaid time expires. In the first case the PDA user 
presses his abort key (EscPressed); this event takes the finite state diagram to the Aborted state. 
In the second case it receives a warning message from the PDA (TimeExpAlert). Upon receiving 
this message it can ignore it or send more e-cash (Ecash) to the MSS to extend the anonymous 
session. If no more e-cash is sent, the finite state diagram returns to the AnoSes state to continue 
its work until the prepaid time finish and the message TimeFin is received which indicates that the 
prepaid time is over and takes the finite state diagram to the Aborted state. 
The Promela code of the user layer shows details deliberately omitted from the finite state 
diagram. 
The user process: it is the anonymous e-mail application running on PDA 
Communication channels connected to this layer: 
---- PDAuser-to-ses --- > 
PDAuser PDAses 
<--- PDAses-to-user --- 
proctype PDAuser 
KpuNegotiation: /* wait till the public key of the MSS is learnt 
PDAses-to-user ? KpuReceived(Kpu) -> goto KsNegotiation; 
KsNegotiation: /* negotiate a session key 
Ks= NewKs-Fetched; 
/* encrypt Ks with Kpu 
do 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks 
if 
PDAses-to-user ? TmpIdReceived 
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/* the last send Ks is the session key 
goto FirstPayment; 
timeout -> Ks= NewKs-Fetched 
if 
od; 
FirstPayment: /* first payment for the anonymous session */ 
/* all messages sent and received to and from the session layer 
* are encrypted/decrypted with Ks 
do 
(i <= MaxNumAttempts) -> /* try MaxNum. Attempts times */ 
PDAuser-to-ses ! Ecash -> /* e-money to pay for an anonymous session 
if 
PDAses-to-user ? EcashRejected -> 
Ecash= NewEcash-Fetched /* fetch a different e--coin and try again 
PDAses-to-user ? EcashAccepted goto AnoSes 
if 
i++ 




PDAuser-to-ses ! EaddrAndTxt /* send as many msg as you can before 
/* the msg TimeFin arrives 
PDAses-to-user ? YouHaveMail 
/* display the msg on the screen 
PDAuser-to-ses ! ChangeMyKs -> PDAses-to-user ? YourNewKs; 
Ks= YourNewKs; /* update Ks 
PDAses-to-user 7 TimeAlert-> 
if 
/* the user wishes to extend his session 
do 
(i =< N); /* try N times to send payment 
PDAuser-to-ses ! Ecash -> 
if 
PDAses-to-user? EcashAccepd -> break 
PDAses-to-user ? EcashRejetd -> 
Ecash= NewEcash-Fetched; /* fetch a different e--coin and try again 
i++ 
fi 
else -> break 
od 
skip /* the user doesn't wish to extend his session 
PDAsos_to-user ? TimoFin goto Aborted 
PDAsos_to-usor ? aborted goto Aborted 
od; 
Aborted: 
/* session has boon aborted 
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The main function of the PDA session layer is to open and manage the anonymous communication 
session of the PDA user and to hide all the details irrelevant to the lay PDA user, such as learning 
the public key of the MSS and the negotiation of the session key and its renewal whenever it is 
necessary. 
The process of obtaining the public key of the MSS is an independent problem easily sepa- 
ýrated from the main protocol; thus, we present it individually, with the help of figure 6.8 and its 
corresponding Promela code. 
Broadcast the public key of the MSS 
To communicate securely with the MSS the PDA needs the MSS public key. Because of this, after 
being activated by the PDAuser layer, the first job of the PDA session layer is to contact the MSS 
and learn its public key. The PDA listens to the air until a message containing a Ifpu is received. 
This message is broadcast through a broadcast channel that the PDA is listening to as illustrated 
in figure 6.7. 
, The Promela code to simulate the KpuMan process is presented next. For simplicity, in our 
simulation we assume that the MSS has only one public key, nevertheless nothing prevents the MSS 
from having more than one public key and broadcasting them to the air in a polling scheme so that 
if a PDA fails to verify the authenticity of one of them, it can try the next one. 
The KpuMam. process: every t units of time a message that contains the public key 
of the MSS is broadcast to the air through a well--known port. 
PDAses KpuMan 




Kpu-val= NewKpu /* fetch one of your Kpu 
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Figure 6.8: Getting the public key of the MSS. 
Learning the public key of the MSS 
The finite state diagram shown in figure 6.8 shows how tile Kpu is learnt by tile PDA. The diagraill 
starts when the PDA is within the area of coverage of the MSS. In this state) called KPuNegotiation, 
the PDA reads messages broadcast by the MSS through a well-known port. Upon receiving a 
message the PDA proceeds to verify the authenticity of the public key of tile MSS by checking tile 
signature of the person or institution who vouches for the key. How tile authenticity of a public 
key call be guaranteed is explained in section 5.10.1. If no messages are received within a certain 
amount of time the diagram moves to tile Aborted state. This event is an indication for tile user to 
locate a new MSS and start again. 
Similarly, the diagram moves to tile Aborted state if no correct Kpu is received after N attempts. 
If the Aborted state is reached the PDA lias to try a different MSS and start again from tile 
1(puNegotiation state. Oil the contrary, the diagram moves to the KsNegotiation state when a 
correct Kpu is received. 
in the finite state machine and Promela code we suggest that tile MSS broadcasts its public 
key periodically. This is only one possible approach, other alternatives are possible, for example 
the MSS may broadcast its public key only when it detects the presence of a new PDA witilin its 
cell. The crucial issue liere is that the PDA has to get the public key from tile MSS as soon as it 
enters the MSS cell and before it sends any message that might reveal tile identity of its user, to 
the MSS. 
It is conceivable that a PDA may receive Kpu messages from more than one MSS at tile same 
time. This is usually the case in urbanised areas where adjacent cells overlap. In case of overlapping, 
the PDA selects the MSS with the strongest signal. 
The Pronicla code for describing the finite inachine of figure 6.8 is presented below. 
GETTING the PUBLIC KEY OF THE MSS: the PDA waits from messages to come 
from the nearest MSS, containing the public key of the latter. It checks for the 
authenticity of the key until its test is successful or a timeout occurs. In the 
latter case it moves to another MSS and starts the process again. 
In case of failure the PDA trios one MSS after another until it is turned off by 
its user. 
Communication channels connected to this layer: 
PDAj3os KpuMan 
<--- KpuPort-to-sos --- 





U <= MAXNUM-ATTEMPTS) 
if 
MSSbcast-to-PDA ? Kpu /* Kpu rcvd: now check for authenticity 
if 
(PuKey == CORRECT) goto KsNegotiation 
else -> i++ 
fi 
MSSbcast-to-PDA ? bogus -> i++ /* bogus msg rcvd: ignore it 
timeout -> goto Aborted /* couldn't hear any msg from this MSS 
fi 




to negotiate Ks here 
Aborted: 
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Figure 6.9: The PDA session layer. 
The finite state diagram that describes the session layer of tile PDA is shown in figure 6-9. To keep 
the diagram readable, ilon-relevant details such as temporary states are not shown in tile figure. 
However, they call be found in the Promela code presented at tile end of this section. 
Upon obtaining a correct public key from the MSS, the session layer moves to tile KsNegotiation 
state where it negotiates a session key with the MSS. Let us assume that PDAj is trying to open 
ail anonymous session. 
PDAj creates a Ks, encrypts it using the Kpu, sends it to tile MSS for approval and waits wilile 
listening to the air (a well-known port). The MSS cliecks that tile Ks suggested by PDAj is correct 
and not in use. If so, it creates a TinpId for PDAj, encrypts it using tile Ks, and sends it to PDAj 
as a reply in a TinpId message. If the Ks suggested by PDAj is incorrect, tile MSS does not reply. 
If it is correct but has been assigned to an existing PDA, say PDAi, the MSS does not reply to 
PDAj and additionally asks PDAi to cliange its Ks. After t units of silence, PDAj can try again. 
Once a suggested Ks is approved, it is used to encrypt and decrypt messages exchanged between 
PDAj and the MSS until either the end of the session or until tile Ks has to be renewed. Messages 
encrypted with Ks can be overheard by other PDAs but they will be ignored as only PDAj call 
decrypt and make sense of them. Having negotiated tile Ks the finite state diagram moves to tile 
PaySes state. 
The procedure for performing the first payment for opening an anonymous session is started 
when the PDAses layer receives tile Ecash message from the PDAuser layer. Tile PDAses layer 
just passes Ecash messages coming from the PDAuser layer to tile PDAtcp layer until either tile 
payment is successful or the intention aborted. In tile former case, the finite state diagram moves 
to the PDAses state; this means that ail anonymous communication session has been opened for 
the PDA and a certain aniount of communication time is credited for the PDA user. In tile later 
case, the finite state diagram moves to the Aborted state. 
Once the anonymous session is opened, Bob has the right to send anonymous messages to Alice 
and to receive Alice's responses. E-mail messages addressed to Alice come from tile PDAuser layer 
in the form of EaddrAndTxt, i. e in a message that contains Alice's address and the body of tile 
message. Once this message is received, the PDAses layer encrypts it with tile current session key 
and forwards it to the MSS through the PDAtcp layer. Conversely, when a message addressed to 
Bob (YouffaveAfaio arrives through the PDAtcp layer, it is decrypted with tile session key and 
forwarded up to the PDAuser layer. 
Once a session key is accepted by tile MSS it becomes the session key used by botil tile PDA 
Tmpld: temporary Identifier 
K.: key 
PayScs: payment it) open an ammyrnow semlon 
PDAý: PDA rwmymmt, t wWon 
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and the MSS to encrypt and decrypt messages till the session finishes or till Bob decides to change 
it for a new one or till the MSS orders the PDA to change it. If for some reason Bob suspects that 
his current session key has been compromised he can instruct his PDA to renew it. To do this the 
PDAuser layer passes down to the PDAses the ChangeMyIfs message. This message eventually 
reaches the KsTmpIdMan who tries to find a new Ks for the PDA, if it does, it sends the message 
YburNewKs to the PDA, if for any reason (no more Ks available for example) the KsTmpIdMan 
cannot send the PDA a new Ks, the message aborted is sent instead. Also it might happen that 
the current session key of PDAj is hit by another PDA. The KsTmprdMan responds to that by 
sending the YourNewKs message which contains a new Ks to PDAj. 
It might happen that while being in an anonymous mail session, the message TimeExpAlert is 
received from the MSS to indicate that the prepaid anonymous time is just about to finish. This 
message is passed to the PDA user layer to indicate that Bob has to send more e-cash if lie wishes 
to extend his anonymous session. Bob might either ignore the TiMeExpAlert message or reply by 
passing some e-cash (Ecash message) to the session layer. As usual, the MSS responds either with 
a EcashAccepted or EcashRejected message. The former message indicates that the anonymous 
message has been extended in the MSS and the latter indicates that it has not. If Bob does not 
extend his anonymous session time, eventually his anonymous session will finish, this is indicated 
by the arrival of the TimeFin message from the MSS. Upon receiving this message the PDA session 
layer cleans up everything and goes to the Aborted state. Naturally, Bob can finish his anonymous 
session before any TimeExp message arrives, to do this lie presses the Esc key on his keyboard; as 
a result of this action the abort message is propagated to all layers in the protocol and the finite 
state diagram moves to the Aborted state. The Promela code for the user layer is presented below. 
PDA ses layer: negotiates the opening of an anonymous session and if successful 
it manages it. With the Ks it encrypts msg before sending them to the tcp layer 
and decrypts them before passing them to the user layer. 
Communication channels connected to this layer: 
< --- KpuPort-to-PDA ---- 
KpuMan 
---- PDAuser-to-ses --- > ---- PDA-to-KsPort ---- > 
PDAuser PDAses KsTmpIdMan 
< --- PDAses-to-user ---- < --- KsPort-to-pda ----- 
---- PDAses-to-tcp ---- > 
PDAtcp 
< --- PDAtcp-to-ses ----- 
pro, ctype PDAses 
f 
KpuNegotiation: /* learnt the MSS Kpu */ 
KsNegotiation: /* negotiate a session key */ 
/* create a random session secret key (Ks), encrypt it with the public 
/* key of the MSS and send it to the MSS. Either succeed or give up after 
-/* NUMATTEMPTS times 
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do 
(i <- MAXNUH-KS-ATTEMPTS) 
Ks- NawKs-Fetchad; 
/** encrypt Ks with Kpu here 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ? Ks(TmpId) 
/* the last send Ks is the session key 
PDAses-to-user ! TmpIdReceived 
goto PaySes; 
timeout -> Ks= NewKs-Fetched; i++ 
if 
else -> PDAses-to-user ! abort; goto abort 
od; 
Payses: 
All messages sent to the flow control layer are previously 
encrypted with Ks. All messages received from the flow control 
layer are docrypted with Ks before passing them to the user 
layer. 
PDAusor-to-sos ? Ecash -> PDAses-to-tcp ! Ecash; /* wait here till Ecash comes 
do 
PDAtcp-to-ses ? EcashAccepted -> PDAses-to-user EcashAccepted; 
goto AnoSes 
PDAtcp-to-scs ? EcashRojected -> PDAses-to-user EcashRejected 
goto PaySes /* try again */ 
:: timoout -> goto Aborted 
od; 
AnoScs: 
do /* loop till anonymous session time expires 
PDAuner-to-ses ? EaddrAndTxt PDAses-to-tcp 1 EaddrAndTxt 
PDAtcp-to-ses ? YoulfaveMail PDAses-to-user ! YouHaveMail 
PDAuser-to-sos ? ChangoMyKs PDAses-to-tcp I ChangeMyKs 
PDAtcp-to-ses ? YourNowKs Ks= YourNewKs /* update current Ks 
PDAuser-to-soa ? Ecash PDAses-to-tcp Ecash /* Ecash >= 0 
PDAtcp-to-sos ? EcashAcceptod PDAsos-to-user EcashAccepted 
PDAtcp-to-sos ? EcashRojected PDAses-to-user EcashRejected 
PDAtcp-to-oos ? TimeExpAlort PDAscs-to-user I TimeExpAlert 
PDAtcp-to-sos ? TimoExp PDAsos-to-usor I TimeExp; goto Aborted 
:: PDAusor-to-soo ? abort 
:: PDAtcp-to-con 7 abortod 
od; 
-> PDAses-to-tcp I abort 
-> PDAscs_to-usor I aborted -> goto Aborted 
Abortod: 
skip /* cloan overything up 
6.6 Procedure rules 
PDAI A PD ] 
t 
tsssesl stsss"'I 
T.. ld nu d, 
"**-%d**- 
% 
% p )p . ., th PDM'. K. 
--- Ks- --- Ks --- 
Tmpld 
.. 
>--I - -Tmpld - - 
4 KsTmpld, %Ian 
W 
4 
.1 d Tml; mk. 
Z: % : 
PDAn bwýd chmd NISSswcsn 
Figure 6.10: The KsTmpIdMan process manages the Ks and TmpId of PDAs. 
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The session keys and TmpIds manager (KsTmpIdMan) is tile main process in tile protocol, it runs 
in tile MSS and as its name suggests is in charge of managing tile session keys used by PDAs and 
tile -temporary identifiers assigned to the PDAs. As shown in figure 6.10, it is linked to AISSSes 
and PDA processes by way of bidirectional channels. 
Basically, the KsTmpIdMan process is there to perform two crucial functions. First, it guar- 
antees that the session keys used by PDAs are correct and unique. Secondly, it assigns a unique 
TmpId to each PDA which has succeeded in suggesting the right session key. 
To explain how the KsTmpIdMan process works let us assume that PDAi is owned by Bob. 
After obtaining the public key of the MSS (see section 6.6.4) Bob's PDA proceeds to negotiate a 
session key with the MSS. PDA1 sends its session key proposal to well-known port of the MSS. 
When a session key proposed by PDA1 is approved by the key manager, the latter forks a process 
(MSSsesl) to be in charge of the anonymous session for PDAL All the details (tile number of 
communication channels to talk to for example) about the MSSsesl process together with tile 
TmpId assigned to PDA1 are sent to PDA1 in tile Tmpld message which is encrypted with Bob's 
session key and broadcast to the air. 
As can be appreciated from the finite state diagram shown in figure 6.11, tile KsTmpldMan 
process spends most of its time in the WaitingForKs state listening for Ks and ChallgeMyIfs 
messages to arrive. A Ks message contains a suggested session key and comes from a newly arrived 
PDA that wants to negotiate a session key, it is addressed to a well-known port of the KsTinpIdAfan 
process. 
When this message arrives, tile finite state diagram moves to the IfsValidation state where it 
is decided whether tile proposed Ks is to be accepted or refused. 
If tile suggested session key is correct, tile finite state diagram moves to the TnapIdSelection 
where a TmpId is selected for tile PDA. It moves to the WaitingrorAs state after the message 
TmpId is sent to the PDA. 
Conversely, if the suggested Ks is incorrect the KsTmpldMan process does not reply to tile 
PDA and the finite state diagram moves to Watingriorlfs state. 
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Figure 6.11: Finite state diagram of the KsTmpIdMan process. 
Once all AISSsesl process is assigned to PDA I, tile bidirectional broadcast channel is not longer 
needed. This channel is used temporarily by the PDA1 process. This is why it is represented by a dashed line. 
Figure 6.10 shows that tile KsTmpIdMan process and tile AISSsesl process are linked together by 
a bidirectional channel. It is through this bidirectional channel that the KsTm IdMan and AlSSsesl P 
processes inform each other about any problem with session keys. It is conceivable that tile sessioll 
key being used by PDAI is hit by a session key proposal coming from PDA2. If this liappelis the 
KsTynpldMan sends a YourNewIfs message to PDAI, which contains a now Ks for it. Also, it is 
possible that the PDA1's user decides to renew his current Ks, if so, tile ChangeMyKs is received 
from PDAI; upon receiving this message, the AISSsesl process informs tile KsTmpIdAfan about 
it. Eventually the KsTinpIdAfan creates a new session key for PDA1, puts it in tile YourNewics 
message and sends it to PDA1. 
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The KsTmpIdMan process: its main task is to ensure that session keys and 
TmpId assigned to PDA are correct and unique. It is in charge for receiving 
session key suggestions from newly arrived PDA. It verifies the suitability 
of the suggested key and if satisfied, forks a child process (MSSses) to ser-**/ 
ve the PDA in its anonymous session. Once a session key is accepted it re- 
plies to the PDA by sending a TmpId. 
It receives requests from MSSses to change their current session keys. If a 
session key currently in use is hit by another PDA proposal, the KsTmpIdMan 
asks the unlucky PDA to change its session key. 
---- KsPort-to-pda --- > 
PDA 
< --- PDA-to-KsPort ---- 
KsTmpIdMan 
---- KsTmpIdMan-to-ses --- > 
MSSses 




PDAi-to-KsPort ? Ks /* received from PDAi 
if 
(Ks == OK) 
/* create TmpId 
run MSSses(Ks, TmpId, /* fork a child process for PDAi*/ 
KsTmpIdMan-to-PDAi ! TmpId 
(Ks == INUSE) -> /* Ks in use by PDAj 
/* send nothing to PDAi */ 
/** find a new Ks for PDAj 
KsTmpIdMan-to-PDAj ! YourNewKs 
fi 
PDAj-to-KsTmpId ? ChangeMyKs /* PDAj asking its current Ks to be changed 
/** find a new Ks for PDAj */ 
KsTmpId-to-PDAj ! New-Ks-for-PDAj 
od; 
6.6.6 The anonymous session 
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It was shown in figure 6.10 that each PDA is served by an anonymous session process created 
by the KsTmpIdMan process when the PDA succeeds in opening an anonymous session. To each 
PDAj process corresponds one MSSsesj process. To serve its PDA the AISSsesj interacts with other 
processes through bidirectional channels as illustrated in figure 6.12. 
The work of each of the MSSses processes can be described with the help of the finite state 
diagram shown in figure 6.13. 
The finite state diagram starts in the WaitingForEcash state where it waits until money from 
the PDA comes. This is represented by the arrival of the Ecash message which moves the finite 
state diagram to the state PaySes where the very first payment for opening an anonymous session is 
performed. Upon receiving the e-coin from Bob, the session layer verifies that the money received 
is suitable to pay for an anonymous session. If it is suitable it sends the EcashAcceptcd message to 
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the PDA and moves to the MSSses state; this means that an anonymous session is now opened for 
Bob. 
An e-coin is considered suitable as a payment for an anonymous session when it matches two 
conditions. First, it has to be a genuine e-coin (not a fake, already spent or out of circulation) in a 
currency -pound sterling for example- accepted by Doug. Second, it has to be at least equal to 
the minimum payment that Doug, the owner of the MSS, charges for an anonymous session. Doug 
can easily verify the second condition by himself, however, lie needs the help of Clare -the bank 
owner- to verify the genuineness of the e-coin. Upon receiving the e-coin, Doug forwards it to 
Clare through the bidirectional channel that links Bob's MSSses and the bank process, and waits 
for a response telling him either that the e-coin is genuine or fake. Based on Clare's verdict, Doug 
accepts or rejects the e-coin. This is explained in more detail later on in section 6.6.7. 
If the e-coin is rejected, the MSSses sends an EcashRejected message to Bob and the finite state 
diagram moves to the WaitingForEcash state. If no suitable e-coins are received before a tinicout 
runs out everything concerning the PDA (its session key and TmpId for instance) is cleared up in 
the MSSses and in the KsTmpldMan process as well. If Bob wishes to persist with his anonymous 
session, he has to start again from the very beginning with the negotiation of a session key and a 
TmPId. 
The MSSses state is where the session layer spends most of its time. It stays there as long 
as there is credit for Bob. It leaves this state permanently when a timeout mechanism goes off 
to indicate that the prepaid communication time has expired, then the finite state diagram moves 
to the Aborted state. Being in the MSSses state, the MSS session layer is ready to receive e-mail 
messages from Bob in the form of EaddrAndTxt messages. When a message like that is received, 
the MSSses decrypts it using the current session key, and forwards it to the AIailSvr process. On 
the. other hand, it receives Alice's replies in the form of YouHaveAlail messages coming from the 
MailSvr, encrypts them using the current session key, and forwards them to Bob by sending them 
down through the protocol stack. More details about how the MailSvr works are in section 6.6.8. 
Naturally, we assume that the MSSses process can convert Bob's messages into a standard 
e-mail format and send them to the Internet using standard e-mail protocols. 
Although it is not shown in the finite state diagram, it may happen that the time Bob is credited 
for his first payment is not long enough for Bob to send and receive his messages. To warn Bob 
about the expiration of his prepaid credit the TimeExp is sent to him. Rom now on lie has n 
seconds to send more e-cash to the MSS unless lie wants his anonymous session to be finished 
abruptly. 
Once again, as in the payment to open the anonymous session, ally e-coin sent by Bob to the 
MSS is subject to a test of acceptance. If the e-coin is accepted, Bob's communication time is 
incremented according to the value of the e-coin and the message EcashAccepted is sent back. Oil 
the contrary, if the e-coin fails the acceptance test the message EcashRejected is sent and the time 
for Bob's anonymous session is left unchanged. 
The session key Bob negotiates with the KsTmpldMan process does not necessarily last until 
the end of the anonymous session. It can be changed ill the middle of the anonymous session. 
There are two situations that leads to the change of the current session key. 
First, because Bob suspects that his current session key has been compromised, Bob may 
instruct his PDA to negotiate a new session key. As illustrated in figure 6.14 ill this case the 
initiative to change the current session key comes from Bob's PDA which solids the CllangeAfylfs 
message to the MSSses process which forwards the message to the KsTTnpIdA1a? 1 process. The 
KsTmpldMan finds a new session key for Bob and replies with a YourNewlfs message. If for ally 
reason (no more session keys are available for example) the IfsTuip1dMan sends all abort message 
to the MSSses from where this message is propagated down the stack protocol until eventually it 
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Figure 6.14: Change of session key initiated at PDA. 
reaches the PDAuserlayer. The result of this is that all layers involved in Bob's PDA communication 
are aborted. 
Secondly, an order to Bob's PDA to change its current session key can be received fron, the 
KsTmpIdMan process in the form of YourNewlfs message as illustrated in figure 6.15. This message 
is sent when the KsTmpldMan process detects that Bob's session key has been hit by somebody 
else. It might be that Bob's session key is hit and that the KsTmpldMan cannot find a new session 
key for him. In such a case, the abort message is propagated to abort Bob's communication session 
as explained above. 
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Figure 6.15: Change of session key initiated at key and TmpId manager. 
MSSses LAYER: it manages the PDAs anonymous communications. It receives 
e-mail messages from the PDA and forwards then to the 'MailSvr', conver- 
sely it receives e-mail messages from the 'MailSvr' and forwards them to 
the PDA. 
It is responsible for keeping the session key, updating it, timing out the 
end of the anonymous time. It receives the PDA payment for the anonymous co- 
mmunication session and with the help of the bank assure that the recei-- 
ved e-coin is genuine. 
---- MSSses-to-MailSvr --- > 
MailSvr 
--- tcP_to_MSSseS --- > MailSvr_to_MSSses ---- 
tcp MSSses 
---- MSSses-to-bank --- > 
bank 
<--- MSSses-to-tcp ---- < --- bank-to-MSSses ---- 




MSStcp-to-ses ? abort got Aborted 
timeout goto Aborted 
MSStcp-to-ses ? Ecash goto PaySes 
od; 
PaySes: 
MSSses-to-bank ! Ecash /* send Ecash to the banker for validation test 
if 
bank-to-MSSses ? GenuineEcashEcash 
if 
:: MINPAYMENT <= Ecash <= MAXPAYMENT) 
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AnonymousTime= Ecash-to-time(Ecash) /* convert Ecash to time 
ses-to-tcp ! EcashAccepted; 
goto AnoSes 
else -> ses-to-tcp ! EcashRejected; goto WaitingForEcash 
fi 
bank-to-ses ? FakeEcash -> MSSBes-to-tcp ! EcashRejected; goto WaitingForEcash 
ExtPayment: 
if 
bank-to-MSSses ? GenuineEcashEcash 
if 
MINPAYMENT <= Ecash <= MAXPAYMENT) 
AnonymousTime= AnonymousTime + Ecash-to-time(Ecash) 
ses-to-tcp ! EcashAccepted; 
goto AnoSes 
else -> ses-to-tcp ! EcashRejected; goto AnoSes 
fi 
/* convert Ecash to time and 
/* extend anonymous time 




MSStcp-to-ses ? EaddrAndTxt -> MSSses-to-MailSvr ! EaddrAndTxt 
/* receive the msg, deencrypt with Ks and forward it to MailSvr 
MailSvr-to-ses ? YouHaveMail -> MSSses-to-tcp ! YouHaveMail 
/* receive the msg, encrypt with Ks and forward it to PDA 
MSStcp-to-Sses ? ChangeMyKs -> /* A PDA user requesting a new Ks 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan ! ChangeMyKs 
KsTmpIdMan-to-ses ? YourNewKs /* Your Ks has been hit update it*/ 
Ks=YourNowKs; 
MSSses-to-tcP YourNeWKS 
MSStcp-to-ses ? Ecash -> goto ExtPayment /* additional payment 
TimoAlort-timcout -> /* alert the user about the end of his anonymous session 
MSSses-to-tcp ! TimeAlert 
TimoFin-timeout -> /* finish the anonymous session 
MSSses-to-tcp ! TimeFin 
goto abort 
KsTmpIdMan-to-ses ? abort -> MSSses-to-tcp ! abort 
goto Aborted 
tcp-to-ses ? abort -> goto Aborted 
od; 
Aborted: 
/* clear everything and finish 
skip 
6.6 Procedure rules 
Figure 6.16: Validation of e-cash at bank work station 
WatingForEcash ? Ecash EcashValidation 
! FakeEcasb 
Ecash: electronic cash 
Figure 6.17: Validation of e--casli 
6.6.7 The bank process 
103 
Although we do not include all of the details concerning the verification of the e-coin, we assume 
that the e-coin that Bob sends to Doug is an anonymous e-cash previously blindly signed by Clare 
(see section 5-8), hence upon receiving the e-coin Clare verifies that it has a valid signature on it 
and that the coin has not already been spent. As is shown in figure 6.16, Clare responds either 
with a GenuineEcash or FakeEcash message depending on whether she is satisfied with the e-coin 
or not. On this basis Doug decides to accept or reject the payment. It is important to recall from 
figure 6.12 that the bank process is linked to the MSSses by a bidirectional channel. Ill fact the 
bank workstation can be any computer connected to the Internet as long as it call be reached by 
the MSSses process. 
The finite state diagram that shows how the bank process works is depicted in figure 6.17. 
The MSSses and the bank processes are linked by a bidirectional channel. As can be appreciated 
from the figure, the bank process keeps waiting in the lVaitingForE, cash state until the message 
Ecaýh arrives from the MSSses serving the PDA. When such a messages arrives it moves to the 
Ecash Validation where it decides whether the Ecash is genuine or not. In the former ease it replies 




Promela code for the bank process is shown below. Ili real life the bank workstation would 
receive real e-coins and would perform real validation tests oil them. At this stage, all we are 
interested in here is the simulation of a validation test. For this purpose we use the nondeterininis tic 
Ks: session key 
PDA: personal digital assitant 
KsTmpIdNIan: secret key and Tmpld manager 
MSSscs: anonymous session at the NISS 
bank: bank work station 
Ecash: electronic cash 
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Figure 6.18: The mail server process 
nature of the Promela guarded commands (: :) by which we arbitrarily decide that an e-coil-I is genuine or fake. Recall that if more than one guarded command is executable, one of t1le 
corresponding sequence is selected at random. 
/** The bank process: receives Ecash from the anonymous session and tests that **/ 
the e--coin is acceptable at the bank and has not been spent before. 
Depending on the result of the test, it responds to the MSSses with either 
a 'GenuineEcashl or 'FakeEcash' msg. 
--- MSSses-to-bank --- > 
mssses bank 
< --- bank-to-MSSses --- 
proctype bank 
MSSses-to-bank ? Ecash 
if 
(Ecash GENUINE) bank-to-MSSses GenuineEcash 
(Ecash FAKE bank-to-MSSses FakeEcash 
if 
6.6.8 The mail server process 
The MailSvr process serves as a bridge for the MSSses process to send and receive e-mail messages 
to and from computers connected to the Internet. As illustrated in figure 6.18, when Bob sends an 
anonymous message, the message is originated in Bob's PDA. Secondly, it travels to the MSSses 
that serves Bob's PDA and from there it goes to the MailSvr process which is in charge of sending 
it to Alice (its final destination) with the lielp of standard e-mail protocols. If Alice replies, lier 
response travels in the opposite direction until eventually it reaches Bob's PDA. 
It is important to notice from figure 6.18 that the mail server is linked to each anonymous 
session serving a PDA by a bidirectional channel. The mail server is located not necessarily ill tlle 
MSS, it call be there or in another computer as long as it is reachable by the Msssesj processes 
through the bidirectional channels. 
The finite state diagram that shows how the mail server process works is depicted ill figure 
6.19. The mail server remains in the WaitingrorMsg state until either the EaddrAndTxt message 
is received or the MessayeIn event occurs. The arrival of the EaddrAndTxt message fron, t1l, 
,, 





EaddrAndTxt: electronic address and text 
Figure 6.19: Finite state diagram of the mail server process 
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MSSses process indicates that the MSSses wants the MailSvr process to forward the message to its 
final destination (to Alice's computer for example). This event moves the finite state diagram to 
the SendingEmail state where it remains until the message is sent -indicated by the MessageOut 
event- and next it returns back to the WaitingForMsg state. 
-- The arrival of Alice's reply at the MailSvr process is indicated by the occurrence of the Messageln 
event. The occurrence of this event moves the finite state diagram to the ReceivingReply state from 
where Alice's reply is sent in the YouHaveMail message to Bob's MSSses process. Upon sending 
the YouHaveMail message, the finite state diagram moves to the WaitingForAfsg state. 
The Promela code for the MailSvr process is shown below. All we are interested in at this 
stage is the simulation of sending and receiving of messages. Thus, the mail server process can be 
implemented in Promela code as an endless loop which checks whether there is a message to read 
from the MSSses process. If there is any, the message is read and discharged. On the other hand, 
the arrival a reply from Alice can be modelled by a timeout mechanisms. The firing of the timer 
is taken as the arrival of one of Alice's replies and then the message YouHaveMail is sent to the 
MSSses process. 
The MailServer process: it receives e-mails from the anonymous session process 
and resends them to their final destination using standard e-mail protocols. 
Also, it receives e-mail messages addressed to Bob and resends them to the 
anonymous session process. 
--- MSSses-to-MailSvr --- > 
MSSses MailSvr 




MSSses-to-MailSvr ? EaddrAndText 
/* resend the message to its final destination 
skip 
timeout -> MailSvr_to_MSSses ! YouHaveMail 
od; 
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6.6.9 The tcp layer 
As with most applications, the protocol we are designing for instance, often needs to send several 
messages (both control and data messages) from one process to another. Using a protocol that 
offers only connectionless and unreliable delivery of packets such as the user datagrarn protocol 
of the TCP/IP set becomes annoying as the designer has to take care of several details to ensure 
that messages arrive at their destination safely. What the designer needs in situations like this is a 
reliable connection-oriented stream protocol that guarantees that messages sent from one process 
to another arrive safely at their destination. Such communication is often called end-to-end and 
is provided by the transmission control protocol of the TCP/IP architecture. 
A TCP connection between two peers guarantees four important features [165,154]: 
1. Explicit initiation and termination of the connection between the two communicating peers. 
2. Reliable, in-order, unduplicated delivery of unstructured streams of data. 
3. Out-of band indication of urgent data. 
4. Flow control to guarantee that the receiving buffer is never overflown. 
On top of a protocol with the above characteristics, the difficulties of designing and implement- 
ing our protocol are significantly reduced. We can confidently rely on the TCP services to transinit 
messages between the PDA and the MSS session layers. 
The first feature the TCP service guarantees that a connection between the two session layers is 
establislied and terminated. The second feature is necessary to ensure that messages received fro, n 
any of the session layers are delivered to the remote peer without partial or total deletions and 
reorderings. This must be guaranteed despite the fact that the underlying layer (the UDP protocol) 
may delete and reorder messages arbitrarily. During the PDA-MSS interaction, it is feasible that 
urgent messages need to be sent to the remote peer to abort an anonymous session for example, 
this is exactly what the third feature guarantees. Finally, the flow control guarantees that if any 
of the communicating parties, the PDA for example, is slower than its peer, information is not lost 
due to buffer overflow. 
With the TCP services in mind we can forget about what is underneath the PDA and MSS 
TCP processes and connect theni directly as illustrated in figure 6.20. 
In the figure, it can be seen that the output channel of the PDA tcp process is connected to 
the input channel of the tcp process of the MSS. Conversely, the output channel of the tcp process 
of the MSS is connected to the input channel of the tcp process of the PDA. This simplification 
is possible because of the semantics of Promela channels. A Promela channel implements flow 
control. Promela channels do not lose or duplicate messages; they deliver thein in the right order. 
To do that, it passes messages in firs t-iii-first-out order. Also, a send operation on a channel is 
executable only when the addressed channel is not full and a receive operation is Only executable 
when the cliannel is not enipty. 
The Proniela code for the PDA and MSS tcp processes is quite simple and shown next: 
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packet delivery 
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PDA: personal digital assistant 
MSS-. mobile support station 
tcp: transmission control protocol 
Figure 6.20: Connection of the PDA and MSS tcp processes. 
The PDAtcp process: Implements a Transmission Control Protocol of the 
TCP/IP set. It is a reliable connection--oriented stream transport pro- 
tocol (no deletions, no duplications, no reorderings of messages) on which 
the PDA session layer can rely to send messages to, and receive messages 
/**ýfrom, the remote MSS session layer. 
--- ses-to-tcp --- > --- pdatcp-to-msstcp --- > 
ses pdatcp MSStcP 
< --- tcp-to-ses ---- < --- msstcp-to-pdatcp ---- 
proctype pdatcp 
do 
ses-to-tcp ? anymsg pdatcp-to-msstcp ! anymsg 
msstcp-to-pda-tcp ? anymsg tcp-to-ses ! anymsg 
, od, 
/** The MSStcp process: Implements a Transmission Control Protocol of the 
/**, TCP/IP set. It is a reliable connection--oriented stream transport pro- 
tocol (no deletions, no duplications, no reorderings of messages) on which 
the MSS session layer can rely to send messages to, and receive messages 
from, the remote PDA session layer. 
ses-to-tcp --- > --- msstcp-to-pdatcp --- > 
ses msstcp pdatcp 
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ses-to-tcp ? anymsg msstcp-to-pdatcp ! anymsg 
pdatCp-to-msstcp ? anymsg tcp-to-ses ! anymsg 
od 
} 
The flow layer 
What is underneath the TCP layer does not influence the behaviour of our protocol since the TCP 
protocol deals with all the difficulties. However, if for any reason the reader is interested in looking 
inside the TCP protocol we would recommend him or her to start with the flow control Promela 
code offered by Holzmann's book [159] which implements the well-known sliding window protocol. 
6.7 Summary 
Before any attempt to implement a distributed system is made, its communication protocol must 
be specified. It is well accepted that for a protocol specification to be complete it should explicitly 
specify five elements, namely: the service provided by the protocol, tile assumptions about tile 
environment where the protocol is used, tile protocol vocabulary, the format of messages, and the 
procedure rules. Practice shows that the hardest part of this task is the specification of proce- 
dure rules as it concerns guarding tile consistency of message exchanges between tile interacting 
processes. 
To specify procedure rules one can use finite state machines. Thanks to their graphic nature, 
finite state machines are casy to read. On tile other hand the mathematical theory behind them 
makes them useful for showing the correct operation of a protocol. However, due to space limita- 
tions and the two-dimensional nature of paper, it is not always easy and practicable to show all 
possible incoming event possibilities including error conditions, local state variables and predicates 
associated with a protocol. Because of these limitations it might be useful to use them in combi- 
nation with other methods, with C style pseudo-code, or a protocol verification language such as 
Proincla, for example. 
So far tile most successful software tool used in tile academic environment to trace logical 
design errors in distributed systems, and in particular in communication protocols, is Spin (Simple 
Proincla INterpreter). ý-) 
Promela is Spin's input language and provides a vehicle for making abstractions of protocols so 
that details that are unrelated to tile communication processes are suppressed. A Promela prograirl 
consists of processes, message channels and variables. The state of tile whole protocol depends oil 
the state of these three components. 
To take advantage of both finite state machines and Promela, the two techniques were used in 
combination to specify the procedure rules of tile anonymizing system introduced in this work: tile 
protocol was divided into layers and then finite state machines were used to specify a simplified 
version of each layer while a complete specification was presented in Promela. The simplified 
specification is easy to read and understand while the Promela specification is ready to validate 
using Spin. 
Chapter 7 
Validation of the model 
7.1 Introduction 
Informally one can say that a protocol is correct if it behaves as its user expects. However, to prove 
that it is correct is a challenging task which involves two strongly connected procedures. Namely 
validation 
' 
and conformance test of the protocol. The aim of the validation is to check that the 
formal specification of the protocol is logically consistent. Once the protocol designer is satisfied 
with the validation results the protocol can be implemented and tested to see if the implementation 
passes a conformance test; i. e. the designer or the user have to check that the external behaviour 
of the implementation of the protocol in equivalent to its formal specification. 
- Since we are in the very early stages of the development of our system, we will concentrate only 
on the validation process. Thus, we are interested only in verifying that the Promela specification 
of our system, i. e. our Promela validation model, is logically consistent without having in mind any 
particular implementation. 
A validation model is an abstraction of the actual system: it simplifies the system by suppressing 
irrelevant details but without losing essential features of the system. For a well-modelled system one 
can assume that if the behaviour of the model is correct, the real system is correct as well. Because 
of -this, system designers talk of validating a system but what they actually mean is validating the 
model of the system. The real system cannot be validated yet, simply because it has not been 
implemented yet. Strictly speaking, only the implementor or the user of the final system can talk 
of validating the system. 
As was stated in section 6.6.2, the most widely used software for protocol validation is Spin. 
It was developed at Bell Labs in 1980, its source code written in ANSI standard C can be easily 
downloaded from the Internet [166] and compiled for Unix, Linux, Windows95 and WindowsNT 
platforms. 
The Spin package consists of two independent tools: a simulator and a validator that are meant 
to be used at different stages of the protocol validation process. 
7.2, The Spin simulator 
As it names implies, the simulator can simulate the execution of a validation program (a model in 
Spin jargon) written in Promela. It simulates Promela code by interpreting its statements on-the- 
fly. To do its job the simulator performs a single-pass verification procedure making effort to save 
memory and CPU resources; it tries to store in memory just enough information to complete the 
verification process and to verify the correctness of the requirements but for the smallest possible 
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fragment of the whole behaviour of the system. For example, if at a given point during the simu- 
lation process the simulator is faced with more than one executable statement (a nondeterministic 
choice), it selects just one. This means the simulator does not perform any exhaustive reachability 
analysis but goes only through a single sequence of reachable states in the system which is chosen 
depending on the value of the seed the random number generator is initialized with; if no seed value 
is specified, the simulator performs a random simulation [167). 
The advantage of using the simulator at an early stage of the system design is that it can 
immediately tell the system designer about simple inconsistences in his protocol, such as deadlocks, 
unspecified receptions. It is fast and does not demand a great deal of computer resources since it 
does not need to construct a global state for the system. Because of this, systems of arbitrary size 
can be easily simulated. However, since it runs a random simulation only, the absence of errors 
reported by the simulator does not necessarily mean that the system is error-free. The accurate 
verification of a system is performed by the Spin validator (see section 7.3). 
In a Unix computer, the simulator is simply executed as 105 spin -options PromelaCode where the 
designer can specify different options to tell the simulator to output on the screen what messages 
are sent or received and by which processes, what line of the code is executed, the value of local 
and global variables, the value of the seed for the random number generator, and so on. 
7.3 The Spin validator 
The job of tile Spin validator is to validate the correctness requirements, (also called correctness 
criteria and properties) of Promela code given at its input. 
Spin belongs to tile category of protocol verification systems that are based on tile analysis of 
the reachability of system states. Before, going further in our discussion let us define what a state 
is in Spill. 
In Spin, a state is completely defined by all control flow points of running processes, all values 
of local and global variables, and the contents of all local and global channels. 
A reachability analysis algorithm tries to generate and inspect all tile states of tile systell, 
that are reachable from the initial state; this means that the algorithm will construct all Possible 
execution sequences from the initial state to tile final state (possibly more than one). In Other 
words and assuming that the system we are analysing is non-deterministic O. e. its Promela code 
contains guarded :: commands), the algoritlim must explore all possible moves. For example, if tile 
validator is faced with the following code: 
Inputquouo ?a 
if 
(a > 0) statementl 
(a - 0) statemont2 
(a < 0) statement3 
fi 
Spin has to explore three possible sequences after reading the from the input queue into variable 
a: first it considers that a>0 and executes statemcntl; secondly, it considers that a=0 and 
executes statenicint2; and finally, the validator assumes a<0 and executes statemenM 
It is worth noting that for a validation to be possible, the Promela specification of tile system 
must restrict the number of processes, flow control point, variables, channels and slots of channels 
to a finite number so that the number of states of the system remains finite and the system can be 
analysed exhaustively by enumerating its reachable states. 
7.3, The Spin validator 
Depending on the size of the system, the generation and analysis of all possible states can 
be computationaly unfeasible. Most of the time the designer of a large system (more than 105 
: reachable system states) is faced with the state space explosion problem. To understand this, we 
will briefly discuss how Spin works [162]. 
A system is represented in a Promela model as a set of process. Spin translates each process into 
a finite state automaton. Next, the asynchronous interleaving product of automata is computed 
and translated into an automaton. This automaton represents the global system behaviour and is 
called the state space of the system or the global reachability graph. 
A correctness requirement of a system is expressed in a formal notation called Linear Temporal 
Logic (LTL for short). LTL can be translated into what is known as the Biichi automaton. 
To perform a verification Spin computes the synchronous product of the Biichi automaton and 
the automaton that represents the global system behaviour. The result of this computation is 
another Biichi automaton and is used by Spin to see what language it accepts. If such a language is 
empty, this means that the correctness requirements expressed in the LTL formula are not satisfied 
, by the system. 
I The thing to keep in mind during the validation is that to tell whether the language accepted 
by the Bfichi automaton is empty or not Spin has to generate and verify all possible sequences of 
states of the automaton; this can become prohibitively expensive since in the worse case, the state 
space of the system has the size of the Cartesian product of all its components: control flow points, 
processes, local and global variables, and channels. 
, 
Once the system is written in Promela code and passed through the simulator, the designer is 
encouraged to validate it by performing the following steps: 
1. By running 10'5 spin -a PromelaCode we can instruct Spin to generate a standard C program 
which is known as the analyser and by default receives the name of panx 
2. The pan. c analyser can be compiled by a standard C compiler to produce ail executable 
analyser as follows: 1061 cc -o pan pan. c. Several directives can be specified to indicate whether 
the analysis of the system is going to be partial or exhaustive; and to optimize memory 
resources. 
3. By typing % pan -options the program is executed to perform the analysis of the PromelaCode. 
Several options are at the designer disposition to indicate memory resources for hash tables; 
selection of hash functions, number of errors before termination, and so on. 
4. If the analysis is completed without find any errors in the system and without running out of 
RAM space the output of pan is a few lines stating that no errors were found. 
5. The execution of pan may have an early termination either because there was not not enough 
RAM memory in the system or because an error was found. 
e Optimization techniques can be used to ideal with shortage of memory. 
If an error is detected by the analyser, it outputs the file pan. t containing the error trial, 
and stops. 
6. The nature and cause of an error detected by pan can be found by instructing Spin to follow 
the error trial left in pan. t by typing % spin -t PromelaCode 
112 
7.4 Full state space search 
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As it names implies, the full state space search technique explores all reachable system states of tile 
system. Because of this, this method is also known as full exhaustive search and just full search. 
The main problem with validators based oil reachability analysis, and Spin is no exception, is 
that the number of reachable system states call be prohibitively large in comparison to the amount 
of RAM memory available to store it and the CPU time available to compute it. As an aside it is 
important to note that since what matters liere is not the total number of system states but only 
the reachable ones, in the literature the number of reachable system states is inaccurately referred 
simply as the number of the states of the system or simple the state space. 
In order that the exhaustion of RAM memory and the length of computational time do not 
take us by surprise and in order to use these resources in the most efficient possible way, it is 
always advisable to have a rough idea of the size of the system in comparison with the available 
computational resources. 
In tile following, let R be the number of reachable states of tile system we want to validate 
with the lielp of Spin; so if 0<i<R-1 and si is one of those reachable states we can define 
A= ISO, 31021 ... , sit-, 
} as the set that contains all the reachable states of the system. Let S be 
the number of bits or bytes necessary to store a single state from the set of reachable states of tile 
system. Finally, lot Al be the number of bits or bytes available for Spin use in the RAM memory 
of the computer. 
Grounded oil his experience, Holzinainni points out that in full exhaustive mode tile values for 
S are normally ill the range of 101 to 102 bytes [159,168] or what is approximately equivalent in 
the range of 101 to 103 bits. 
Assuming that it is true, we call estimate that if we run Spin ill full exhaustive mode tile 
maximum number of reachable states that call be stored in a computer with a RAM memory of M 
bytes as follows: R,,,.. = A11S = A1/1 X 102. In other words, the designer will run out of memory 
if lie attempt to run the Spin validator in full exhaustive mode to validate a system with more that 
, A1/1 X 102 reachable system states. Another serious boundary that the designer has to keep in mind is the length of the CPU tilne 
to perform the analysis. It has been observed [159] that in a computer equipped with current 
technology the tinie to analyse a system state is of the order Of 10-6 seconds. It follows that for 
a system of R= 36 X 108 states, we will need about I liour (i. e. 3600 seconds) of computation: 
CPU, i,,,, = 36 X 108 x1x 10-6 = 3600. Likewise, it call be estimated that a system of tile order 
of 1030 states will need about 1016 years of CPU time. 
When R :5R,,,,,, i. e. when the number of reachable system states of the system we are validating 
(1008 not exceeds tile maximum number of reachable system states that the computer call liandie, 
and when the R<IX 108 (assuming one hour is the maximum amount of CPU time tile designer 
is ready to spend in the validation) tile validation is straightforward; Spin performs all exhaustive 
s, ýarch to verify the correctness requirements. The only thing the designer has to do is to follow L 
the steps enumerated in section 7.3. When the validation finislies without any errors detected, 
tile designer is certain that his system has been validated with 100% coverage. Although it is not 
always easy to kiio%v in advance, knowing the number of expected states is llClPftll Since this number 
call be used to calculate tile size of tile hash table needed and then instruct Spin (-wN hash table 
option) to allocate it hasli table to handle that number of states rather tban using the default one 
which is equal to 218 = 262144 entries i. e. it call store 262 144 states. If for a given systell, t1lis 
number happens to be too big it will cause 11 waste of ineiriory; conversely, if it is to small, it will 
increase tile number of hasil collisions, waste CPU time in resolving them and consequently, Slow 
down tile Vorificatioll. 
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However, it can happen that in the middle of the execution of the ro pan step Spill runs out of 
RAM memory. If this happens a message like pan: out of memory appears on the output screen 
and the validation stops; the result of this is that what was meant to be an exhaustive search with 
a 100% coverage deteriorates into an uncontrolled partial search. Although some results about 
detected errors are reported on screen they are not reliable since we do not know what part of the 
system has been validated and what has not; there is no guarantee that the critical parts of the 
system have been inspected. Hence a pan: out of memory message is in fact an indication that 
further memory optimization is needed to validate the system. 
From the above estimations it should be clear that the size of systems that can be validated 
with the Spin validator is directly determined by memory of the computer or more precisely by 
the par ' ameter 
M and by the computational power of the CPU. Both M and CPU are hardware 
dependent and normally cannot be modified by the designer; fortunately if any of these two resource 
is exhausted, the designer can still manipulate the parameters S and R which are system dependent 
to fit his system to the available resources. 
7.5 ' Controlled partial search 
From the above discussion one question arises: if an exhaustive search deteriorates into all uncon- 
trolled partial search when the RAM memory is exhausted; is there any technique to drive the Spin 
validator into a controlled partial search rather than letting it deteriorate into an uncontrolled one? 
The'answer is yes, techniques for controlled partial search have been studied and suggested. In 
general and in accordance with tile approach to fitting tile system into tile available RAM memory, 
controlled partial search methods can be divided into two groups: In tile first group fall those 
methods that indicate to the Spin validator what part of the system to inspect. Tile main difficulty 
with this technique is that it is not trivial to decide what parts of the system to inspect and what 
not. Common sense would suggest to inspect those parts of tile system where we expect to find 
errors. '' However, this is a debatable argument since real life practice shows us that errors appear 
where tile designer does not expect them to be. Another limitation of this approach is that for 
large systems, the RAM memory available might be not enough to handle the parts of the system 
we have decided to inspect. The reader interested in a more detailed discussion oil these controlled 
partial seýrch methods is encouraged to refer to [159]. 
'In tile second group fall the methods that instead of trying to predict in which parts of the 
system errors can be found, perform a random simulation, i. e. a random walk- through the number 
of reachable system states. The main idea here is to organize tile state space of the system so that 
it can be randomly simulated using precisely M bytes of RAM memory, i. e. the memory available 
for Spin in the target computer. Thanks to this strategy, systems of sizes that would overflow tile 
available RAM memory in exhaustive search, can be validated in a comparatively small amounts of 
memory. Because of this and because of the difficulties mentioned above about validating methods 
that try to guess where errors can be found, Spin focuses on random simulation techniques when 
it comes to validating a large system. In particular, Spin implements a method called supertrace 
or bit-state hashing. 
7.6 , Supertrace controlled partial search 
The supertrace technique was introduced into Spin to validate systems that cannot be validated in 
full verification mode because R>i. e. when the RAM memory requirements are beyond 
what is available in the target computer. 
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Let us say that we have a computer with M bytes of RAM memory which is not enougli. to 
store R and analyse the system in full exhaustive mode; what Spin does in supertrace mode is 
to organize the memory and system state space in such a way that it uses precisely M bytes of 
memory, no more and no less; them from the total system space state, Spin randomly selects tile 
maximum number of states that can be analysed in M bytes of memory so that the coverage of 
the analysis is as large as possible. 
If in full veriflcation mode S bits of memory are required for storing a single state si, where S 
is normally between 101 and 103 bits, in supertrace mode a single bit can be used to manage the 
set of reachable states. 
A crucial idea behind the supertrace mode is to save RAM memory by not storing each visited 
state si but storing only enough information to tell whether tile state lias or has not been analysed 
before. Because of the technique used to store the information about each visited state (explained 
below), this nictliod is called bit-state hashing as well. 
Although one bit is enotigh, in practice Spin uses two bits with tile sole purpose of reducing 
hash conflicts. In fact though it call be set to 1-bit by manipulating tile 1-bit or 2-bit hashing 
option of Spin, the default is set to 2-bit; this implies two crucial things: First, that a pair of 
independent liash functions are used (one for each bit); and second, that a liash collision requires 
a collision oil both bits; it is note worthing that this technique is known as multi-bit hashing [168]. 
For simplicity let us assume that we use Spin in 1-bit hashing mode, then tile information 
for managing the set A= ISOiShS2i ... sR- I} of the reachable states of tile system is the array 
Ahash : -- U0, fl, f2, ... ' 
fit- I} of R-1 bi ts where each fi = 110 is a binary flag. The address (tile 
position in the array) of each fi uniquely identifies a state. To access Ahash efficiently a liasil 
function is implemented which for a given state si locates the corresponding fi flag in A fl hash to ind 
out whether the flag is oil or off. Ill the former case the state si is considered redundant, (i. e. it 
has been analysed before) and discarded. In the latter case, the state si is considered new; it is 
analysed and its corresponding bit in Ahasi, is switched oil. The array Al, ash is called the hash table 
and its size is normally equal to the maximum amount of RAM memory available in tile target 
computer, i. e. R is normally equal to M expressed in bits. It is in fact the memory arena where 
tile system is to be analysed. 
Note that in supertrace mode Spin does not have a constraint oil the number of reachable 
system states that call be validated since it attempts to select all optimal fraction of the full state 
space that call be searched using theavailable RAM resources. However, to use theavailable RAM 
and CPU efficiently it is always useful to )lave in idea about the number of reachable system states 
we are expecting as this tells the designer how many bytes of memory are needed to store the liasll 
table. By efficiency liere we have in mind that the maximum available RAM is used to store tile 
hash table and without asking the target computer to validate a number of reachable system states 
that is beyond a reasonable computational time. 
In practice the value of R is normally unknown, however, we call have a rough idea about it by 
running the validator just to learn from the output the number of states analysed and the value 
of tile hash factor (explained below). The number of states analysed is reported as transitions. if 
tile hash factor is high (over 100) the number of states analysed should be a good approximation 
of Clio actual number of reachable system states. Let us assinne, that we roughly know tile value 
of R; if we run Spin in 1-bit mode we will need at least Al =RXI bits of memory to store Ahasi, 
and at least Al =RX2 bits if we run Spin in 2-bit mode. 
Spin provides the option -ivN to set the size of the liash table as 2N bits, i. e 2N entries in tile 
11IL411 table. By default this value is set to 2 22 i. e. it allocates a hash table of 2 22 = 4194304 entries. 
This nicans that is we use tile algorithin in 1-bit mode that table call liandle up to 4 194 304 states; 
Wid 111) to 4194304/2 = 2097152 if we use it in 2-bit mode. For this to be possible, Spin needs a 
, 
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computer with at least 222 bits of RAM memory, which is about 219 = 524288 bytes. 
To estimate the coverage of a supertrace run, Spin introduces the notion of hash factor. The 
hash factor is defined as the size of the hash-table divided by the number of states stored [159,168]. 
It is calculated by the validator after each run and displayed at the output as an indication of the 
coverage of the run. For example, is the size of the hash table is 2 24 = 16777216 bits and the number 
of states stored by Spin in the hash table is Ill 553, the hash factor is 16777216/111553 = 150-395. 
As the number of stored states approaches the size of the hash-table the hash factor approaches 
1. A hash factor equal or greater than 100 implies good coverage; conversely, a hash factor near 
1ý implies poor coverage. The explanation for this is that as the number of stored states in the 
hash-table increased th number of hash collisions increases as well, this result in parts of the state 
space not being analysed (this is discussed in section 7.7). 
As in exhaustive search (see section 7.4), CPU time is a serious constraint in supertrace mode. 
Empirically, we have learnt that in the Silicon Graphics computer we use to run Spin (see section 
7.10) it takes about 8.0 x 10-5 seconds to analyse a state. For simplicity let us say the CPU time 
to analyse a single state is of the order Of 10-5. If that holds true it will take about one hour (i. e. 
3600 seconds) of CPU time to analyse 3.6 X 108 states as 3.6 x 108 XIX 10-5 = 3600 seconds. 
Similarly, it will take about one year of CPU time to analyse 3.1 X 1012 states. 
7.7 Hash conflicts 
To allow for state comparison each system state analysed by Spin must be stored in memory where 
it can be retrieved efficiently and where new states are stored. 
Spin uses (in both exhaustive and controlled partial search) a hash table to maintain the state 
space of the system being analysed. By applying a hash function to a given state, Spin tries to 
fi. nd out whether the state has or has not been analysed. If the state is found to be a new one (not 
pr eviously analysed) it is analysed and included in the hash table. In the opposite case, the state 
is considered an old one (previously analysed) and it is discarded. 
One of the most serious flaws encountered in the use of hash methods for constructing search 
tables is that although in theory it is possible to find one-to-one functions that assign one element 
and only one to each storage cell, in practice this has been shown to be impossible since normally 
the elements to be stored are seldom known a priori. Consequently, it is conceivable that the hash 
function eventually will attempt to assign more than one element to the same cell store; in the 
literature this issue is called a hash collision, hash clash, or hash conflict and has been well studied. 
Hash algorithms just accept that collisions are inevitable and rather than attempting to eliminate 
them entirely, they treat collisions as special case by calling a special procedure which will find an 
alternative cell store for the current element. This is what is called resolving hash conflicts and 
several techniques has been suggested to deal with the problem [169,170,171); a widely used one 
is to include the clashing elements in a linked list in the hash table. 
The hash algorithm used by Spin is not an exception, therefore, hash conflicts occur during the 
validation, however, hash conflicts here have a particularity: In a exhaustive full verification where 
each reached system state is fully stored in the hash table, Spin resolves hash collisions by resorting 
to a linked list. 
Conversely, since the actual contents of reached states are not stored in supertrace mode, hash 
collisions cannot be corrected. When Spin finds a bit turned on, it cannot tell whether the current 
state has been analysed or its hash function has clashed. Because of this, Spin can erroneously 
believe that a state has been analysed, this result in the discard of the state and the failure to visit 
it and its successors. If this happens pieces of the code might be left unexplored and possible errors 
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not detected. In other words, in supertrace mode, Spin cannot guarantee 100% coverage due to the 
possibility of unresolved hash collisions. To reduce the effect of hash conflicts it is recommended 
to a technique called sequential multihash and multiple hashing [159,168]. 
7.8 Sequential multihash 
When due to hash collisions the designer is not satisfied with the coverage of his supertrace run let us say when the hash factor is below 100, the designer can resort to sequential multillash. This' 
technique consists of repeating the validation with alternate and independent hash functions. Tile 
main idea here is to move hash conflicts to a different part of tile state space so that Spin call 
recover the fractions of tile state space missed in tile previous run. 
As explained in detail in [1681, by resorting to sequential multillash tile level of coverage of 
supertrace validations call be as high as the designer wants it to be regardless of the size of tile 
system. By continuously repeating the process (each time with a different pair of hash functions) 
the designer call got as arbitrarily close to 100% coverage as lie wishes to [159,168,167]. 
Spin includes the runtime option -RN to allow the designer to specify that tile supertrace run is 
to be repeated N times, each time with a different pair of hash functions (see section 7.6); current 
versions of Spin support up to 32 pairs of such functions. To give one example; the designer call instruct Spin to perform 16 independent supertrace runs by typing Z pan -R16. This strategy will 
probably satisfy the most demanding designer regardless of the size of the system; tile only problem 
here being CPU time, for large systems it might take hours to complete tile run. 
7.9 Correctness requirements 
A crucial decision the designer of a protocol lias to make is what correctness requirements (absence 
of deadlocks, mutual exclusion, temporal claims, etc. ) to clieck his system on. This is extremely 
important not only because this will guarantee that the system is free of a particular kind of error 
but also because the inclusion or exclusion of one of these requirements can have significant impact' 
on the number of reachable states of the system and for instance on RAM memory and CPU tilne 
demand to validate them. 
Although the correctness requirements that are usually validated in protocols are well-known 
[172], the list of correctness requirements the protocol designer tests lier protocol on, depends on two 
factors: the particular characteristics of the system and the stage of development. The termination 
correctness requirement for example, can be important for one protocol but not required for other. 
Similarly, temporal claims are not normally tested in early stages of development, but at the final 
stages, when the protocol is free of the basic errors. 
Proniela provides well defined means of expressing different correctness criteria; namely, t1j, 
designer can include in his Promela specification statements to prompt the Spin validator to clierk 
for the following correctness criteria of his system: assertions, system invariants, deadlocks, 11011- 
progress cycles, livelocks, and temporal claims. 
7.9.1 Assertions and system invariants 
An assertion is often expressed as a boolean condition inserted somewhere in the Promela code. It 
has the form of ass ertio it (booL condition) and is expected to be true whenever a process reached a 
given state. The assert statement hwq no effect if the boolean condition holds true; conversely, it 
generates an error message if the boolean condition becomes false. 
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-, If the designer wants a boolean condition to remain true in all reachable system states lie call 
express this as system invariant. A system invariant is just a generalization of an assertion, it has 
the same form, assertion (bool-condition), and is placed in a separate process that runs concurrently 
with the one the designer wants to validate; the assert statement is executed precisely once for 
every state of the system. 
7.9.2 Deadlocks 
Since Spin expects only systems with a finite number of states; it expects that the one it is validating 
either terminates after a finite number of state transitions or it goes back to a previously visited 
state. Both alternatives are considered a valid end to a process. Although the second alternative is 
not the final state of the system, it is considered and called a proper end state in Spin. If the system 
does not match this correctness criterion it is said to have a deadlock. In Promela, a proper end 
state is'identified by a three-character prefix end-state label which has the form of endsomething, 
where something is any sequences of characters accepted by Promela in names used as identifiers. 
Example of end-state labels are: end, endcycle, endO, endl and so on. 
7.9.3 Progress cycles and livelocks 
In Prome, la (and other programming languages) infinite cycles are considered correct behaviour for 
a process as long as the process goes through the states the designer expects. 
To express that a process cannot cycle infinitely without visiting certain states Proniela provides 
the statement progresssomething to mark such states. States marked by such labels are called 
progress-states since the system must go through them to make any progress. Ail execution sequence 
that violates this claim is called a non-progress cycle. 
To express that it is incorrect to cycle infinitely through a given state, Promela provides the 
statement acceptsomething to mark the state. Such state is called an acceptance-state. The name 
is a bit misleading and comes from the fact that a sequence of statements that contains acceptance- 
state'labels is named an acceptance cycle. What we are saying here is that we want a system without 
any acceptance cycles. The job of Spin is to detect these acceptance cycles if there are any in the 
system. 
As before something is any sequences of characters accepted by Promela in names used as 
identifiers. For example, progress-svr, progressClt, acceptO, acceptl, etc. 
Acceptance cycles are also known as livelock since a process that goes infinitely often through 
states marked by acceptance lables is still doing something but trapped in a looop. It cannot escape 
from there and go through the states the designer wants it to go through. 
7.9.4 Temporal claims 
In some cases it is necessary to express that a state in which a certain condition is true cannot be 
followed by a state in which that condition or a different one is false. For example, the designer 
might want to express that if it is true that a channel with a single slot is full, it cannot remain full 
after reading a message from it. In Spin these correctness requirements are called temporal claims 
and in ýPromela are expressed with the help of the statement 
never(Prom-statementl, Prom-statement2, Prom-statement3, 
I where each Prom-statement is a Promela statement that contains the details of the claim; for 
example assertions, progress-states and acceptance-states labels. 
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7.9.5 Safety and liveness properties 
In protocol validation, properties are grouped into two major classes: safety properties and liveness 
properties. Informallly, a safety property states that nothing bad never happens. Let us take a lift 
as an example. A safety property will state that if the lift is travelling or stopped between two 
levels its door will never open. On the other hand, a simple liveness property states that something 
good will eventually happen. Again, let us take a lift as an example. A simple liveness property 
will state that if a user has arrived at the intended floor, the door will eventually open. In other 
words, the passenger will eventually terminate his journey. 
Another way of explaining safety and liveness properties is by saying that a safety property 
states what we do not want the system to do. Conversely, a liveness property states what we want 
the system to do. 
These two concepts have been widely used in the literature devoted to correctness of concurrent 
programs since they were introduced by Lamport [173]. 
In Spin the concept of safety properties is used to group together assertions and system in"- 
variants, deadlocks, and unspecified receptions. On the other hand, non-progress cycles, livelocks 
and temporal claims fall in the class of liveness properties [159]. As explained in section 7.9.. 6, the 
designer can use Spin directives to instruct the validator to validate the properties lie is interested 
in. 
It is a well-known fact that it is always simpler specifying what we do not want from a systern 
than specifying what we want, thus, it makes sense to begin the validation of a protocol by validating 
safety properties first and leave liveness properties for the last stages of the validation. 
The reader interested in more details about safety and liveness properties is encouraged to refer 
to [173,174,175,176] where these concepts are studied in depth. 
7.9.6 Cost of correctness requirements 
We have just discussed what correctness criteria can be specified in Promela to be validated by 
Spin; the order in which we introduced them reflects the level of sophistication in the validation 
and at the same time the cost of performing the validation in terms of RAM memory and CPU 
time demands. 
Holzmann reports ([159,162]) that it is comparatively cheap to validate assertions and absence 
of deadlocks. The computational cost for this is linear in tile number of reachable states (R) 
of tile system both in RAM memory space and CPU time. To check on progress cycles and 
livelocks can be twice as hard in terms of CPU time but there is not a noticeable increase in 
RAM memory requirements. The most expensive correctness criterion to validate is temporal 
claims. Compared to assertions and absence of deadlocks validation, the cost can be 2N times as 
hard, where N is the number of reachable states in the sequence of statements contained in tile 
neverlProm-statementl, Prom-statement2, Prom-statement3,... } claim. 
It is important to notice that Spin allows us to validate these correctness criteria separately (for 
example check tile system for non-progress cycles only, or for acceptance cycles only) so that tile 
simpler requirements do not contribute to the cost of the more sophisticated ones. 
The selection of tile correctness criteria to validate is made with the help of Spin directives 
and options before running the validator: At compilation the designer can specify tile -DSAFETY 
directive to indicate that he is interested only in validating safety properties, the definition of safety 
is explained in section 7.9.5. Similarly, the directive -DNP indicates that the designer wants to 
check on non-progress cycles. 
Once the validator is compiled with the appropriate directives, runtime options are used to 
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check the desired correctness criteria: The execution of Zo pan will explore safety properties of the 
system. Likewise, the execution of Zo pan -a checks the system on acceptance cycles. Finally, the 
execution of 76 pan -1 will find non-progress cycles. 
7.10 Validation platform 
To validate our system Spin Version 3.3.5 -28 September 1999 was downloaded from the Internet 
[177], gec-compiled, and installed in the following platform: 
Computer Silicon Graphic 
Model Octane 
CPU 2 175MHz MIPS R100OO(IP30) Processors with MIPS R10010 FPUs 
RAM memory 512 Mbytes 
Operating system IRIX64 Release 6.5 
gcc compiler gcc version 2.8.1 
According to the terminology introduced in section 7.4, we have a computer with M= 512000000 
bytes. Let us make an estimation of the RAM resources we have at our disposition to validate a 
system using Spin in full exhaustive and supertrace mode. 
In full exhaustive mode and considering that for middle size system the number of bytes to store 
a single state is of the order of S=1X 102 (see section 7.4); we can say that in our Silicon Graphic 
platform we can validate systems with R ...... = MIS = 512000000/1 X 102 = 512 X 104 states. 
Naturally, if the system is extremely large (with S=1X 103) we can analyse only Rmax = 512 x 103 
states. 
By default, in supertrace mode each state occupies only two bits, so S=2; it follows that 
in a memory of M= 512000000byteý = 512000000 x 8bits = 4096000000 bits we can store up to 
Rm,, x = MIS = 4096000000/2 = 2048000000 states. To store information about these states we 
need to allocate a hash table of 4096000000 bits; since it is common practice to express the size of 
the hash table as 2N and 231 = 2147843648 and 232 = 4295687926 we can say that the largest hash 
table we can allocate in our computer is 232. 
This is where the CPU time constraint discussed in sections 7.4 and 7.6 have to be taken into 
account. The available RAM memory allows us to store up to 2048000000 states; however; before 
any attempt to allocate a hash table for such a number of states it is advisable to have a rough 
idea about the CPU time needed to analyse them; accordingly with our empirical observations, it 
take about 8x 10-5 seconds to analyse a single state (see section 7.6); it follows that the CPU time 
to analyse 2048000000 states amounts to CPUti,,, e = 2.8 x 109 x8x 10-5 = 2.24 x 105 seconds; 
which is about 61 hours. 
Similarly, we can estimate that if the designer does not want to spend more than one hour 
waiting for his results he can analyse only about 3600/8 x 10-5 = 4.5 x 107 states; to analyse such 
a number of states in 2-bit mode Spin needs a hash table of 4.5 x 107 x2= 90000000 bits; since 
226 = 67108864 and 227 = 134217728; we have to set the size of the hash table equal to 226 to ensure 
,a computation 
time equal or less that one hour. A supertrace analysis with a hash table larger than 
226 becomes prohibitively expensive and has to be avoided even though it provides higher coverage. 
From this discussion it should be clear that there is a trade-off between run-time and coverage in 
supertrace mode. Also, it should be clear that we are not able to take full advantage of the 512 000 
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000 bytes of RAM memory available in our target computer. If only we had a more powerful CPU 
(say a CPU with as many processors as possible) the story of the coverage would be different. 
7.11 An estimation of the size of our system 
As can be appreciated from the Promela specification of the system, a special effort was made to 
keep the size of the system as small as possible in terms of reachable number of states. With the 
sole purpose of reaching this crucial goal, the number of variables, channels, slots in channels and 
processes was reduced to the absolute minimum without losing the generality of the validation. In 
particular, except for two exceptions, all global channels were initialized with a single slot; as for 
local channels, they were initialized either with a single slot or with three. Similarly, the number 
of PDAs in the system in the area of coverage of the MSS was set to three. We believe that the 
interaction of three PDAs with the MSS is enough to explore the whole system and bring to light 
any possible error in the protocol; moreover, three PDAs is still a reasonable number if we intend to 
validate the system on a desktop workstation equipped with standard current technology resources. 
Besides the effort to keep the system small the resulting system can be easily categorized as a large one. Including comments, the whole of the Promela specification of the system is about 1500 
lines long. 
Perhaps more relevant than the number of Promela lines is the amount of RAM memory needed 
to validate such a system and how long it will take to run the Spin validator. 
For the moment, let us assume that we want to validate by running the Spin validator in 
full exhaustive search mode. As we discussed in section 7.4 the amount of RAM needed can be 
estimated by multiplying R (the number of reachable states of the system) by S (the number of bytes required to store each state). Both S and R are unknown, yet they can be roughly estimated 
from the Spin output. 
With the sole intention of estimating the size of the system and without any attempt at detecting 
any possible errors in the system, one can run the Spin validator in full search mode and observe its 
output, 'even if the validation is not complete due to lack of memory, the designer can still learn the 
value of S from the output where it is reported as the size in bytes of the State-vector or something 
similar, depending on the Spin version. By this approach we estimated that our system requires 
about 1600 bytes to store each reachable state. 
Similarly, R can be estimated by running the Spin validator in supertrace mode and observe 
the hash factor and the number of stored states at the output. Following this strategy we learnt 
that in one supertrace run Spin stored 1.81351 X 1007; let us assume momentarily that this is the 
true number of reachable system states. Then M (the amount of memory to analyse the system in 
full exhaustive mode) will be M=RXS=1.81351 X 1007 x 1.600 x 103 = 2.901616 X 1010, i. e. we 
are talking of a RAM memory of the order of 30 Gbytes. Moreover, a low hash factor shown in the 
output indicates that not all reachable states were stored, some of them were missed due to hash 
conflicts (see section 7.7); thus, R=1.81351 X 1007 is just a poor approximation that tell us that 
to analyse our system in full exhaustive mode we need at least 30 Gbytes of RAM memory. 
7.12 Avoiding paging 
In [168,178] Holzmann shows why it is not recommended to use disk memory to store the systen, 
state. In theory it is possible, however, in practice it is strongly not recommended as the validatioll 
will dramatically slow down due to read/write operations on the 
disk any time a new state is 
generated. In fact even if the designer has no intentions of using 
disk memory it is strongly 
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recommended to avoid paging so that the speed of the verification is maintained within acceptable 
limits. By default (see the pan. h header file created by Spin) Spin sets the memory bound to run the 
validator to 225 = 33554432 or 2 28 = 268435456 bytes, depending on whether the target computer 
is a PC or not; if the default is too small Spin will waste memory, conversely, if the default is too 
big, the computer will endlessly page. If the designer knows an exact memory bound, lie can set 
it by using either the -DMEMCNT=N Mbytes or -DMEMLIM= N Mbytes directive during the 
compilation of the Promela code. The latter directive is supported by Spin 3.3.0 and more recent 
versions. 
In section 7.10 we learnt that M= 512000000 for the computer we are using; accordingly, it is 
advisable to set our bank of memory at 500 Mbytes in order to avoid paging. We can use either 
the -DMEMLIM or -DMEMCNT compile directives as follow: -DMEMLIM = 500 Mbytes or 
-DMEMCNT=2 28 bytes. Note that 2 28 = 268435456 and 2 29 = 536870912. As can be seen the 
former directive gives a more precise control of the memory. 
7.13 Reduction of complexity of the systems 
Regardless of how much RAM memory and CPU power the designer has available in his computer, 
there always will be a system that will exhaust his computational resources. In situation like this lie 
can try to validate correctness criteria sepaxately as recommended in section 7.9.6; likewise, lie can 
try to reduce the number of reachable states of his system by decreasing the number of processes, 
variables and slots in channels; if this does not help he has to resort to a rather different approach; 
namely, to divide his system into modules (protocol layers) and validate the modules separately. 
The flaw of this approach is that it works well when the system can be relatively easily separated 
into independent modules so that the correctness of each module validated separately holds when 
all of the modules are put to work together. Except for extremely well defined protocol layers, the 
separation of a system into modules is not trivial. Also, a separate module is tested with a module 
tester that plays the r6le of the upper and lower layer of the module being tested. Normally, the 
module tester is in charge of injecting inputs to the module, receiving its outputs and possible 
feedbacking some of the outputs. Because of this, there is always a risk that the module tester 
can introduce spurious errors to the system or hide real ones. Other techniques to reduce the 
complexity of a system are discussed by Holzmann in [159]; we do not discuss them because they 
are not relevant for the validation of our system. 
7.13.1 Separate and monolithic validation 
From the discussion presented in sections 7.11 and the technical information presented in section 
7.10 it is clear that the size of our system clearly overflows our computational resources. 
For a large system like ours, a full exhaustive search validation is infeasible. Consequently, 
, 
the designer has to resort to other techniques; namely, to supertrace search (see section 7.6) and 
modular validation (see section 7.13). 
One particular characteristic of our system is that its processes are tightly interrelated; for 
example, to truly see how PDAi behaves while sending anonymous messages, all of the processes 
(the public key manager, the secret and TmpId manager, the bank, the mail server, and other 
PDAs) must be active because the PDAi needs the public key manager, the secret and TmpId 
manager, the bank and the mail server to perform its work and because other PDAs might have 
. an impact (hit its secret key for example) on PDAi 
, 
It can be argued that our system can be separated into independent modules and validate 
each module separately; we certainly considered this possibility, however, we found that due to the 
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strong interrelation of the component processes, the validation of one of them independently of the 
others oversimplified the work of the process and rendered the model and the validation almost 
meaningless. After all, if there is an error in the protocol, we believe that it is likely to be in the 
interaction of the processes all together rather than in the interaction of two of then or inside the 
code of one of them. 
Because of this we make a special effort not to indiscriminately divide the system into modules; 
in fact the only modules we believe that can be safely separated and validated independently of 
the rest of the system without losing the essential features of the validation are: the public key 
manager, the bank, and the mail server. 
7.14 Selection of correctness requirements 
As it can be appreciated from the discussion presented in section 7.10, checking the correctness of 
a system of middle to large size on all the correctness criteria might be extremely expensive and 
infeasible due to lack of computational resources. However, in most cases this level of sophistication 
is not required, particularly at an early stage in the development of a system, the validation of basic 
safety properties (assertion and system invariants, absence of deadlocks) and proper end-states is 
more than enough [162,159]. 
It is time now to consider what correctness requirements we would like to impose on our 
anonymizing system. In accordance with our computer resources and stage of development we 
assume that it is enough to validate our system on the following list of requirements: 
"t units of time after arriving at the MSS a PDA must either learn the public key of the MSS 
or terminate. 
"t units of time after learning the public key of the MSS a PDA must obtain a session key and 
a TmpId or terminate. 
" At any time, each PDA in session with the MSS must have a unique session key and unique 
TnipId. 
"A TnipId must last for the duration of the anonymous session. 
"A session key can be changed at any time by initiative of the MSS or the PDA. 
" Having finislied its anonymous session (voluntarily, forced by the MSS or due to an unexpected 
interruption of the communication channel) a PDA must terminate. 
"A server processes (public key manager, mail server, bank server and the XsTmpId manager) 
must never terminate. 
"A payment must be accepted only if the e-cash is genuine and its value is within a certain 
range (minimum and maximum accepted payment). 
Having provided the appropriate payment a PDA must be credited with an anonymous and 
finite session time. 
The anonymous session must be terminated by the MSS when the credit for a PDA expires. 
Replies to anonymous messages sent by the PDA are optional. If at the end of an anonymous 
session some messages are left unanswered the PDA must not block but terminate and the 
resources allocated to it at the MSS's side must be released. 
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From the list of correctness requirements one can see that at this stage the emphasis of the 
validation is on creating the basis for the anonymous communication. Our main aim is to guarantee 
that each PDA has the right Tmpld and the right session key. To put it in abstract words, we can 
say that we are dealing with a problem of mutual exclusion which can be validated by using safety 
properties. On the other hand we put emphasis on process termination. More precisely, on avoiding 
invalid end-states. Process termination belongs to the class of liveness property, however, in Spin 
it can be validating by using its safety properties directive (see section 7.9.6), since this directive 
instructs Spin to check that each process terminates in what is considered a proper end-state (see 
section 7.9.2). In our case, PDAs must always terminate and disappear and servers must always 
stay and wait for new clients to arrive. 
Notice that the validation process has been simplified. At this stage we are not interested in 
validating non-progress cycles and temporal claims. Our aim is to validate only basic correctness 
properties. This simplification inevitably reduces the strength of our validation and leaves some 
windows where potential errors might appear. This is discussed later on in section 7.20. 
7.15 Validation of the public key manager module 
Recall from the discussion presented in section 6.6.4 that the goal of the public key manager 
process is to broadcast periodically to the air through a well-known (to the PDAs) port a message 
containing the public key of the MSS. On the other hand, PDAs interested in learning the MSS 
public key of the MSS receive the message and verify that the Kpu is correct by checking the 
signature of the person or institution who vouches for the key. If the Kpu received happens to be 
incorrect, the PDA waits for the next broadcast till eventually it gets a correct key or a timeout 
mechanism forces it to terminate. It is worth mentioning that in our Promela code a counter that 
counts the number of attempt is used instead of a timeout, if the maximum number of attempts is 
reached the process terminates. 
To claim that the Promela code that describes this protocol is correct we have to show two 
things: First, we have to show that after a certain amount of time each PDA involved is in 
pI ossession of a certified Kpu or it gives up and terminates. Second, we have to show that the 
protocol complies with the correctness requirements discussed in section 7.9. 
To show that a PDA is in possession of a certified Kpu we use output messages to announce that 
a PDA is in possession of a Kpu key. To show that the Promela code is correct is more complicated; 
it is done by analysing the Spin output. 
The interaction between the PDA and the MSS is relatively simple; to prove that the protocol 
is correct it is enough to prove that after a certain amount of time each initialized PDA terminates. 
By termination we have in mind that each PDA process either finishes its execution or it remains 
in a valid end state (see section 7.9.2). Also we want to be certain that the value of the Kpu learnt 
by PDAs belong to the domain of certified Kpu. On the other hand, we have to prove that the 
KpuMan process cycles back to a valid end state each time after a Kpu is broadcast. To validate 
a system like this it is more than enough to check its safety properties (see section 7.9.6). 
The Promela specification of the KpuMan is relatively simple, however, there is one issue that 
deserves a few lines of comments here: As it was discussed in section 6.6.2, Promela support 
only one-to-one communication, neither multicast nor broadcast communication is supported in 
Promela; for this reason the broadcast of the Kpu key to the air has to be simplified. To get around 
the problem we do not actually broadcast the Kpu key, it is just placed by the KpuMan in the 
output channel, where it is eventually read by a PDA, when the Kpu is read, the KpuMan places 
another one, to be read possible by another PDA, and so on. 
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The Promela specification of the XpuMan can be categorized as a small system. As can be seen 
in appendix A. 1, the whole code (comment lines included) is about 120 lines. 
7.15.1 Simulation results 
The results of the KpuMan simulation validation are shown below. Note that the line numbers are 
not part of the Spin output; they are there to simplify the discussion. 
7. spin -n19 KpuMan /* feed random generator with n=19 to run Spin simulator 
01: PDAnum=2 GOT CERTIFIED Kpu= 12 at the NumAttempts==lth 
02: PDAnum=O GOT CERTIFIED Kpu= 12 at the NumAttempts==3th 
03: PDAnum=1 Failed to get Kpu after NumAttempts= 5; going to ... Aborted... 
04: PDAnum--1 ... ABORTED+++ BYE-BYE-BYE 
As can be appreciated from the above lines, at the end of an arbitrary run of the Spin simulator 
each PDA is either in possession of a certified Kpu key or aborted. In this case, PDA with numbers 
2 and 0 managed to get a certified Xpu, while PDA with number 1 fails and terminates in abortion 
(line 04). 
To support the results of the Spin simulator, we will validate the system using the Spin validator. 
7.15.2 Validation results 
By following the approach presented in section 7.11 we can learn that the number of reachable 
states in the system to check safety properties is approximately R= 140415 and that the number 
of bytes needed for each state is about S= 84. It follows that the memory needed to validate 
this system is RxS= 11797380 bytes, i. e. only about 12 Mbytes. We can certainly validate the 
KpuMan in full exhaustive mode using our platform with 512 Mbytes. 
By compilingthe KpuMan codeby Z cc -DMEMLIM=16 -DSAFETY-opan pan. cwe obtained 
the executable file called pan. Since we expect about R= 140415 states, and R is between 217 = 
131072 and 218 = 262144) it is recommendable to execute Ilo pan -w18; this means a hash table 
with 262144 entries. Recall from section 7.4 that the option -wNspecifies the size of the hash table 
as 2N states to be stored. 
Needless to say that there is no risk of exhausting our RAM memory since 262144 X 84 
22020096 bytes is less than our M of 512 000 000 bytes. In regard to CPU time, it takes only about 
5 seconds to complete the validation. 
% spin -a KpuMan /* generate an analyser for the Promela specification 
/* of KpuMan and store it in pan. c 
% gcc -DMEMLIM=16 -DSAFETY -o pan pan. c /* compile the pan. c verifier into the pan file 
/* analyse SAFETY properties only, use no 'more 
/* than 16 Mbytes 
% pan -08 /* allocate a hash table for 2^18= 262144 states and run the Spin validator 
01: (Spin Version 3.3.5 -- 28 September 1999) 
02: + Partial Order Reduction 
03: 
04: Full statespace search for: 
05: never-claim - (none specified) 
06: assertion violations + 
07: cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY) 
08: invalid ondstatos + 
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09: 
10: State-vector 84 byte, depth reached 123, errors: 0 
11: 140415 states, stored 
12: 47624 states, matched 
13: 188039 transitions (= stored+matched) 
14: 16 atomic steps 
'15: hash conflicts: 
26215 (resolved) 
16: (max size 2-18 states) 
17: 
The above lines show that after an exhaustive search no errors concerning safety properties were 
detected. Spin printed the number of states stored and matched (lines 11 and 12 respectively). 
Stored states are the states that were stored in the hash table. Finally, matched states are states 
that were analysed and stored in the hash table and later revisited and discarded. The output also 
shows (line 15) that during the search 26215 hash conflicts were resolved (see section 7.7). 
7.16 Validation of the mail server 
From the discussion presented in section 6.6.8 we learnt that the MailSvr process is linked to each 
MSSses process serving a PDA who has successfully opened an anonymous session. Rom each 
MSSses process the MailSvr receives messages Bob want to send to Alice. When a message arrives 
the MailSvr forwards it to its final destination. Also the MailSvr process receives Alice's replies to 
Bob. When an Alice's reply arrives, it forwards it to the corresponding MSSses in order that the 
MSSses forwards it to Bob. 
7.16.1 Simulation results 
To show that the Promela specification of the MailSvr is correct the output of have to show that the 
MailSvr receives messages coming from MSSses processes and that the MSSses processes receives 
replies to some of the messages. Note that replies to Bob messages are at Alice's discretion. She is 
not expected to reply to all of the messages she receives. 
% spin -n12 MailSvr /* feed random generator with n=12 to run Spin simulator 
01 MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=l 
02 MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=2 
03 Mssses: rcvd reply for PDA tmpId= 2 
04 MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=l 
05 MSSses: rcvd reply for PDA tmpId= 1 
06 MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=2 
07 MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=O 
08 MSSses: rcvd reply for PDA tmpId= 0 
21 
22 MSSses: tmpId=O has finished: HAPPY END BYE-BYE-BYE 
26 MSSses: tmpId=l has finished: HAPPY END BYE-BYE-BYE 
30 MSSses: tmpId=2 has finished: HAPPY END BYE-BYE-BYE 
31 
32 
126 Validation of the model 
From the above output lines we can see that in line 01 the MailSvr receives a messages from 
the PDA with tmpId=l. Yet there is no reply for it. In line 02 the MailSvr receives a messages 
from the PDA with tmpld=2 and in line 03 the MSSses receives a reply to that messages. Lines 04 
to 08 show similar information. In lines 22,26, and 30 the output shows the termination of PDA 
sessions with tmpId=O, tmpId=l, and tmpId=2 respectively. 
The output of the Spin simulator is not enough to claim that the Promela specification for the 
MailSvr complies with the correctness requirements; to prove this we have to validate it using the 
Spin validator and prove safety properties. 
7.16.2 Validation results 
By following the approach presented in section 7.11 we empirically learnt that the number of 
reachable states expected for this system is about R= 293934 and that the number of bytes needed 
to store each state is S= 240. It follows that we need about RxS= 300000 x 240 = 70544160 
bytes of RAM memory. Naturally, we can validate this system in full exhaustive mode in our 
platform omputer with 512 Mbytes. If 218 = 262144 and 219 = 524288 We need a hash table with 
219 = 524288 entries only. As to the CPU time, it takes only about 20 seconds to complete the 
validation. 
spin -a MailSvr /* generate an analyser for the Promela specification 
/* of MailSvr and store it in pan. c 
gcc -DMEMLIM=500 -DSAFETY -DVECTORSZ=512 -DPC -o pan pan. c /* compile the 
/* validator in pan. c into the executable pan file 
pan -w19 /* allocate a hash table for 2^19= 524288 states and run the Spin 
/* validator 
01 (Spin Version 3.3.5 -- 28 September 1999) 
02 + Partial Order Reduction 
03 
04 Full statespace search for: 
05 never-claim - (none specified) 
06 assertion violations + 
07 cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY) 
08 invalid endstates + 
09 
09 State-vector 240 byte, depth reached 192, errors: 0 
10 293934 states, stored 
11 158380 states, matched 
12 452314 transitions (= stored+matched) 
13 0 atomic steps 
14 hash conflicts: 57500 (resolved) 
15 (max size 2-19 states) 
16 
The output lines above show that 293934 states were stored, that 57500 hash conflicts were 
resolved and that no errors were detected by the validator. 
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From the discussion presented in section 6.6.7 we already know that the job of the bank process 
is to, verify the genuineness of e-cash sent by PDAs to the MSS as payment for an anonymous 
session. It is the MSSses process who forwards the e-cash. received from a PDA to the bank and 
then wait for a reply. The reply is either GenuineEcash or FakeEcash; naturally, in the former case 
the payment is accepted by the MSS and in the later refused. 
- 
To prove that the Promela specification of the bank process is correct we have to show that the 
bank indeed receives and e-cash and replies to the MSS. Note that for the sole purpose of validating 
the bank Promela specification the e-cash sent by the MSSses process to the bank is created by 
the MSSses itself; in the whole system this e-cash comes from a PDA. 
7.17.1 Simulation results 
The following lines show the output lines of the Promela simulator when its random number genera- 
tor is initiated with the value of 100. Note that the following assumption were made in the Promela 
specification: First, e-cash of value -1 are considered a fake; second, cash of value greater than 0 
are considered genuine; finally, the number of attempt to send a valid payment is restricted to 3; 
in no more that three attempts the PDA either succeeds and goes to a state where the anonymous 
session is supposed to begin and block, or terminates in abortion, 
% spin -n1OO bank /* feed random generator with n=100 to run Spin simulator 
01 BANK: rcvd FakeCash payment=-1 from PDA with tmpId=O 
02 BANK: rcvd FakeCash payment=-I from PDA with tmpId=l 
03 BANK: rcvd FakeCash payment=-1 from PDA with tmpId=O 
04 BANK: rcvd GenuineEcash payment=15 from PDA with tmpId=2 
05 
06 MSSses: AnoSes opened for PDA with tmpld=2 (payment=15 ) 
07 BANK: rcvd FakeCash payment=-1 from PDA with tmpId=O 
10 MSSses: PDA with tmpId=O failed to pay: ... ABORTED.... BYE-BYE-BYE 
11 BANK: rcvd FakeCash payment=-l from PDA with tmpId=l 
12 BANK: rcvd GenuineEcash payment=20 from PDA with tmpId=l 
13 
14 MSSses: AnoSes opened for PDA with tmpId=l (payment=20 
15 ... ... 
I As can be appreciated from the above lines, the PDA with tmpId=O sends fake e-cash to the 
bank in its three attempts (lines 01,03, and 07); consequently, it fails to pay for the anonymous 
session and terminates in abortion (line 10). 
The bank receives a fake payment from the PDA with tmpId=l on lines 02 and 11; however, 
on line 12 it receives a genuine e-cash from the PDA, thus, an anonymous session is opened for it 
in line 14. 
The PDA with tmpId=2 is the most efficient of the PDA group, it succeeds in sending genuine 
cash in its first attempt (line 04), thus, an anonymous session is opened for it in line 06. 
- 
According with the results, we can argue that the Promela specification of the bank does what 
we expect, however, to claim that the system is correct we have to verify that the correctness 
criteria we include in the code, namely, safety properties, hold true by validating it with the Spin 
validator. 
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Validation of the model 
As can be appreciated from the Promela code presented in section A. 3, the bank process contains 
(comment lines included) 197 lines. Following the strategies introduced in section 7.11 we learnt 
that the expected state space for the system is about 764346 states and that we need 232 bytes to 
store each state. It follows that we need roughly 764346 x 232 = 177328200 bytes to analyse the 
system in full exhaustive mode. We can certainly analyse it in our platform of 512 Mbytes. To use 
the RAM memory efficiently we can instruct Spin to allocate a hash table for 764346 states (see 
section 7.4. Since 219 = 524288 and 2 20 = 1048576, we need to set the -wN Spin option as -w20. 
From the point of view of CPU time, the system can be considered small, it takes only about 47 
seconds for the validation to complete. 
spin -a bank /* generate an analyser for the Promela specification 
/* of bank and store it in pan. c 
gcc -DMEMLIM=500 -DSAFETY -DPC -DVECTORSZ=256 -o pan pan. c /* compile the 
/* verifier stored in pan. c and generate an executable file in pan 
% pan -w20 /* allocate a hash table for 2-20= 104857 entries and run the Spin validator 
01 Fri Dec 3 17: 33: 53 GMT 1999 
02 (Spin Version 3.3.5 -- 28 September 1999) 
03 + Partial Order Reduction 
04 
05 Full statespace search for: 
06 never-claim - (none specified) 
07 assertion violations + 
08 cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY) 
09 invalid endstates + 
10 
11 State-vector 232 byte, depth reached 148, errors: 0 
12 764346 states, stored 
13 281699 states, matched 
14 1.04604e+06 transitions (= stored+matched) 
15 0 atomic steps 
16 hash conflicts: 115543 (resolved) 
17 (max size 2^20 states) 
18 
The above output lines show that the Spin validator stored 764346 states, that the space 
occupied for each state was 232 bytes. Spin analysed a total of 1046040 states (transition states), 
281699 
' 
of them are reported as matched, i. e. visited more than one time. Next, in line 16 Spin 
reports 115543 hash conflicts resolved (see section 7.7). Finally, and the most important, Spin 
reports in line 11 that no errors were detected during the validation, thus, we can claim that the 
system is correct. 
7.18 Validation of the backbone of system 
]A -om the discussions presented in sections 7.9.6 and the technical information about available 
memory resources presented in 7.10 we learnt that it is infeasible to validate our system by full 
exhaustive search. In section 7.13.1 we argued why it is not recommended to separate tile systell, 
indiscriminately into modules and validate each module separately. Because of these reasons we 
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decided to validate together as many modules as possible. From the whole Promela specification 
we have separated the KpuMan, the bank and the mail server and nothing else. What is left is 
what we call the backbone of the system since it includes the main components, namely, the three 
PDAs, the Xs and TmpId manager, and the three MSS session process. 
7.18.1 Simulation results 
To prove that these processes do what the designer expects, we have run the Spin simulator and 
analysed its output lines. Since we are dealing with the main components of the system, the output 
lines here have to show the main aspects of the algorithm we presented in section 5.10.3. Once 
again, here Bob is a PDA user and Alice is the destination of Bob's messages. 
Each PDA arriving at the MSS either registers with the MSS and is given a Ks key and a 
TmpId or terminates. In addition, we have to show that a Xs key can be renewed during the 
anonymous communication session. 
In an actual implementation of the system the Ks key is used to encrypt/decrypt messages 
travelling from the PDA to the MSS and in the opposite direction. Since the encryption and 
decryption of messages are arithmetic operations and irrelevant to the communication they 
are not shown here. 
We show that Bob can send an e-coin as a payment to the MSS and that the e-coin can 
be accepted or rejected by the MSS. In addition, we show that after certain amount of time 
the prepaid time expires and Bob either extends it by sending another e-coin or accepts the 
abrupt termination of his session. N seconds before the prepaid time expires, Bob receives a 
warning message. 
In an actual implementation; the time to warn the PDA user and the time to terminate the 
session are measured by a timeout mechanism; in our validation model, and for the sake of 
simplicity, we use a counter that decrements one unit of time for every message sent by Bob 
to Alice. We consider that this does not affect the behaviour of our system. 
Note that Alice's replies are not shown in the output of the backbone of the system because 
the mail server module is out of the validation, this output will be shown is section 7.19 where the 
whole system is simulated. 
Before analysing the output of the simulator it is important to mention that the PDA Promela 
code is composed of three layers (the PDAuser, PDAses, and PDAtcp), hence, when a PDA finishes 
it interaction with the MSS, all of these three processes must terminate and the resource (the 
channels and the TmpIds for example) they use must be released. 
This observation, however, immediately leads to an obvious question, call these resources be 
reused? In theory the answer is yes; they can be reused by new PDAs, however, for this to be 
safe, we would need a mechanism to recycle the identifiers used to name them. Not to be involved 
with additional complexity irrelevant to the communication protocol, we decided not to reuse any 
resource. 
Another restriction to keep in mind is that in the Promela specification we restricted the values 
of valid session keys to 1,2,3, and 4; other values are considered invalid. Similarly, valid values 
for TmpId are: 0,1,2,3, and 4; other values are considered out of domain. Finally, the minimum 
amount of money accepted for opening or extending an anonymous session is 15 and the maximum 
accepted is 100. Values less than 0 are considered a fake. 
I, 
What follows are the output lines of a single run of the simulator whose random number 
generator was initialized with the arbitrary value of 3456. 
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spin -n3456 SysBackBone /* feed the random generator with 3456 
/* and run Spin simulator 
001 PDAses: PDAnum=l; pid=4 RgTED Ks=3 (tmpId= 0) after i=l attpt 
002 MSSses: rcvd FakeEcash I too little or to big money=l from PDA-tmpId=O 
003 PDAses: PDAn==2; pid=7 RgTED Ks=l (tmpId= 1) after i= I attps 
004 MSSses: rcvd GenuineEcash=20 from PDA-tmpId=l 
005 MSSses: rcvd FakeEcash I too little or to big money=l from PDA-tmpId=O 
006 PDAses: PDAnum=O; pid=5 RgTED Ks=2 (tmpId= 2) after i= 1 attps 
007 MSSses: rcvd GenuineEcash=20 from PDA-tmpId=2 
008 MSSses: credit=10 CreditLeft=10 for PDA-tmpId=l 
010 PDAses: PDA-tmpId=l ASKING to change DldKs=l 
Oil MSSses: rcvd GenuineEcash=20 from PDA-tmpId=O 
042 PDAses: tmpId=l GOT new Ks DldKs=l NewKs= 4 
083 MSSses: credit=O CreditLeft=7 for PDA-tmpId=l 
085 PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=l has been TimeAlerted 
086 PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=l has sent EXTRA payment=20 
093 MSSses: credit=O CreditLeft=5 for PDA-tmpId=l 
099 MSSses: PDA-tmpId=l SENT extra payment=20 to bank 
102 MSSses: credit=O CreditLeft=8 for PDA-tmpId=2 
109 PDAusor: PDA-tmpId=O has been TimeAlerted 
Ill PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=O has sent EXTRA payment=20 
115 PDAuser: tmpId=l AnoTime INCRTED 
118 PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=2 has been TimeAlerted 
119 PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=2 has sent EXTRA payment=O 
124 MSSses: credit=O CreditLeft=5 for PDA-tmpId=O 
126 MSSses: PDA-tmpId=2 SENT extra payment=O to bank 
128 MSSses: PDA-tmpId=O SENT extra payment=20 to bank 
129 MSSses: credit=14 CreditLeft=10 for PDA-tmpId=l 
134 PDAusar: AnoTime NOT incremented for PDA-tmpId= 2 
135 PDAuser: tmpId=O AnoTime INCRTED 
As can be seen from the output lines. There are three PDAs interacting with the MSS. To 
be able to tell thein apart before they are given a proper tmpld by the MSS we called then, 
PDAnum=O, PDAmin1=1 and PDAnuzn=2. 
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On line 001 the PDAnum=I manages to register a Ks=3 with the MSS and in return it is 
given a tmpld=O. Likewise, on line 003 the PDAnum=2 registers a Ks=1 and receives the 
Finally, on line 006 the PDAnum=O is assigned the tmpId=2 after registering 
Ks=2. Note that both the session keys and the tmpIds are unique. From now on we will refer 
to PDAs by they tmpIds. 
On line 002 the PDA with tmpId=O tries to open an anonymous session with the MSS, 
unfortunately the money it sends is below the minimum payment accepted by the MSS, 
consequently the payment is refused. On line 005, it fails again. Finally, it manages to pay 
for the anonymous session on line 011 where it sends 20 units of genuine money. 
On line 004 the PDA with tmpId=l successfully pays for opening an anonymous session. It 
sends 20 units of genuine money to the MSS. From the total payment, 10 units of money 
are reserved as Creditleft and the rest as credit (see line 008). The credit part of the money 
is immediately used to charge the PDA user for every single message lie sends to the MSS. 
The CreditLeft money is used after the credit is run out and the PDA user is alerted about 
his communication time being about to finish. When the CreditLeft money runs out, the 
communication session is abruptly terminated. 
On line 083 we can see that the credit money for PDA with tmpId=l has run out. Thus, on 
line 085 the PDA is time-alerted; as a result, it sends 20 units of money to the MSS to extend 
its communication session on line 086. The time extension takes place on line 115. Note that 
after the PDA is time-alerted and before the money to pay for an extension arrives, the MSS 
is still serving the PDA and charging it from the CreditLeft money (line 093) until it runs out 
or new money arrives. The result of the extension can be seen on line 129, where the PDA 
shows credit=14 and CreditLeft=10. 
On line 118 the PDA with tmpId=2 is time-alerted. Thus, it tries to extend its anonymous 
session by sending a payment=O to the MSS (line 119), although the payment is genuine for 
the bank, it is not within the rank of accepted values for the for the MSS, consequently, the 
payment is refused by the MSS on line 134 and the anonymous time is not incremented.. 
The PDA with tmpld=O is time-alerted on line 109, thus, it sends 20 units of money on line 
111; the payment is accepted and the anonymous time incremented on line 135 for the PDA. 
Each PDA can ask the KsTmpId process to change the PDA's Ks key any time during the 
anonymous communication session. The PDA with tmpld=l decides to ask for a Ks change 
on line 010; as a result, it receives a new Ks on line 042. 
The output of the Spin simulator is not enough to claim that the backbone of the system is 
correct; to prove that the system complies with the correctness criteria included in its Promela 
specification it has to be explored by the Spin validator. 
7.18.2 Validation results 
The Promela specification of the system backbone is shown in appendix A. 4. In terins of number of 
lines, the size of the system is about 1300 lines (with comment lines included). The precise number of 
reachable system states and Mbytes of memory needed to validate this system is impossible to know. 
Yet by following the approach presented in section 7.11 it can be estimated that the system has at 
least 4.14323 X 107 states and each state occupies about 1780 bytes. The amount of RAM memory to 
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validate this system in full exhaustive mode would be 4.14323 x 107 x 1.780 x 103 = 7.374949 x 1010 7 
which is approximately 73 Gbytes of memory. It is clear that we cannot validate such a system in 
our platform using Spin in full exhaustive mode. We have to resort to supertrace mode and take 
tile best of it. 
From section 7.10 we learilt that there is a trade-off between run-time and coverage in supertrace 
mode. Also, we estimated that the CPU time to analyse 4.5 x 107 states is about one hour and 
that the size of tile hash table for such a number of states is 2 26 ' 
We decided that CPU times longer than one hour for a single run are beyond the limits, for this 
reason, we validated tile backbone of tile system using a hash table of 2 25 entries. Unfortunately, 
the hash factor of the validation is only about 2.0, which means a poor coverage. Recall from 
section 7.6 that the hash factor measures tile coverage of tile run and that hash factors near 1.0 
imply low coverage and hash factor over 100.0 mean high coverage. 
In tile last resort not to separate tile whole system indiscriminately into modules and to improve 
the coverage of the validation we used sequential multiliash techniques (see section 7.8). We ran 
tile Spin validator with 16 different pairs of hash functions (pan -w25 -R16). 
Before analysing tile results of tile validation it it worth commenting that to prove that tile 
backbone of the system is correct we focused only on checking safety properties. We believe that 
at this stage of tile development it is enough to claim that the system complains to correctness 
requirements. Safety property were included in the Promela specification in the form of assertion 
statements to guarantee several conditions: 
" To guarantee that a Ks key is within a certain domain and that each Ks is unique. 
" To guarantee that TmpId are within a certain domain and that they are unique. 
" To guarantee that the payment for the anonymous session is within the limits accepted by 
the MSS. 
" To guarantee that, after the expiration of Bob's prepaid time, t. lie MSS does no forward any 
message from Bob to Alice and from Alice to Bob. 
" To guarantee that after a certain time all the instantiated processes reach a valid end state. 
In this case, all the instantiated processes, except for the KsTmpId process which remains 
blocked in valid end state waiting for the arrival of a new PDA, terminate. 
The results of the validation are shown in the following lines: 
spin -a SysBackBone /* generate an analyser for the Promela specification 
/* of SysBackBon and store it in pan. c 
gcc -DMEMLIM=500 -DVECTORSZ=2048 -DBITSTATE -DSAFETY -DPC -o pan pan. c 
/* generate an executable spin validator in the pan file 
pan -w25 -R16 /* run the spin validator using 16 different pair of hash 
/* functions 
Run 1: 
1.81076e+07 states, stored 
2.221e+07 states, matched 
4.03176e+07 transitions (= storcd+matched) 
6.87069o+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.85306 (best coVerage if >100) 
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Run 2: 
1.85122e+07 states, stored 
2.0463e+07 states, matched 
3.89753e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
8.30765e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.81255 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 3: 
1.78501e+07 states, stored 
2.2038e+07 states, matched 
3.98881e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
6.22926e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.87979 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 4: 
1.73915e+07 states, stored 
2.10173e+07 states, matched 
3.84088e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
6.81976e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.92936 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 5: 
1.859e+07 states, stored 
2.00003e+07 states, matched 
3.85903e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
1.41714e+07 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.80497 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 6: 
1.83468e+07 states, stored 
2.30855e+07 states, matched 
4.14323e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
6.24582e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.8289 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 8: 
1.86209e+07 states, stored 
2.04937e+07 states, matched 
3.91146e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
8.51168e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.80198 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 9: 
1.83666e+07 states, stored 
2.28473e+07 states, matched 
4.12139e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
6.62465e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.82693 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 10: 
1.85906e+07 states, stored 
2.05512e+07 states, matched 
3.91417e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
8.32099e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.80492 (best coverage if >100) 
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1.81843e+07 states, stored 
134 
1.929e+07 states, matched 
3.74743e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
1.36091e+07 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.84524 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 12: 
1.77686e+07 states, stored 
2.1414e+07 states, matched 
3.91826e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
6.5271e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.88841 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 13: 
1.79687e+07 states, stored 
2.23608e+07 states, matched 
4.03296e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
6.6289e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.86738 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 15: 
1.80276e+07 states, stored 
2.20338e+07 states, matched 
4.00614e+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
6.37275e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.86128 (best coverage if >100) 
Run 16: 
(Spin Version 3.3.5 -- 28 September 1999) 
+ Partial Order Reduction 
Bit statespace search for: 
never-claim - (none specified) 
assertion violations + 
cycle checks - (disabled by -DSAFETY) 
invalid endstates + 
State-vector 1780 byte, depth reached 2972, errors: 0 
1.7194e+07 states, stored 
1.76727e+07 states, matched 
3.48667c+07 transitions (= stored+matched) 
8.49598e+06 atomic steps 
hash factor: 1.95152 (best coverage if >100) 
(max size 2-25 states) 
Validation of the model 
Rom tile output of tile Spin validator we have learnt that the system consists of more that 
4x 107 states, that 1780 bytes are needed to store each state, and tile best, that after exploring tile 
system with 16 different hash functions no errors were detected. It is perhaps worth mentioning 
that it takes roughly less than 16 hours of CPU time to complete that validation. 
The result also show that the hash factor of each run is only about 2.0. We pointed out ill 
section 7.6 that hash factors greater that 100.0 are recommended because theY imply a coverage 
close to 100% of the total number of reacliable system states. However, a hash factor lower than 
100.0 should not be underestimated. Holzmann has shown [168] that in some cases a hash factor 
of 4.0 corresponds to a coverage of 93%. 
Grounded oil this empirical knowledge we argue that although tile hash factor of our validation 
is only about 2.0 for a run with a single pair of hash functions, by running the validator witil 16 
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different pairs of independent hash functions we readied a coverage closer to 100%. On this account 
we can safely claim that the backbone of the system is correct. 
7.19 Simulation of the whole system 
Having validated the public key manager, the mail server, the bank, and the backbone of the 
system, there should be a high degree of confidence about the correctness of the whole system. 
Although it is computationaly impossible to validate it, we can still run a single simulator to see 
how the different components of the system interact. To make the output lines clearer, we decided 
to simulate it for a single PDA only. The result of the simulation are shown next and are aimed to 
show that Bob can send anonymous messages to Alice and that if Alice decides to reply, Bob can 
receive Alice's reply. 
spin -n3456 AnoConComm-1PDA /* feed random generator with= 3456 
/* and run Spin simulator 
01 PDAses: PDAnum--O; pid=5 HAS RgTED Ks=5 (tmpId= 0) after i= I attps 
02 BANK: GenuineEcash payment= 20 rcvd from PDA-tmpId= 0 
06 MSSses: tmpId=O credit=9 CreditLeft=10 
12 MSSses: tmpId=O credit=5 CreditLeft=10 
13 ===+++>PDAuser tmpId= 0 chnum= 0 GOT E-MAIL addr= XX txt= YY 
14 MSSses: tmpId=O credit=4 CreditLeft=10 
15 === ... >PDAuser tmpId= 0 chnum= 0 GOT E-MAIL addr= XX txt= YY 
19 MSSses: tmpId=O credit=O CreditLeft=10 
20 PDAuser tmpId=O has been TimeAlerted 
21 PDAuser tmpId=O has sent EXTRA payment=20 
On line 01 Bob's PDA succeeds in registering a session key with the MSS and in return lie 
receives a tmpld=O. Next, on line 02, the PDA pays for its anonymous session. Line 06 shows that 
the amount of money Bob was credited for is being used. On line 06 lie has 19 units of time while 
on line 12 he has only 15. On line 13 Bob receives an answer to one of the anonymous messages 
he sent to Alice. The same happens on line 15. On line 19 Bob is running out of session time (lie 
is left only with 10 units of money), therefore, his PDA is time-alerted by the MSS (line 20). Oil 
line 21 Bob sends 20 units of money to extend his anonymous session. 
7.20 Coverage of the validation 
In section 7.14 we specified what correctness requirements our anonyinizer systems must meet at 
this stage to be considered correct. Even though we focused only on safety properties and process 
termination Spin helped detect several errors: 
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" Unexpected messages and messages sent to incorrect receivers, which would have cause dead- 
locks. 
" Subtle deadlocks between processes running on the PDA and the MSS. 
" Incorrect termination of processes at the MSS after unexpected termination of the communi- 
cation session at the PDA side. This causes unnecessary hold of resources. 
" Subtle errors in the session key and TpmId tables stored by the MSS which were easily 
detected by assertion violations. 
At this stage we significantly reduced the correctness requirements of our system. Except for 
process termination, we did not validate its liveness properties. Because of this simplification we 
cannot claim yet that our system complies with correct liveness properties. Consequently, we cannot 
claim yet that our system, our PDAs for example, does not suffer from service starvation. Moreover, 
without validating temporal claims we cannot guarantee that contentions in our system are fairly 
resolved. Likewise, we cannot claim yet that messages sent over the Promela reliable channels (see 
section 6.6.9) arrive safe, not duplicated and in first-in-first-out order. A brief introduction to 
service starvation and fairness requirements is presented in [179]. 
7.21 Spin limitations 
Spin is a protocol validator based on exhaustive global state generation. Hence, in theory Spin can 
validate any system provided that its number of reachable states is finite [172]. Promela does not 
restrict the number of processes, message queues, length of message queues and variables that can 
be created. This number can be arbitrarily large as long as it is finite. At first glance the problem 
seems easy and one can get the impression that the only two things the designer needs to validate 
large systems are a large memory and plenty of CPU time. However, the point not to be missed is 
that a large memory can easily mean several Gigabytes. Similarly, plenty of CPU time can easily 
mean millions of years. Due to the space explosion problem, in practice it is extremely important 
that the number of processes, message queues, length of message queues and variables be restricted 
as much as possible, but without losing important features of the system. Failure to keep this 
number small results in systems with prohibitively large number of reachable system states that 
can be validated only with poor coverage. 
Because of these restrictions Spin does not perform well when it comes to validating protocols 
with random inputs within a wide range. In our particular case for example, what was supposed to 
be a key randomly selected from a large domain had to be selected from a random choice between 
six values. This limitation caused some difficulties in reusing session keys. 
Another limitation of Spin validation is that communication in Promela is one-to-one. It does 
not support either multicast or broadcast. This limitation becomes apparent when the designer 
wishes to simulate a MSS broadcasting to the air its public key and other messages addressed to 
the public or to anybody who can understand them. 
In Promela, timeouts are intensively used to escape hang states. Interestingly enough, Promela 
does not have a mean of specifying timeout intervals. Timeout is just a timeout possibility, somL, 
thing that will eventually happen. This abstraction is justified [159,180] on the basis that if an 
untimed Proincla model is correct, it guarantees to preserve its correctness under all Possible real 
time constraints. However, there are situations where the designer wishes to timeout two or more 
event in a certain order (event p before event q for example). In cases like this the power of Promela 
clearly weakens. 
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A possible way of getting around the lack of time intervals of Promela timeouts is by specifying 
timeouts in terms of numbers of attempts to do something. For example, to rescue a PDA from 
hanging at a MSS while trying to learn its public one can restrict the number of incorrect MSS 
public keys received instead of restricting the trying time to t units of time. Obviously, we are 
assuming that the MSS never fails to deliver either correct or incorrect keys. 
7.22 Summary 
To ensure that a distributed system is correct, its communication protocol must be specified and 
validated. State-of-the-art validation techniques involve the use of software tools which are called 
protocol validators, or just validators. 
In the academic environment, the most successful protocol validator is Spin. It can be down- 
loaded for free from the Internet. Spin is a generic verification system that accepts design specifica- 
tion written in Promela. Spin's validation of correctness is based on the analysis of the reachability 
of system states. 
Small systems can be validated in a full exhaustive search which guarantees 100% coverage as 
Spin explores all reachable states. However, it can happen that the computer runs out of memory 
and the full search deteriorates into an uncontrolled partial search. In cases like this, one can resort 
to a controlled partial search (or supertrace controlled partial search) where Spin makes the best 
use of the available memory to validate the system regardless of its number of states. Naturally, 
100% coverage is not guaranteed but the results are still of practical use. Also, it is feasible that 
the memory is large enough to store the states of the system but the CPU time to validate it is 
prohibitively large. CPU time can be reduced by reducing the number of states to validate. The 
designer can reduce this number simply by limiting the memory allocated to Spin to a certain 
number of megabytes. 
The anonymizing system introduced in this work can be considered large; consequently, to 
validate it, it was separated into independent modules. Next, each module was validated separately 
either by full exhaustive search or supertrace controlled partial search. 
At early stages of the development of a system it is normally enough to validate only safety 
properties (deadlocks, unspecified receptions, assertions and system invariants) and process ter- 
mination. Having passed the safety property tests, the designer can move oil to validate liveness 
properties (progress cycles, livelocks and temporal claims). Since the anonyinizing system proposed 
in this work is at an early stage in of development, is was tested on safety properties only. Re- 
gardless of some limitations present in the Spin validator, Spin is certainly helpful to detect design 
errors. According to the Spin's outputs, the system is error free at this stage. 
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Chapter 8 
Enhancing the basic system 
8.1 Introduction 
In chapter 5 we introduced a system to make anonymous calls from a PDA based on the public 
telephone box paradigm. The protocols, in finite state diagrams and Promela, language to implement 
the our proposal were presented in chapter 6. As was stated, our strategy was to keep the system 
as simple as possible so that its central ideas were easy to explain and understand. This forced 
us to leave out issues that have to be considered in a real life implementation and usage of the 
resulting system. In this chapter this issues are discussed and some refinements to the system are 
suggested. Due to space and time constraints we do not go in to detail in our discussion; our sole 
intention is to make the reader aware of problems that need further attention. This chapter is 
therefore tentative. 
8.2 Traffic analysis 
Message encryption prevents Ebe, an intruder, from understanding the contents of messages ex- 
changed between Bob to Alice. Yet it does not prevent him from overhearing that something is 
being transmitted through the network. 
Though Ebe, cannot extract the contents of the message, lie can observe the pattern of the 
messages and determine the location of the hosts involved in the communication, the frequency 
and length of messages being transmitted. This type of attack is known as traffic analysis and is 
something we have not taken into account in our system. 
In an extreme case, Bob and Alice might be the only two persons connected to the network 
or to the segment that links them, if this is true, traffic analysis would leave Ebe without ally 
doubt that Bob is e-mailing Alice and the anonymity of Bob would be considerable reduced. To 
meddle in Bob's affairs Ebe can just e-mail Alice, anonymously if lie wishes to, and tell her that 
the anonymous message she has just received was sent by Bob. 
,, 
The risk of traffic analysis in our system can be prevented easily -at the expense of efficiency 
and complexity- by deliberately keeping the communication lines active with bogus message traffic. 
The MSSs for example may be equipped with a mechanism for sending bogus messages to each 
'other, 
at random intervals of time and of different length. A snapshot of the network loaded with 
bogus messages is shown in figure 8.1. 
The idea behind this is that if Ebe is meddling with the lines that connect the anonymous 
cal ,I- er's current 
MSS and Alice's WS to the network lie can never find out whether the traffic lie 
detects was originated at MSSI, is a bogus message or is a meaningful one. Neither can lie tell if 
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Legend: PDA-- Personal Digital Assistant 
MSS-- Mobile Support Station 
WS-- Work Station 
Figure 8.1: Prevention of traffic analysis. 
a meaningful message reaching MSS3 from a bogus one. 
8.3 Coexistence of physical and electronic cash 
The main motivations we had for founding our system on the use of electronic cash were the 
advantages of e-casli over physical cash discussed in sections 5.5.1 and 5-6. Tile possibility for the 
anonymous caller to send his e-coin to tile MSS remotely from tile park bench where lie can be 
sitting down while sending his anonymous message certainly contributes to hiding his identity. 
Another motivation we had in mind when we decided in favour of e-casli against physical casil 
was the assumption that in the early years of tile 21st century e-cash will be widely accepted and 
available. Note that we are only saying that e-cash will be widely used and not saying that physical 
cash will disappear as many authors have predicted. 
Predicting that physical cash will disappear from tile business world is not a safe bet at all but 
a debatable claim. To please both contentious parties one can say that in the future there will be 
as imich e-casli as physical, i. e. they will coexist and complement each other rather than compete. 
Though this may sound as an easy way of avoiding confrontations, our last guess makes sense wilen 
one goes beyond the boundaries of computer technology to see how new technologies are normally 
accepted by human beings. With few exceptions, old technologies do not disappear completely 
from tile scene when now ones are deployed, some of them share the space on equal terms, other 
lose importance and stay behind, however, still in existence. To support this with real life examples 
we call mention that although cars outperform liorses in terms of power and speed, liorses are still 
used, police forces find thein appropriate in more than one situation; there are only a few of t1lem 
but they are still there. Similarly, airplanes are quicker than cars and can fly, notwithstanding, 
they have not replaced the latter and they never will. Last example, television brings not only 
sound but pictures as well, yet it peacefully shares the audience with the old-fashioned radio. 
The main reason why now teclinologics coexist with new ones is that it is hard, if not impossible, 
to create a new technology that outperforms the old one in entirely all aspects. For example, all 
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airplane outperforms a car when it comes to travelling long distances (thousands of kilometers), 
yet a car is better for travelling short ones. 
Another factor of major importance regarding the resistance to the acceptance of new tech- 
nologies is inertia. Once a technology becomes entrenched, it is very difficult to change it. Social, 
cultural, organizational, and emotional factors resists the change. 
Humans are sentimental creatures. Thus, after certain time, they fall in love with what they use 
and find it difficult to depart from it. Consequently, sometimes they would preserve old technologies 
for the sole pleasure of having it and doing things the old traditional way. Though car lovers will 
claim the opposite, horse riders will offer convincing arguments to prove that the pleasure of riding 
a car is nothing compared to riding a horse. Let us mention an example from the electronic world. 
Only by taking into account the pleasure and the prestige that an old-fashionable mechanical 
wristwatch gives to his holder one can explain why digital wristwatches have not replaced the 
mechanical ones when everybody knows that a digital wristwatch is cheaper, more accurate, and 
practical than a mechanical one. 
The introduction of electronic money is not an exception, it complies with the rules we have 
just discussed. In terms of pleasure, more that one person would claim that one thousand pounds 
in e-cash is a nice thing to have in your PDA memory. Yet one thousand pounds in five, ten, and 
twenty pounds notes in your pockets makes them feel better (rich and prestigious). The fact that 
physical money can be seen, weighed, touched and smelled is bonus to the monetary value of the 
money, a bonus that counts a great deal for many people. It follows that it is likely that physical 
cash is going to be around sharing space with electronic cash for a long time. 
The reader interested in more details about the stages a new technology goes through before it 
is widely accepted by the masses is encouraged to refer to [181]. 
8.4 Text analysis 
The most elementary thing the receiver of an anonymous message would do in order guess who is 
the sender of the anonymous message is to have a look at the text in search for patterns that might 
lead to the identity of the sender. Patterns like spelling and grammar mistakes, favourite words 
and sentences, blank spaces, length of lines and others, can provide a great deal of information 
about the writer of a text. For example, an obvious English mistake would tell Alice that Bob is 
not a native English speaker. 
A simple approach to preventing the analysis of Bob's messages in our system is to make the 
MSS translate them before sending them to Alice. By translation here we mean converting the text 
from Bob's writing style into a different one, say, a flat, robot-like style. This translation can be 
performed by changing words in the original text by their synonyms and by reformatting the text. 
A potential problem with text translation is that if words and format are changed arbitrarily, 
the result of the translation might lose its original meaning. It seems that Bob lias to make a choice 
between the risk of being caught by text analysis and conveying a meaningless message to Alice. 
To give Bob the chance to decide by himself the MSS can be provided with a selection switch so 
that Bob can choose between translated and non-translated text. 
8.5 Potential risks of e-cash payment 
In regards to performance and other practical issues, it is time to discuss the potential danger 
that e-cash brings to its users. The crucial issue to keep in mind is that e-cash is electronic, 
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consequently, it is stored, managed, and transmitted by electronic computers and networks, i. e. by 
systems that are: 
9 prone to failures due to hardware and software design errors, and 
e exposed to security attacks from malicious amateur and professional intruders. 
One thousand pounds of e-casli stored in a PDA is worth nothing if tile PDA on tile network 
is broken when the PDA user needs to purchase something. So far, we have not been capable of 
designing unbreakable systems. If this is true it sounds reasonable for a PDA user to have both, 
c-cash in his PDA memory and physical cash in his pockets. 
In tile same way, the security of eýcasll stored in the PDA memory heavily depends on tile secu- 
rity of the PDA, the network, and other computers involved in the e-cash management. Regardless 
of how strong cryptosysteins are, their security will be broken sooner or later. 
To talk precisely about the system we propose for sending anonymous and confidential ines- 
sages from a PDA, we have to adinit that the anonymity of tile anonymous caller depends oil tile 
anonymity of the e-cash used as payment, if the latter is not observed, if the anonymous payment 
system fails due to a flaw in the protocol or tile implementation for example, the anonymity of tile 
caller is seriously compromised. The existence of potential flaws in tile protocol or implementation 
is all inherent weakness of any cryptosysteni, something its user should be aware of. Real life lias 
taught us that unbrcakable cryptosystems do not last for long, sooner or later somebody will ilit 
their point of vulnerability and find a sort of electronic finger prints left on the L-note sent by 
the PDA; this fact lias been admitted by cryptographers long time ago. Thus, if tile anonymous 
caller is really concerned about this issue and does not want to take any risk, lie perhaps would 
prefer using a couple of twenty pence coins to pay for his anonymous call instead of using L-casli. 
Obviously, lie whis in terms of cryptographic security but loses in terms of physical surveillance 
since lie will need to go personally to the MSS to insert his twenty pence into tile MSS slot. There 
lie might be observed by somebody and Iiis anonymity compromised. 
Another problem with the anonymous payment protocol is that the anonymity of the e-note 
Bob solids to Clare the banker to be blindly signed is based on the assumption that Clare signs a 
great deal of c-notes everyday, so that Bob's L-note blends into the wad of notes signed by Clare. 
The fewer notes Clare signs, the more vulnerable is the system. Again, the use of coins would work 
better in this situation. 
One of the problems of having two equivalent technologies working at the same time is that a 
double infrastructure is needed to support theiii, this may be regarded as a luxury since it migIlt 
double tile cost of the system. A public teleplione box for example that accepts both coins and 
credit cards is considerable more expensive that one that supports only one method of payment. 
The saine applies to a MSS that supports coins and e-coins. Doug, the owner of the MSS of our 
hypothetical network will need to equip thein both with all wireless antenna to receive e-cash and 
it slot to receive coins. 
8.6 Cheating with e-casli 
In section 4.1.6 the protocol for writing blind signatures on electronic notes was presented. It was 
mentioned also that this protocol allows Clare the banker not only to detect forgery C-notes but 
also to find out the identity of the cheater. It detects if Doug, the MSS owner, is preseliting an 
e-note to Clare for it second time. Moreover, it leads to the identity of Bob, the anonymous caller, 
if lie is trying to spend an e-note twice. 
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In our system no action is taken if Clare detects that Bob is cheating. Bob's forged C-note 
is refused and nothing else happens. In a real life system legal actions have to be taken again 
the deceiver, perhaps a sort of Internet police should be informed to investigate and sort out the 
problem between Bob and Doug. 
In our system e-cash is either accepted of refused by Clare, she does not make any distinction 
between invalid e-cash and forgery. By invalid cash we mean, e-cash that is not recognized by 
Clare as a legal payment, the use of dollars in the United Kingdom for example. The payment is 
simply refused, there is no crime to prosecute in this case. On the contrary, by forgery me mean 
the use of illegal e-cash with the conscious intention of deceiving Clare. For example, the use of 
hand-made forgery or the use of e-cash that has already been spent. 
8.7 Use smart cards to pay anonymously 
The need to contact Clare the banker to check for the validity of Bob's e-cash sent to Doug as a 
payment for an anonymous communication session with the MSS stems from the freedom Bob has 
to make his own money in his PDA. This might result in Bob double-spending an e-coin either 
accidentally or maliciously. To prevent Bob from doing this, we had to bring Clare in to the game 
and consequently make our system slightly more complicated. There is a way of going around 
this question which consists in decreasing Bob's power to create the e-coins lie uses to pay for his 
anomymous calls. 
The essential idea here is for Bob to pay for his anonymous communication sessions with a sort 
of prepaid telephone magnetic card. The property of the prepaid we are interested in her is that it 
stores money units (Z5.00 for example), that are retrieved from the card by the card reader. Once 
a money unit is spent, it is permanently deleted from the magnetic band of the card. Consequently, 
there is no hope of reusing it. 
A smart card (see section 4.3) can be used to implement this method to pay for MSS services. 
Bob can buy a smart card and without writing any personal information in its memory or oil its 
surface, he brings it to Clare the banker to charge it with e-money. To pay, Bob can present Clare 
with physical cash. The smart card is charged by converting Bob's physical cash into e-notes signed 
by Clare and loading them into the card memory. 
As long as Clare gets paid, she does not care who the card owner is or where the e-coins she 
signed are going to, thus, she is happy charging a card without asking Bob for any identification. 
Neither is she interested to know how the e-coins are going to be spent. If this holds true, Bob's 
identity is protected and the card can be used for anonymous payment to merchants who recognize 
Clare's signature. 
, 
Money is put in and out of the smart card by a program stored by the smart card inicrocontroller. 
The program is activated by inserting the card into a card reader and typing the propers commands 
, from the card reader keyboard. Bob does not have any access to the program which is in control 
of the e-coins stored in memory. Once an e-coin is spent, it is deleted from memory or marked as 
spent. In this manner, there is no chance for double spending. 
, Smart card readers might be deployed inside PDAs or connected to them, this way Bob can 
transfer payment for anonymous communications to Doug from his PDA. Upon receiving Bob's 
, payment, Doug sees Clare's signature and knowing that money coming from smart cards is not 
prone to double spending and forgery, accepts it immediately. 
As a side comment, it is worth mentioning that money stored in a smart card might be used to 
pay for any goods and commodities (at vending machines for example) as long as the merchant has 
the hardware and software to communicate with the smart card and recognizes Clare's signature. 
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consequently, it is stored, managed, and transmitted by electronic computers and networks, i. e. by 
systems that are: 
* prone to failures due to hardware and software design errors, and 
e exposed to security attacks from malicious amateur and professional intruders. 
One thousand pounds of e-cash stored in a PDA is worth nothing if the PDA on the network 
is broken when the PDA user needs to purchase something. So far, we have not been capable of designing unbreakable systems. If this is true it sounds reasonable for a PDA user to have botli, 
e-cash in his PDA memory and physical cash in his pockets. 
In the same way, the security of e-cash stored in the PDA memory heavily depends on the secu- 
rity of the PDA, the network, and other computers involved in the e-cash management. Regardless 
of how strong cryptosystems are, their security will be broken sooner or later. 
To talk precisely about the system we propose for sending anonymous and confidential ines- 
sages from a PDA, we have to admit that the anonymity of the anonymous caller depends oil the 
anonymity of the e-cash used as payment, if the latter is not observed, if the anonymous Payment 
system fails due to a flaNv in the protocol or the implementation for example, the anonymity of the 
caller is seriously compromised. The existence of potential flaws in the protocol or implementation 
is an inherent weakness of any cryptosystem, something its user should be aware OL Real life has 
taught us that unbreakable cryptosystems do not last for long, sooner or later somebody will hit 
their point of vulnerability and find a sort of electronic finger prints left on the e-note sent by 
the PDA; this fact has been admitted by cryptographers long time ago. Thus, if the anonymous 
caller is really concerned about this issue and does not want to take any risk, lie perhaps would 
prefer using a couple of twenty pence coins to pay for his anonymous call instead of using e-cash. 
Obviously, lie wins in terms of cryptographic security but loses in terms of Physical surveillance 
since lie will need to go personally to the MSS to insert his twenty pence into the MSS slot. There 
lie might be observed by somebody and his anonymity compromised. 
Another problem with the anonymous payment protocol is that the anonymity of the e-not, 
Bob sends to Clare the banker to be blindly signed is based on the assumption that Clare signs a 
great deal of e-notes everyday, so that Bob's e-note blends into the wad of notes signed by Clare. 
The fewer notes Clare signs, the more vulnerable is the system. Again, the use of coins would work 
better in this situation. 
One of the problems of having two equivalent technologies working at the same time is that a double i nfras truct tire is needed to support them, this may be regarded as a luxury since it might 
double the cost of the system. A public telephone box for example that accepts both coins and 
credit cards is considerable more expensive that one that supports only one method of payment. 
The same applies to a MSS that supports coins and e-coins. Doug, the owner of the MSS Of our 
hypothetical network will need to equip them both with an wireless antenna to receive e-cash and 
a slot to receive coins. 
8.6 Cheating with e-cash 
In section 4.1.6 the protocol for writing blind signatures on electronic notes was presented. it Was 
mentioned also that this protocol allows Clare the banker not only to detect forgery e-notes but 
also to find out the identity of the cheater. It detects if Doug, the MSS owner, is presenting . 1, 
e-note to Clare for it second time. Moreover, it leads to the identity of Bob, the anonyinous calle' 
if he is trying to spend an e-note twice. 
r, 
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In our system no action is taken if Clare detects that Bob is cheating. Bob's forged e-ilote 
is refused and nothing else happens. In a real life system legal actions have to be taken again 
the deceiver, perhaps a sort of Internet police should be informed to investigate and sort out the 
problem between Bob and Doug. 
In our system e-cash is either accepted of refused by Clare, she does not make any distinction 
between invalid e-cash and forgery. By invalid cash we mean, e: --cash that is not recognized by 
Clare as a legal payment, the use of dollars in the United Kingdom for example. The payment is 
simply refused, there is no crime to prosecute in this case. Oil the contrary, by forgery me mean 
the use of illegal e-cash with the conscious intention of deceiving Clare. For example, the use of 
liand-made forgery or the use of e-cash that has already been spent. 
8.7 Use smart cards to pay anonymously 
The need to contact Clare the banker to clieck for the validity of Bob's e-cash sent to Doug as a 
payment for an anonymous communication session with the MSS steins from the freedom Bob has 
to make his own money in his PDA. This might result in Bob double-spending an e-coin either 
accidentally or maliciously. To prevent Bob from doing this, we had to bring Clare in to the game 
and consequently make our system slightly more complicated. There is a way of going around 
this question which consists in decreasing Bob's power to create the e-coins lie uses to pay for his 
anomymous calls. 
The essential idea liere is for Bob to pay for his anonymous communication sessions with a sort 
of prepaid teleplione magnetic card. The property of the prepaid we are interested in lier is that it 
stores money units (ýMOO for example), that are retrieved from the card by the card reader. Once 
a money unit is spent, it is permanently deleted from the magnetic band of the card. Consequently, 
there is no hope of reusing it. 
A sinart card (see section 4.3) can be used to implement this method to pay for MSS services. 
Bob can buy a smart card and without writing any personal information in its memory or on its 
surface, lie brings it to Clare the banker to charge it with e-nioney. To pay, Bob can present Clare 
with physical cash. The smart card is charged by converting Bob's physical cash into e-notes signed 
by Clare and loading theiii into the card memory. 
As long as Clare gets paid, she does not care who the card owner is or where the e-coins She 
signed are going to, thus, she is happy charging a card without asking Bob for any identification. 
Neither is she interested to know how the e-coins are going to be spent. If this holds true, Bob's 
identity is protected and the card can be used for anonymous payment to merchants who recognize 
Clare's signature. 
Money is put in and out of the sinart card by a program stored by the sinart card inicrocontroller. 
The program is activated by inserting the card into a card reader an(] typing the propers commands 
from the card reader keyboard. Bob does not have any access to the program which is in control 
of the e-coins stored in memory. Once an e-coin is spent, it is deleted from memory or inarked Is 
spent. In this manner, there is no chance for double spending. 
Sinart card readers might be deployed inside PDAs or connected to thein, this way Bob can 
transfer payment for anonyinous communications to Doug from his PDA. Upon receiving Bob's 
payment, Doug sees Clare's signature and knowing that nioney coming from sinart cards is not 
prone to double spending and forgery, accepts it immediately. 
As a side comment, it is worth mentioning that money stored in a sinart card inight be used to 
pay for any goods and commodities (at vending inachine-s for example) its long as the merchant ])as 
the hardware and software to communicate with the smart card and recognizes Clares signature. 
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It is worth closing this section by mentioning that the selection of a smart card as our hardware 
platform to store and manage Bob's e-cash is just a technological decision based on the fact that a 
smart card suits our computational and memory needs, and matches nicely current PDA parameters 
in terms of size, energy, weight, price, and so on. Yet it should be kept in mind that a smart card 
is just one example of what are known as secure coprocessors, Le tamp er-resistant modules that 
perform computational operations on data stored inside them and destroy it in response to any 
unauthorise attempt to read or write the data. 
We are assuming that data stored in a tamp er-resistant module like a smart card is secure. 
No intruders can access it. To be precise, one should say no intruders without the proper equip- 
ment can read it since Bruce Sclincier [182] argues that tamp er-resistant techniques do not work. 
Sophisticated attacks based on time spent in cryptographic operations, power consumption, and 
radiation emissions against a smart card can be devastating. 
8.8 Loss of payment in incomplete transactions 
In the finite state diagram presented in section 6.6.3 which concerns the interaction between tile 
user and his PDA through the PDA keyboard, there is an entry (EscPressed) to allow the user to 
abort his anonymous session with the PDA any time during tile anonymous mailing session. It is 
conceivable that tile abort occurs when a considerable amount of prepaid anonymous communica- 
tion time is left. No actions is taken to return to the PDA user his unspent e-money, tile system 
just imitates a public telephone box which does not give change. The unspent e-cash goes to Doug. 
A refinement of the algorithm would be appropriate in order that Bob is given his change. 
Likewise, it is possible that the system crashes any time after tile payment has been performed, 
while the e-cash is travelling through the network to Doug or to Clare for example, from tile 
protocol we are proposing, the fate of the unspent or partially spent e-note is not clear, tile e-note 
if left in the limbo. In general the problem we are facing here comes from the fact that our system 
does not support atomic e-cash transactions [1831. 
Again, further research in this direction is necessary to trace tile e-cash and decide to whom 
it belongs. In a public telephone box, it always goes to the owner of tile telephone Box, regardless 
of the user's anger. In our anonymizing system a different and fairer approach can be taken; if 
the anonymous caller does not want his e-note back not to compromise his identity, tile e-cash in 
dispute may go to a charity organization instead of Doug's account. 
8.9 Anonymous debit bank accounts 
A question that inevitably come to the reader's mind after learning about anonymous casli is 
whether it is possible to have all anonymous debit bank account. That is to say, an account opened 
by Bob at Clare's bank without Clare knowing the name of the account owner and with a Possibility 
to withdraw and deposit money anonymously. In terms of technology, the answer is yes. Technically 
speaking, the only thing we need to open all anonymous account is a pair of public and private 
keys and all anonymous e-inail system like the one we are presenting in this work. Althougll tile 
affirinative answer to the question looks like a solution to some problems Bob may have, it is ill 
fact the raising of several issues that have not been researched. There are legal and financial issues 
that have to be studied before the idea of anonymous debit accounts can be put into practice. 
Roughly speaking, tile procedure to open all anonymous debit account is as follows. 
Bob brings to Clare a certain amount of money is physical cash -say X1000-00- and a smart 
card. 
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Clare generates a pair of public and private keys for Bob. She stores the private one in the 
smart card so that nobody sees it and Bob does not forget or lose it. 
Clare opens a record in her computer where she puts Bob's L1000.00 and identifies it with an 
account number, no names or any personal date, just a unique string of digits. The number 
is stored in the smart card. 
In public key cryptosystems, the public key is known by everybody, in this case it is kept 
secret by Clare so that only she can decrypt messages encrypted with Bob's private key. 
To withdraw or deposit money from and to his account Bob sends Clare messages that contains 
his account number and encrypted with his private key. 
Upon receiving a message from Bob asking for some money, Clare knows that the message is 
coming from Bob and not from somebody else as only Bob knows the private key. 
To prevent an intruder from linking Bob to his anonymous account, Bob sends his messages 
to Clare anonymously. He can use the our anonymous system for example. 
@ Deposits to and withdrawals from Bob's account are made by anonymous e-cash. 
It should be clear that the purpose of this section is not to discuss this issue at large but to 
raise the question. Several problems are hidden behind the algorithm we suggest. For example, 
once Bob leaves the bank he has no evidence but his private key that the L1000.00 is his money. If 
the key is lost, damaged or if Clare dellies that Bob has an anonymous account with her, Bob loses 
his money. In practice, bankers are prone to billing mistakes which are normally favourable to their 
accounts and seldom favourable to their customers. If Clare makes accidentally or intentionally 
a billing mistake, Bob will need a mechanism to recover his money, ideally without disclosing his 
identity. 
, Another problem is what would happen if an e-note sent to Clare 
(a deposit) or to Bob (a 
withdrawal) does not reach its destination; will it be lost?, is there any way for Bob to recover his 
money?. 
It seems that there are more questions than answers in our attempt to create anonymous credit 
accounts, one may wonder what do we need this for when payments call be performed by e-cash 
and smart cards as was discussed in sections 5.6.2 and 8.7 respectively. The justification for going 
through all this hassle is Bob's money safety. An e-coin in a smart card or in PDA memory is 
lost if the smart card or the PDA is damaged or stolen. Both the smart card and the PDA call 
be replaced but the e-coin cannot. An e-coin in the bank computer is safer for several reasons. 
For a start, bank computers are stationary, secondly, they have stronger security measures than 
mobile devices like smart cards and PDAs have, and after all, if something goes wrong with the 
bank computer it is not Bob's concern, he is guaranteed that Ills bank will give his money back 
when he needs it. 
8.10 Anonymous credit bank accounts 
jt seems that anonymous debit account are feasible, yet it remains to be seen how it works in 
commercial applications. If this is feasible, one might wonder whether there is a way to open ail 
, 
anonymous credit bank account. That is to say, we want Clare to lend Bob some money without 
knowing Bob's identity. Though this would be a marvellous thing to have, we argue that there is 
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no way to open an anonymous credit bank account without putting Clare at the risk of losing soine 
money, something bankers are not keen on, or without putting Bob's anonymity into risk. 
Our position is based on the fact that no banker will lend money without being certain that 
she will be able to catch the credit account owner in case the later fails to pay. 
However, one can think of a fairly close approximation to an anonymous credit account. The 
approach is based on the use of secret splitting techniques [184,118]. The core idea is to take data 
D and divide it up into n pieces D1, D2, D3) .... D,, in such a way that the knowledge of 0<k<n Di pieces makes D easily computable. The knowledge of k-I or fewer Di pieces is absolutely 
worthless to recover D. 
We can assume that Bob's personal data (name, address, and so on) is D, i. e. a string of bits. 
Clare is happy to open an anonymous credit account for Bob as long as she is allowed to split D 
into two pieces: DI for herself and D2 for a government financial authority. If Bob fails to pay his 
debt before the agreed date she calls the government financial authority, puts D, and D2 together 
to reconstruct D and rings the police to prosecute Bob. The weak side of this approach is that 
Bob's identity depends on the willingness of Clare and the government financial authority to keep 
it; there is a risk that the two -of 
them can get together to conspire against Bob at any time and 
without a legal reason for it. This risk can be significantly decreased by involving more people into 
the game, i. e. by splitting D into more than two pieces so that a conspiracy is more difficult to 
achieve. Nevertheless, regardless of how big the number of pieces is, the risk of conspiracy never 
disappears. One has to admit that the system is not truly anonymous. 
8.11 An improvement to e-voting schemes 
One of the most appealing applications of anonymous e-mails is electronic voting. The topic is not 
new, it has been extensively studied. It is now well understood that a voting protocol has to satisfy 
the following basic requirements [118]: 
" Only authorised voters can vote and only once. 
" Votes are anonymous. No one can determine for whom anyone else voted. 
" Votes are personal. No one can duplicate anyone else's vote. 
" Neither the voters nor the election board can cheat without being discovered. 
The election board is not allowed to change the choice of a voter, neither is a voter 
allowed to change anyone else's choice. 
The election board cannot present a false tally. 
a Each valid vote is counted. -No one can 
be excluded from the final tabulation. 
Several protocols have been proposed that, to a satisfactory degree, match the previous require- 
ments [118,185,186]. Unfortunately, all of the proposed protocols, share a common drawback: 
they fail when it comes to providing true anonymity. The common failure stems from the fact 
that they assume the existence of a secure, untraceable electronic mail system to send the votes to 
the election board, that they do not provide. They are based on anonymizing schemes Composed 
of a set of intermediate computers called mixes. The r6le of the mixes is not distinct from the 
one performed by the e-mail anonymizer we criticized in chapter 3. A mix computer receives an 
electronic ballot (e-ballot) from a previous one, suppress the voter's name and address and sends 
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the vote to the next mix computer; the process is repeated till eventually the vote reaches the 
computer of the election board [187]. 
As can be seen, the anonymity of the voter can be violated if the mixes collude in disclosing the 
identity of the voters. A collusion of all mixes might sound unthinkable in a democratic country 
but not in a totalitarian regime where the whole of the mixes may be under the control of the 
totalitarian oppressor. Even worse, if a key escrowed cryptosystem is in use, the oppressor can 
easily gain access to the escrowed keys and reduce the anonymous election to a mere illusion. 
We believe that the danger of collusion and key escrow can be sorted out by grounding the 
proposed electronic voting algorithms on the untraceable anonymous e-mail facilities of our system. 
By looking closely at an electronic note and an electronic ballot-paper one can realize that the 
similarities between them are striking. Both have to be signed by a trusted authority. By a banker 
in the former case and, in the latter, by a central ballot legitimization agency before the vote is 
accepted by the election board. In the same manner, both can be used only once. The difference 
being that the user can make as many e-notes as he wish but it is allowed to make one e-ballot 
only. 
Let us say Bob, is an anonymous voter, Clare a central ballot legitimization agency, and Alice 
the election board. Likewise, let us assume that Clare has a list of all PDA owners who are entitled 
to vote. The following is the sketch of an algorithm which with some refinements can lead to a 
powerful electronic voting scheme that matches the requirements presented at the beginning of 
this section. It is based on the blind signature protocol presented in section 4.1.6. The reader is 
encouraged to familiarize with that in order to understand what follows. 
" Bob generates n sets of e-ballot each containing a valid vote for each possible outcome, Le if 
the vote is a yes or no question , each set contains two votes, the 
firsts is marked yes and the 
second-no. As with e-notes, each vote contains additional information to ensure that Bob 
is not cheating. 
" Bob sends the set of e-ballot to Clare for a blind signature in a similar was as lie sends O-notes 
to her (see section 5.6.2). 
" Clare checks her database to see that Bob is entitled to vote and if she is satisfied, she blindly 
sings Bob's e-ballot. 
4, Bob unblinds the signed e-ballot received from Clare and chooses one of the votes (a yes or 
a no according to his preferences) and discard the second. 
" Now Bob holds a valid e-ballot readily accepted by Alice since it has Clare's signature on it. 
" To send his e-ballot to Alice, Bob opens an anonymous session with the MSS. He uses e-notes 
to pay for it (see section 5.8). 
" Upon receiving Bob's e-ballot Alice verifies that it has not been received before; if so she 
counts it, otherwise the e-ballot is discarded. 
It is worth insisting that it is not our intention to present a complete voting algorithm but 
to show how existing ones can be greatly improved by using the anonymous facilities offered by 
our system. This make electronic voting schemes more robust against dishonest vote delivery and 
immune to dishonest key escrowers. A key escrower might learn who is supporting a giving vote 
but never the identity of the voter. 
In theory electronic voting schemes work and work well, yet it remains to be seen how they 
work in practice. One of the major concerns is that they make it easier to buy and sell votes. Ebe 
148 Enhancing the basic system 
the intruder for example, can know that Bob is over 18 and entitled to vote, contact him and offer a 
L1000.00 for the pair of signed votes that Bob has just unblinded after receiving them from Clare. 
To avoid being detected by the police, Ebe, can negotiate with Bob anonymously, using our own 
anonymizing system and pay him a L1000.00 in e-cash. A pair of votes in Ebe's hands is just like 
a coin, lie can choice the yes or the no one and send his choice to Alice, sell the pair or destroy it. 
Regardless of the potential danger and not yet studied issues, electronic voting is a useful 
application, a well implemented scheme makes electronic election more anonymous than traditional 
ones where due to physical elements involved in the process (physical ballot-boxes) the winner of 
an election can always know whether a village voted him or his political opponent. This question 
is answered by electronic voting since nobody can learn which part of the country or city e-ballots 
are coming from to the electronic ballot-boxes. 
8.12 Coexistence of key escrow and non-key escrowed cryptosys- 
tems 
The core idea behind key escrow mechanisms and their debatable arguments for and against their 
suitability were discussed in section 4.2.3. We bring it back to this section to make some additional 
comments about this issue because key escrow significantly plays a fundamental part in our system. 
It is not clear yet when this intellectual battle will end and who will win it, if there is a winner, 
probably not. We argue that since it is difficult to come up with a single system that suits the 
demands of different applications, in the future it is likely that key escrowed and non-key escrowed 
cryptosystems will coexist and the user will choose the more suitable for her as long as her choice 
complies with legal regulation enforced by governments; for example, the use of encryption keys no 
larger than ii-bits, communication restricted to the boundaries of a corporation, etc. 
It has been admitted that key escrow is an open door that can easily lead to Internet censorship. 
Hence, if key escrow is enforced by law, it is likely that there will be a sort of key escrow immunity 
for trusted users by which they may not be key escrowed. For example, diplomats may be given 
diplomatic key escrow immunity. Likewise, world wide known scientists, academics, writers and 
other figures of unquestionable intellect may be given the privilege of not having their key escrowed 
if they do not wish to. If the reason to enforce key escrow if the catch of terrorists, narcotic dealers 
and other dangerous criminals, governments will find it difficult to present solid arguments in favour 
of escrowing the key of a well-known peace activist, a Nobel prize winner or a famous writer. 
8.13 Key escrow confidentiality and anonymity 
Non-key escrowed cryptosystems have the inherent risk that if for any reason tile encrypting key 
is lost, forgotten or damaged the encrypted data is not recoverable. It is lost for ever or in the 
best case, till tile encryption is broken by means of brute force. Depending on the length of tile 
lost key and the power of the computer used, a brute force procedure may take seconds, hours 3 day, or years to break all encryption. Most of tile times this is unacceptable, so it follows that key 
escrow makes sense. However, it renders tile confidentiality of the messages encrypted with tile 
escrowed key seriously compromised. We cannot talk of a truly confidential cryptosystem wher, tile 
encryption key is available to somebody else, apart from its owner, and can be used without tile 
owner knowing about it. This holds true for our system as well. The confidentiality of the messages 
exchanged between Bob's PDA and tile MSS cannot be guaranteed if tile public key of tile MSS 
is escrowed, neither the confidentiality of messages exchanged between the MSS and Alice can be 




by Bob that contains the session key, having the session key (see 6.6.4) means being able to open 
every single message in the session, read the contains of the message and find out that the message 
is addressed to Alice. Again, if Alice responds to Bob by sending her response encrypted with the 
public key of the MSS or with a session key sent to her by Bob, the government can decrypt Alice's 
message, read its contents, and find out that it is addressed to somebody, who is currently at the 
MSS with a given TmpId, fortunately, nothing else is revealed to the government. If the aim of the 
government was to know the identity of Bob, the former will be certainly frustrated. This is where 
the power of using TmpId becomes apparent. 
A TmpId protects the identity of the PDA user against, the recipient, the MSS and against 
key escrower as well. This is equivalent to tapping a call from a public telephone box, the meddler 
can understand the whole of the conversation, can learn the called number and the name of the 
called person, however, he cannot learn the identity of the caller. This is exactly what our system 
is imitating, hence, we claim that it is truly anonymous. 
8.14 Summary 
Simple ideas are easy to understand and extend. It has been proven in practice that simplicity is 
good and complexity is bad. Simple ideas can work well. Complex ideas can only fail. If the basic 
idea is simple and good it can serve as the ground for building another system on top of it. If the 
second system is good and simple, it can serve as the basis for building a third good and simple 
system; and so on. The Unix operating system is grounded on a simple idea, so are the Internet and 
the Web. The three of them work and work well. This explain why they have been used successfully 
to support a great variety of applications. Surprisingly, this lesson is frequently forgotten by the 
computer science community which is frequently enchanted and diverted by complexity. 
The principle of simplicity was not forgotten in this work. The idea of building an anonymizer 
based on the paradigm of the public phone box is remarkably simple; therefore, it can be enhanced. 
It can be extended in different directions and useful applications can be built on top of it. Some of 
these potential applications were briefly discussed in this chapter. 




In this thesis, we have introduced a novel approach to addressing the problem of sending anonymous 
and confidential messages through the Internet. A system was proposed, described, designed, 
specified, and validated, and the results of the validation presented. It is time now to describe 
the experience learnt from this research, to assess our results, to admit their limitations, and to 
comment on issues related to this topic that would benefit from further investigation. 
9.2 Contribution 
The necessity of sending confidential and anonymous messages over the Internet was identified 
about a decade ago when the Internet changed from being an exclusively academic network into a 
universal network widely and intensively used by the masses, where people from different countries 
and culture and with different backgrounds, profiles, ideas, and interests, coexist. That was the 
time when experts in the field raised the issue. Since then, due to the many Internet applications 
that heavily depend on confidentiality and anonymity, the importance of the issue has now become 
more apparent. Electronic commerce is probably one of the best examples of an Internet application 
that will not find a wide acceptance until a satisfactory answer to this problem is found. 
A great deal of effort and resources have been devoted to the investigation of confidentiality 
and anonymity. Several implementations of anonymizers have been proposed and deployed in the 
Internet. However, none of them has so far given a satisfactory solution to providing true anonymity 
because the degree of anonymity achieved entirely depends on and is limited by the ability and 
desire of a third party (a computer or set of computers located between the sender and the receiver 
of the anonymous message). 
This thesis has set out to demonstrate that it is possible to send confidential and anonymous 
messages without depending on properties of the computer (or computers) located between the 
sender and the receiver of the anonymous message. To demonstrate our claim, we not only proposed 
a new approach to providing confidentiality and anonymity, but also designed a protocol based on 
the approach, specified it in a validation language (Promela) and validated it using a validating 
software (Spin). 
Because we believe that PDAs and other similar, wireless, portable, pocket-sized computers 
equipped with wireless communication antennae, are going to be widespread in the years to come, 
and because PDAs fit smoothly into our paradigm, the senders of the anonymous messages are in 
possession of PDAs. We also assumed that there is a set of MSSs that for a fee provides Internet 
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access to PDAs. 
The main contributions of this research are: 
Conclusions 
The proposal of a novel approach to sending confidential and truly anonymous Internet mes- 
sages from a PDA. 
The specification of a protocol based on the approach and its validation to prove that the 
protocol satisfies a set of basic correctness criteria. 
im Another contribution of this thesis is the introduction IP-addressless computers in the Inter- 
net. 
9.3 The model 
One of the guiding aims of our approach was simplicity. Knowing that complicated systems are 
difficult to understand, manage and scale, we grounded our approach on a rather simple idea: Our 
approach to sending anonymous messages is inspired by an old and well-known idea, namely, tile 
paradigm of a public telephone box. We did not try to create something new to solve tile problem 
of sending anonymous messages through tile Internet, but instead introduced an existing paradigm 
from the public telephone network and brought it into the Internet. Similarly, to validate our 
protocol we tried to keep the validation model as simple as possible but without losing tile essential 
features of tile protocol. We believe that after proving that tile main modules of ithe system are 
correct, the system can have additional components added to transform it into a working practical 
implementation. 
To bring tile functionality of a public telephone box into the Internet, we needed only to find a 
functionally equivalent element in the Internet to the elements of tile public telephone box. In this 
way, the telephone communication infrastructure is equivalent to tile Internet one: the MSS is a 
sort of public telephone box used by the general public; and finally, the coins used to operate tile 
public telephone box are replaced by anonymous electronic cash to operate tile MSS. 
In our paradigm, Bob (the anonymous caller in possession of a PDA) uses tile communication 
services of an MSS to send messages to users reachable through the Internet (Alice for example) and 
to receive messages while his PDA is switched on and registered with tile MSS. Not to give away 
any information about his identity, Bob connects to tile MSS by using a temporary, non-personal, 
random, identifier (TinpId for short). The TmpId is assigned by tile MSS and is valid only for the 
duration of a session. 
To provide confidentiality, we used both public key and secret key cryptographic techniques. 
In this way, public key encryption is used by the MSS and the PDA to negotiate a TmpId, and a 
secret key is used later to encrypt messages exchanged between the PDA and the MSS. 
Surprisingly, the translation of the paradigm from one network into another was straightforward 
and the resulting system is remarkably simple. Also, it provides new, valuable features not found 
in its original environment; namely, the fact that in our paradigm tile caller does not need to 
physically go to the public telephone box to dial tile callee's number and make her call, but can do 
tile same remotely using the wireless antenna of her PDA. 
The outstanding feature of our approach is that although the MSS is interposed between Bob 
and Alice, the MSS has no means of finding out about Bob's identity, simply because Bob is not 
using a personal IP address but rather a TmpId that does not belong to him, just as a public 
telephone box does not belong to its user. The result of this is that tile degree of anonymity 
achieved by this approach does not depend of the willingness nor strength of the intermediary (the 
MSS) to keep secrets. 
9.4 The validation 
9.4 The validation 
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We believe that the only reliable way of determining that an idea is of any practical use is to 
implement it, and put it into practice so that it is exposed to as many users, critics, and unexpected 
working conditions as possible. To increase the chances that an idea will work correctly, it is 
advisable to validate its design before implementing it. 
We have followed this strategy: we designed the protocol of our system, specified it in the 
Promela language and validated its basic safety properties (deadlocks, unspecified receptions of 
messages, and assertion violations) and proper end-states, by using the Spin validator. 
From the validation of the protocol we have learnt the following: 
Although we made efforts to keep the Promela validation model simple, its size in terms of 
CPU and memory used to validate it exhaustively is exceptionally large for current computer 
technology. The exhaustive validation of the whole model would have required of the order 
of several Gbytes of RAM memory to store the system states and of the order of several days 
of CPU time. 
This observation encouraged us to resort to modular validation (separation of the whole 
Promela validation model into modules to validate them separately) and to supertrace val- 
idation (random selection of the maximum number of states that can be validated in the 
available memory). 
In modular validation the risk of leaving out important features of the protocol is always 
latent. Similarly, the random nature of the supertrace technique introduces the risk of not 
exploring the part of the protocol where an error exists. Hence, compared to exhaustive 
validation, these techniques techniques do not give the most accurate results, yet it is the 
best we can do for a system of the size of ours. In addition, the results are good enough for 
practical purposes and reliable enough to claim that the system is correct. 
Our protocol is free from errors related to basic safety properties and improper end-states. 
We are aware that by checking correctness of basic safety properties we checked only for basic 
errors. We did not check our protocol for subtler safety properties, nor did we check it for 
liveness properties. Thus, we cannot claim that our validation is complete. It can easily 
be enhanced. However, we believe that at this stage of development, proving correctness of 
safety properties gives a significant degree of confidence about its correctness. 
This is probably enough at this stage to appreciate the feasibility or our idea. On the other 
hand, the main aim of this work was to propose a new paradigm for sending anonymous and 
confidential messages over the Internet. Exhaustive validation of the protocol fells outside of 
our interests. 
9.5 Limitations of the work and suggestions for future research 
In accordance with the results of the validation our protocol is free from basic safety properties and 
improper end-states. From this stage the designer can step further: it would have been useful to 
have more time at our disposition to validate liveness properties or convert the Proniela specification 
of the protocol into a working implementation (say C++ code), test its behaviour and then later 
migrate the C++ code into a real PDA and MSS. This would give the opportunity to see how the 
performance of the system is affected by the numerous cryptographic operations involved in the 
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communication which were not included in the Promela specification as cryptographic operation 
are pure arithmetic operations that are not relevant to the communication protocol. 
A minor limitation of our protocol is that it relies on a PDA to send its anonymous and 
confidential messages. This might not be a serious drawback as we expect that in future PDAs 
will be widely available. However, if this is not the case, it is an open question as to whether it 
is possible to send truly anonymous messages from a desktop IP-addressed computer. We suspect 
that the answer is no. Research in this direction would be useful. 
Another minor limitation of our protocol is that it does not support user handoff: once the 
anonymous caller opens an anonymous session with the MSS, he has to terminate his call at that 
MSS. We deliberately left this feature out of the protocol, because we consider that even though it 
would be certainly useful to have support for user handoff, this topic has to be addressed from the 
point of view of user location and message routing, rather than from the point of view of anonymity 
and confidentiality. More research is needed to investigate what impact the mobility of the sender 
of the anonymous messages could have on our protocol. 
A more serious limitation of our system is that it does not offer any protection against potential 
abuse of anonymous messages. The danger lies in Bob's ability to send as many anonymous messages 
to Alice as lie wishes to. One of Bob's messages can contain a virus for example. Alice has no way 
to prevent Bob from annoying her other than instructing her computer to drop any anonymous 
message coming to its door. Unfortunately, this approach seems too costly as it prevents Alice 
from receiving any anonymous message, those coming from Bob as well as other PDA users. This 
raises the question whether it is possible to provide Alice's computer with protection against Bob's 
abusive anonymous messages. So far, this problem has not been investigated. 
Care should be taken not to think that the system for sending anonymous and confidential 
messages that we propose is unbreakable. Having in mind that, in practice, the design of all 
unbreakable system based on cryptographic techniques in arguably an intractable problem, we did 
not attempt to design an unbreakable system. In theory, unbreakable systems can be designed but 
they are not practical because they demand significant amounts of computer resources and are too 
complex to use. 
Rom the cryptographic point of view the security of our system totally depends on the strength 
of the cryptographic technology we use. If we admit that a cryptographic system sooner or later 
will be broken, we have to admit that our system sooner or later will be broken as well. Said in a 
few words, our system is unbreakable for lay users equipped with current technology (i. e. for most 
people but not for users with strong background in cryptography and sophisticated equipment). 
]For example, we do not have any hope that our system will survive the attack of users equipped 
with quantum computers of the twenty-first century, which promise to demolish DES and RSA 
keys in few minutes [188,189]. 
We hope that this thesis contributes to the problem of finding a satisfactory solution to the 
issue of confidentiality and anonymity. We would dare to argue that our system gives a satisfactory 
answer most applications will be happy with. 
Perhaps the field that needs urgently to be researched is the social impact of anonymity. 
9.6 Social issues 
The main motivation to research the field of confidentiality and anonymity was the Potential of 
its applications. For instance, we realized that the provision of a mechanism to send anonymous 
messages will encourage PDA users to use their PDAs to perform business transactions, among 
other attractive applications. Anonymity protects buyers against intrusive merchants by preventing 
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them from sending the buyer unwanted advertisements. In everyday life, anonymity has other 
valuable applications which include personal love affairs, medical assistance and freedom to express 
political opinions. In general, it can be said that anonymity provides protection against intrusion, 
embarrassment and retaliation. Aside from these advantages, anonymity has several serious and 
negative side effects that make its deployment in the Internet a controversial issue. The potential 
danger that might result from its misuse could outweigh its benefits. It would not be difficult to 
write at length about the pros and cons of anonymity; there are strong arguments for and against 
it. Because of this, we believe, that before saying that it is a good or bad thing to have in the 
Internet and before saying that it should be legal or illegal, we have to bring it into practice to test 
it. Therefore, our position on the issue is that anonymity in the Internet should not be prohibited 
but regulated so that its potential danger is diminished. 
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Appendix A 
Promela specification of the system 
In this appendix we present a complete listing of the set of Promela modules we validated in chapter 
7 and we present also the Promela specification of the whole system. 
A. 1 Promela code for validating the public key manager 
* PROGRAMME: Promela validation model for the public key manager. 
* AUTHOR: Carlos Molina Jimenez; 
* ADDRESS: The University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
* DATE OF CREATION: 27 Jul 1999 
* DATE OF LAST UPDATE: 11 Nov 1999 
#define CERTIFIED-Kpu 12 /* Kpu certified by a certification authority 
#define UNCERTIFIED-Kpu 10 /* Kpu not certified by a certification authority 
#define INVALID-Kpu 00 /* Kpu out of domain 






mtype= fKpu, BogusKpul 
1 
0 
1 /* any integer 
-1 /* any negative integer 
3 /* max number of PDAs in the MSS 
chan KpuPort-to-PDA=[Il of 1byte, intj /* broadcast channel from MSS to PDAs */ 
KpuMan process: it places a msg in KpuPort-to-PDA channel. The msg is read by 
PDAs. It contains certified Kpu key, uncertified Kpu key or bogus 
message. When the msg is read, the KpuMan places another one, waits until 

















Promela specification of the system 
PDAses process: This code is the part the PDAses process and deals with 
the Kpu negotiation between the PDA and the MSS. 
If the Kpu is learnt successfully by the PDA, it moves to the KsNegotiation 
state where it tries to obtain a Ks key. The Ks negotiation and the rest of 
the PDAses code is provided in this appendix in "Promela specification of 
* the backbone of the system". So, this code just blocks when it reaches the 
* negotiation state. The PDAses ends in 'Aborted' if it fails to get the Kpu 
* after MAXNUM-Kpu-ATTEMPTS. 
proctype PDAses(int PDAnum) 
int PuKey; /* public key of the MSS 
int Ks= ANYINT; /* session key suggested by PDA to MSS after a successful 
/* Kpu negotiation 





(i <= MAXNUM-Kpu-ATTEMPTS) 
if 
KpuPort-to-PDA ? Kpu(PuKey) 
if 
:: (PuKey == CERTIFIED-Kpu) 
:: else 
fi 
-> /* Kpu rcvd: now check for authenticity */ 
-> goto KsNegotiation 
:: KpuPort-to-PDA ? BogusKpu(PuKey) -> i++ /* bogus msg rcvd: ignore it */ 
timeout -> /* couldn't hear any msg from this MSS: move to new MSS */ 




printf("PDAn==%d Failed to get Kpu after N= %d attempts; 




A. 2 Promela code for validating the mail server process 
printf("PDAnum=%d GOT CERTIFIED Kpu= %d after N=%d attempts\n", PDAnum, PuKey. i-1); 
assert(PuKey == CERTIFIED-Kpu); 
end: if 
:: (false) -> skip 
fi; 
Aborted: 
printf("PDAnum= %d ... ABORTED... BYE-BYE-BYE\n", PDAnum) 
I 
* Initiate the KpuMan process and MAXNUMPDA processes attempting 
* to get a certified Kpu 
init 
f 
byte PDAnum; /* number given to a PDA */ 
run KpuManO ; /* create Kpu manager process */ 
atomicý /* create MAXNUMPDA processes, one for each PDA */ 
PDAnum= 0; 
do 
PDAnum < MAXNUMPDA -> run PDAses(PDAnum); PDAnum++ 




A. 2 Promela code for validating the mail server process 
* PROGRAMME: Promela validation model for validating the mail server process. 
* AUTHOR: Carlos Molina Jimenez; 
* ADDRESS: The University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
* DATE OF CREATION: 27 Jul 1999 
* DATE OF LAST UPDATE: 11 Nov 1999 
#def ine YES 1 
#define NO 0 
#define ANYINT 1 /* any integer 
#define NEGINT -1 /* any negative integer 
#define MAXNUMPDA 3 /* max num of PDA in the MSS 
#define NUMofPDA 3 /* num of PDA visiting the MSS 
#define QSZ 1 /* num of msg stored in a channel 
#define MAXNUMEMAILS-SENT 4 /* max num of msg sent by a PDA. This's a temporary 
/* restriction to set a finite boundary for the model 
mtype= ýaborted, EaddrAndTxt, YouHaveMail); 
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chan MSSses-to-MailSvr(MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan MailSvr-to-MSSses(MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of ýbyte, int, jntj; 
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MSSses process: receives messages from PDAs and replies from MailSvr. 
When a msg is rcvd it is forwarded to the MailSvr process. 
Replies are forwarded to the corresponding PDA. Messages from PDAs and 
replies from MailSvr are not actually received here but simulated. 
proctype MSSses(int tmpId, chnum) 
int addr; /* store msg address 
int txt; /* store msg body 
int NumM; /* num of msg 
NumM=MAXNUMEMAILS-SENT; 
do 
(NumM >= 1 && nfull(MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnuml)) 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnum] ! EaddrAndTxt(-pid, 
-pid); NumM-- 
MailSvr-to-MSSses(chnuml ? YouHaveMail(addr, txt) -> 
printf("MSSses: rcvd reply for PDA tmpId= %d \n", tmpId) 
(NumM <1 kk empty(MailSvr-to-MSSses(chnuml) && timeout) 
if 
nfull(MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnuml) 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnuml H aborted(tmpId, chn=) 





printf("\n\nMSSses: tmpId=%d has finished: HAPPY END BYE-BYE-BYE \n", tmpId) 
MailSvr process: receives messages from the MSSsos and pretends to deliver 
them to their final destination. If there is a reply to a 




int RoplyVac[MAXNUMPDA]; /* reply vector 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel num 
int addr; /* store msg address 
int txt; /* store msg body 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
f 
A. 2 Promela code for validating the mail server process 
int i; /* counter 
i=O; 
do 
:: i< MAXNUMPDA 
ReplyVec[il= 0; 
i++ 






MSSses-to-MailSvr[Ol ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
assert(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt 11 msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
addr= fl; txt= f2; ReplyVec[01= ReplyVec[Ol + 1; 
printf(I'MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=O \n"); 
goto MailRcvd 
:: (msgtype == aborted) -> tmpId= 0; chnum-- 0; goto ClearChan 
fi 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[l] ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> 
assert(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt 11 msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
addr= fl; txt= f2; ReplyVec[lj= ReplyVec[l] + 1; 
printf(I'MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=l \n"); 
goto MailRcvd 
:: (Msgtype == aborted) -> tmpId= 1; chnum-- 1; goto ClearChan 
fi 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[21 ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> 
assert(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt 11 msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
addr= fl; txt= f2; ReplyVec[21= ReplyVec[21 + 1; 
printf(I'MailSvr: has rcvd a msg from PDA tmpId=2 \n"); 
goto MailRcvd 





(ReplyVec[O] >= 1) 
if /* Alice doesn't reply to Bob: discharge a msg 
ReplyVec[01= ReplyVec[01 -1 
skip 
fi; 
if /* make chnum=O if there's a reply for channel 0 
(ReplyVec[Ol >= 1) -> chnum= 0 




(ReplyVec[l] >= 1) 
if 




(ReplyVec[l] >= 1) -> chn== I 
else chn== -1 
fi 
(ReplyVec[21 >= 1) 
if 




(ReplyVec[21 >= 1) -> chnum-- 2 
else -> chnum= -1 
fi 
Promela specification of the systern 
if 
(chnum >= 0 && chnum < NUMofPDA) 
if 
MailSvr-to-MSSses(chnuml ! YouHaveMail(chnum, 
-pid) 
progress-replySent: skip 
timeout-> skip /* PDA is off or has left the MSS 
fi; 








MailSvr-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 









int PDAnum; /* PDA number 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
, 
A. 3 Promela code for validating the bank process 
atomicf 
run MailSvrO; /* instantiate MailSvr process 
PDAnum-- 0; 
do 
PDAnum < NUMofPDA -> /* instantiate MailSvr process 
if 
:: (PDAnum == 0) -> tmpId=O; chnum--O 
(PDAnum 1) tmpld=l; chnum--l 
(PDAnum 2) tmpId=2; chnum=2 
fi; 
run MSSses(tmpId, chnum); 
PDAnum++ 
PDAnum >= NUMofPDA -> break 
od 
I 
A. 3 Promela code for validating the bank process 
PROGRAMME: Promela validation model for the bank process. 
AUTHOR: Carlos Molina Jimenez; 
ADDRESS: The University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
DATE OF CREATION: 27 Jul 1999 
















3 /* max num of attempts to pay for an anonymous session 
100 /* max money accepted for opening an anonymous call 
20 /* golden is considered genuine and enough 
15 /* min money accepted for opening an anonymous call 
1 /* genuine money but not enough 
0 /* no money 
-1 /* fake money 
40 /* max amount of money for extra payment: the user can 
/* extend his call twice: 20+20 or 15+15 or 20+15 
1 
0 
3 /* max num of PDA in the MSS 
3 /* num of PDA visiting the MSS 
I /* num of msg stored in a channel 
5 /* Valid Ks domain [1 ... 51 
1 /* 
mtype= ýaborted, abort, Ecash, EcashRejetd, EcashAccepd, GenuineEcash, FakeEcashl; 
chan MSSses-to-bank(MAXNUMPDAI=(QSZ1 of ýbyte, int, intj; 
chan bank-to-MSSses[MAXNUMPDAI=(QSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
163 
164 Promela specification of the system 
MSSses process: simulates to receive a Ecash from a PDA (in fact 
the Ecash is created locally); upon receiving it, the 
Ecash is forwarded to the bank for verification of genuineness while 
the MSSses waits for a reply. If the reply is 'FakeCash', it fetches a 
different e-coin and tries again until it receives a 'GenuineEcash' 
answer or MAXNUMPAYATTEMPTS is exhausted. In the former case the 
* MSSses enters the anonymous session state. In the latter case, the MSSses 
* terminates in abortion. 
* This piece of code helps validate the bank process ONLY, so it blocks 
* when it reaches the anonymous session state. 
proctype MSSses(int tmpId, chnum) 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 




f lag= YES; 
i= 1; 
FirstPayment: do 






MSSses-to-bank[chnuml ! Ecash(payment, tmpld) 
bank-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fi, f2); 
if 
(msgtype - FakeEcash) 
i++ /* go back and fetch another coin from PDA memory 
(msgtype - GenuineEcash) -> payment= fl; 
goto end-AnoSes /* Ecash has been accepted by bank, go and 
fi; /* open an anonymous session for PDA 





(flag - YES) 
printf("\nMSSses: AnoSes opened for PDA with tmpld=%d (payment=%d An", tmpId, payment); 
flag - NO; 
od; 
Aborted: 
printf("\n\nMSSacs: PDA with tmpId=%d failed to pay: ... ABORTED.... BYE-BYE-BYE \n", tmpId) 
A. 3 Promela code for validating the bank process 
bank process: receives Ecash from the MSS and checks for genuineness; 
if it is satisfied with the Ecash it replies by sending an 
'GenuineEcash' msg, in the opposite case, it replies with 'FakeEcash' 
msg. Upon sending a reply, it goes back to wait for the next 'Ecash, 
msg to arrive. For the purpose of the validation, Ecash of value -1 
is considered to be fake money. 
proctype banko 
f 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
int payment; 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 





MSSses-to-bank[Ol ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
assert(msgtype == Ecash msgtype == aborted); 
if 
:: (msgtype == aborted) chnum-- 0; tmpId=O; goto ClearChan 
:: (msgtype == Ecash) -> payment=fl; chnum= 0; tmpId=O; goto EcashTocheck 
fi 
:: MSSses-to-bank[l] ? msgtype(fi, f2) -> 
assert(msgtype == Ecash msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype aborted) chnum= 1; tmpId=l; goto ClearChan 
(msgtype Ecash) payment=fl; chnum-- 1; tmpId=l; goto EcashTocheck 
fi 
MSSses-to-bank[21 ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
assert(msgtype == Ecash msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype aborted) chnum= 2; tmpId=2; goto ClearChan 




/* proc with tmpId= 0 has chnum=O, proc with tmpId=l has chnum=2, etc 
assert(O <= chnum && chnum < NUMofPDA && 0 <= tmpId && tmpId < NuMofPDA); 
if 
(payment == FAKEMONEY) -> bank-to-MSSses[chnuml ! FakeEcash(payment, f2); 
printf("BANK: rcvd FakeCash payment=%d from PDA with tmpId=%d \n", payment, tmpId) 
else -> bank-to-MSSses[chnuml ! GenuineEcash(payment, f2) -> 
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nempty(bank-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> 
baLnk-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> skip /* drop this msg 




init process: instantiates the bank process and 
three PDA processes 
init 
int PDAnum; /* namber given to PDA 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
atomic( 
run banko; /* instantiate the bank process 
PDAnum= 0; 
do 
PDAnum < NUMofPDA -> /* instantiate 3 PDA processes 
if 
:: (PDAnum == 0) -> tmpId=O; chnum=O 
(PDAnum 1) tmpId=l; chnum=l 
(PDAnum 2) tmpId=2; chnum=2 
fi; 
run MSSses(tmpId, chnum); 
PDAnum++ 
PDAnum >= NUMofPDA -> break 
od 
A. 4 Promela code for validating the backbone of the system 
* PROGRAMME: Promela validation model for the backbone of the system 
* AUTHOR: Carlos Molina Jimenez; 
* ADDRESS: The University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
DATE OF CREATION: 27 Jul 1999 
DATE OF LAST UPDATE: 11 Nov 1999 
#dofine MAXNUMPAYATTEMPTS 3 /* max num of attempts to pay for an anonymous session 
#defino MAXMDNEY 100 /* max money accepted for opening an anonymous call 
#dofino GOLDENMONEY 20 /* golden, is considered genuine 
A. 4 Promela code for validating the backbone of the system 
#define MINMONEY 15 /* min money accepted for opening an anonymous call 
#define TOOLITTLEMONEY 1 /* genuine money but not enough 
#define NOMONEY 0 /* no money 
#define FAKEMONEY -1 /* fake money 
#define MAXEXTPAY 40 /* max amount of money for extra payment: the user can 
/* extend his call twice: 20+20 or 15+15 or 20+15 
#define LAST-MSGS 10 /* Num of msg left after TimeExp alarm goes off 
#define YES 1 
#define NO 0 
#define ANYINT I /* any integer, the value is not important 
#define NEGINT -1 /* any negative integer, the value is not important 
#define MAXNWDA 3 /* max number of PDA in the MSS 
#define NUMofPDA 3 /* num of PDA visiting the MSS 
#define QSZ 1 /* num of msgs that a channel can store 
#define LOCALQSZ 3 /* num of msgs that local chan can store 
#define MAX-Ks 5 /* Valid Ks domain [1 ... 51 
#define MIN-Ks 1 /* 
#define MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS 3 /* max num of attempt to register Ks 
#define MAXNUMMSGREAD 4 /* max num of attempt to receive an 
/* answer from the MSS encrypted with 
/* the suggested Ks and containing a tmpId 
#define MAXNUMEMAILS-SENT 16 /* temporary restriction for validation purposes */ 
#define KsBlack 1 
#define KsBlue 2 
#define KsGreen 3 
#define KsPink 4 
#define KsWhite 6 /* <-- invalid key */ 
mtype= ýaborted, abort, TimeFin, TimeAlert, YourNewKs, ChangeMyKs, 
tmpIdRcvd, Ecash. EcashRejetd, EcashAccepd, GenuineEcash, 
FakeEcash, EaddrAndTxt, YouHaveMaill; 
/* This is equiv. to YouHaveMail=l, EaddrAndTxt=2, FakeECash=3,... 
" The MSS receives Ks proposals from PDAs at its PDA-to-KsPort channel 
" the PDA read the MSS reply from KsPort-to-PDA channel which can 
chan PDA-to-KsPort=[13 of fintl; 
chan KsPort-to-PDA=[NUMofPDA] of fint, int, int) 
chan KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of ibyte, int, intl; 
chan MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of ýbyte, int, intj; 
chan PDAses-to-tcp[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, int); 
chan PDAtcp-to-ses(MAXNUMPDAI=EQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan MSSses-to-tcp[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, int); 
chan MSStcp-to-ses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of fbyte, int. intl; 
chan PDAuser-to-ses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, int); 
chan PDAses-to-user(MAXNUMPDAI=EQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
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KsTmpIdMan process: is in charge of managing session keys and temporary 
Id assigned to PDAs. It guarantees that tmpIds assigned 
to PDAs are unique. Also, it guarantees that session keys are unique and 
secret. It asks a PDA to change its Ks when it detects that is has been 
hit by another PDA. Also, upon request, it provides a PDA with a new Ks. 
proctype KsTmpIdManO 
f 
int tmpIdVec[MAXNUMPDA]; /* vector for storing TmpIds 
int KsVec[MAXNUMPDA]; /* vector for storing Ks 
int Ks; /* session key 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
int OldestKs; /* oldest Ks accepted by MSS and sent to KsPort-to-PDA */ 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int fhl; /* scratch field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int fh2; /* scratch field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int NewKey; /* new Ks key 
int count; /* counter 
int n; /* counter 
int i; /* counter 
int j; /* counter 
i=O; /* initialize to 0 and -1 the valid cells in vectors KsVec 
do /* and tmpIdVec, respectively 
i< NUMofPDA -> 




else -> break 
od; 
i= NUMofPDA; /* initialize to -3 the ununed cells in the vectors' 
do /* KsVec and tmpIdVec respectively 
i< MAXNUMPDA -> 




else -> break 
od; 
TestTmpIdKs: 
test that tmpId assigned to PDA are unique 
atomic( 
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i=O; 
do 
(i < MAXNUMPDA) 
if 





(i P j++ 
else -> 
assert(tmpIdVec[i] != tmpIdVec[jl); 
j++ 
fi 
else -> break /* move to next i 
od 
:: else -> skip /* tmpIdVec[il <0 are unused elements 
fi; 
i++ 
else -> break /* comparison finished 
odj; 




(i < MAXNUMPDA) 
if 





(i == j) j++ 
else -> 
assert(KsVec[il != KsVec[jD; 
j++ 
fi 
else -> break /* move to next i 
od 
:: else -> skip /* KsVec[i] <0 are unused elements 
fi; 
i++ 
else -> break /* comparison finished 
odl; 
tmpIdKsOK: /* tmpId and Ks are all right, continue */ 
Ks= 0; 
end: do /* valid endstate of this server process 
:: PDA_to-KsPort ? Ks -> goto KsVerification 
:: MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[Ol ? msgtype(fl, f2)-> 
170 Promela specification of the system 
chnum=0; tmpId= 0; goto MSSsesCare 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan(l] ? msgtype(fi, f2)-> 
chnum=l; tmpId= 1; goto MSSsesCare 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[21 ? msgtype(fl, f2)-> 




:: (Ks <= MAX-Ks && Ks >= MIN-Ks) -> /* Is Ks within the valid domain? 
i=O; 
do /* is Ks already in use by another PDA? 
(i < NUMofPDA) -> /* valid Ks are [1,2,3,41 
if 
(Ks == KsVec[i]) 
printf("KsTmpIdMan: Ks=%d KsVec[%dl=%d is in use by tmpId[%dl=%d \n", 
Ks, i, KsVec[il, i, tmpIdVec[il); 
goto KsInuse 
:: (Ks 1= KsVec[iD -> i++ 
fi; 
else -> goto KsNotInuse 
od; 
else -> /* suggested Ks is incorrect 




/* Find a free tmpId in tmpIdVec and assign it to PDA 
/* The values of valid tmpId are (0,1,2,3,41 
/* tmpIdVec[01= 011121314 means tmpId=O already being used by some PDA 
/* tmpIdvec[01= -1 means tmpId=O is free 
/* tmpIdvec[01= -2 means tmpId=O has been used and can't be recycled yet 
/* tmpIdvec[01= -3 means tmpId=O is not in use at all 
/* tmpIdVec[ll= 011121314 means tmpId=l already being used by some PDA 
/* tmpIdvec[ll= -1 means tmpId=l is free 
/* tmpIdvec[lj= -2 means tmpId=l has been used and can't be recycled yet 
/* tmpIdvec[ll= -3 means tmpId=l is not in use at all 
/* tmpIdVec[21= 011121314 means tmpId=2 already being used by some PDA 
/* tmpIdvec[21= -1 means tmpId=2 is free 
/* tmpIdvec[21= -2 means tmpId=2 has been used and can't be recycled yet 
/* tmpIdvec[21= -3 means tmpId=2 is not in use at all 
i=O; 
do 
(i < NUMofPDA) -> /* tmpId= -3 not in use at all 
if /* tmpId= -2 not in use: to be recycled later 
(tmpIdVec[il I= -1) -> i++ /* tmpId is already in use, try next one 
else -> break /* tmpId is free, use it 
fi 
else -> /* no more tmpId to be assigned: take this as KsINUSE= YES 
/* and don't reply no anybody 
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goto TestTmpIdKs 
od; 
tmpId= i; chnum--i; /* tmpId & chnum assigned to new PDA with session key= Ks 
if 
atomicfnfull(KsPort-to-PDA) -> /* there's space in ch for key(tmpId, chnum) 
KsPort-to-PDA ! Ks(tmpId, chn=); 
tmpIdVec[il= i; 
KsVec(i]= Ks; 
run MSSses(tmpId, chnum, Ks)l /* initiate MSS session to take care of new PDA 
atomicffull(KsPort-to-PDA) -> /* no space in ch, discharge oldest msg 
KsPort-to-PDA ? OldestKs(fl, f2); 
tmpIdVec[fll= -2; /* empty PDAj from your tables 
KsVec(fll= -2; /* and terminate MSSses assigned to PDAj 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[fI1 1! abort(fl, f2); 




KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnum. ] ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
printf("KsTmpIdMan: removed from ch: Ks=%d tmpId=%d chnum--%d \n", 
OldestKs, fl, f2)1 
fi; 
goto TestTmpIdKs; 
" Ks suggested by the new PDA is already in use by PDA with tmpId=i and 
" chnum=i. KsMan has to get a new Ks for this PDA and send it to new PDA 
KsInuse: 
printf("KsTmpIdMan: suggested Ks=%d is already in use by PDA with tmpId=%d 
chnum=%d\nII, Ks, i, i); 
count= 1; 
do 










(n < KUMofPDA) 
assert( 0 <= nn< NUMofPDA); 
if 
(KsVec[n] NewKey) count++; break 
(KsVec(n] NewKey) n++ 
fi; 
else -> goto NewKsFoundl 
od; 
else -> /* couldn't find any available Ks 
atomicý 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[il !! abort(i, Ks) -> /* order the MSSses to abort 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[il ? aborted(fl, f2); 
tmpIdVec(i]= -2; 





KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses(chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 




assert((MIN-Ks <= NewKey)&&(NewKey <= MAX_Ks)&&(O <= i)&&(i < NumofPDA)); 
if 
atomic(KsTmpIdMan_to_MSSses[il 1 YourNewKs(NewKey, Ks) 
KsVec[il= NewKeyl 
timeout -> printf(IlKsTmpIdMan: tmpId=Y. d chnum--%d Ks=Yd NOT THERE, 





(msgtype == ChangeMyKs) 
printf("KsTmpIdMan: rcvd ChangeMyKs from PDA-tmpld=%d chnum=%d\n", tmpId, chnum); 
count= 1; 
do 










(n < NUHofPDA) 
assert( 0 <= nn< NUHofPDA); 
if 
(KsVoc[n] NewKey) count++; break 
(KsVoc[n) NewKey) n++ 
fi; 
else -> goto NewKsFound2 
od; 
else -> /* couldn't find any available Ks 
atomic( 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses(chnuml 11 abort(tmpId, chnum); /* order HSSses to abort 
do 
MSSsos-to-KsTmpIdMan[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2)-> 
if 
(msgtype I- aborted) -> skip 
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do 
nempty(KsTmpIdman-to-MSSses[chnuml) 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 






/* assert((MIN-Ks <= NewKey)&&(NewKey <= MAX-Ks)&&(O <= tmpId)&&(tmpId < NuMofPDA)); 
assert(MIN_Ks <= NewKey && NewKey <= MAX-Ks); 
assert(O <= tmpId && tmpId < NUMofPDA && tmpId == chnum); 
if 
atomicfKsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[tmpIdI ! YourNewKs(NewKey, fl) 
KsVec[tmpIdl= NewKeyl 
timeout -> printf("KsTmpIdMan: tmpId=%d with chnum=%d Ks=%d NOT THERE, 
ignore it\n", tmpId, chnum, fl) 
fi; 
(msgtype == aborted) -> /* PDA or MSSses want abort the ano. ses. 
atomicf 






KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
printf("KsTmpIdMan: ABORT FOR tmpld= %d \n", tmpId)l 




MSSses process: is in charge of managing the anonymous communication session of 
the PDA. It charges the PDA for the communication, receives the 
payment, forwards it to the bank for verification, accepts or rejects the payment, 
warns the PDA user about the prepaid time expiration and abruptly finishes the 
communication session when the prepaid time expires. Also, it is the link between 
the PDA and the session and TmpId manager; and the link between the PDA and the 
mail server. 
proctype MSSses(int tmpId, chnum, Ks) 
f 
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chan q-to-MSStcp=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-KsTmpIdMan=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-MailSvr=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-bank=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
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byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int MyKs; /* a session key 
int addr; /* e-mail address 
int txt; /* text in an e-amil msg 
int payment; /* payment for anonymous session: one unit of money is converted 
/* to one msg to be sent 
int credit; /* prepaid payment: num. of msg the PDA user has prepaid for 
int CreditLeft; /* prepaid payment before warning msg: number of msg the user can 
/* send after the expiration time warning and termination of the 
/* session 
run MSStcp(tmpId, chnum, Ks); 
FirstPayment: 
do 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == Ecash) 
payment= fl; tmpId= f2; 
if 
(payment == FAKEMONEY 11 payment < MINMONEY 11 payment > MAXMONEY) -> 
printf(I'MSSses: rcvd FakeEcash I too little or to big money=%d from 
PDA-tmpId=%d\n", payment, tmpI d); 
if 
(nfull(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml)) 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnum] ! EcashRejetd(payment, tmpId) 
timeout -> skip /* MSStcp is sending aborted go and read it 
fi 
(payment != FAKEMONEY U MINMONEY <= payment && payment <= MAXMONEY) 
printf("MSSses: rcvd GenuineEcash=%d from PDA-tmpId=%d\n", Payment, tmpld); 
if 
(nfull(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml)) -> 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ! EcashAccepd(payment, tmpId); 
assert(payment > LAST-MSGS); 
credit= payment - LAST-MSGS; 
CreditLeft= LAST-MSGS; 
goto AnoSes 
timeout -> skip /* MSStcp is sending aborted, go read it 
fi 
fi 
(msgtype - aborted) -> goto AbortBank 
fi 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? abort(fl, f2) MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml !! abort(tmpId, chnum) 
do 
MSStcP_to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype aborted) skip /* discard the msg 
(msgtype aborted) 
printf("MSSses PDA-tmpId=%d aborted by KsTmpIdMan; going ... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto AbortBank 




assert( O<= chnum && chnum <= NUMofPDA); 
AnoSes: 
do 
/* to msstcp 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? [abort(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MSStcp) 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? abort(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp H abort(fl, f2) 
/* to KsTmpIdMan */ 
MSStcp_to-ses[chnum] ? [aborted(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-KsTmpIdMan) 
MSStcp_to_ses(chnum] ? aborted(fl, f2) -> q-to-KsTmpIdMan !! aborted(fl, f2) 
/* to msstcp */ 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnum] ? [YourNewKs(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MSStcp) 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? YourNewKs(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp 1 YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
/* to KsTmpIdMan */ 
MSStcp_to_ses[chnum] ? [ChangeMyKs(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-KsTmpIdMan) 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml ? ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) -> q-to-KsTmpIdMan ! ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) 
/* to MailSvr */ 
MSStcp_to_ses[chnum] ? [EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MailSvr) 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnum3 ? EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2) -> q-to-MailSvr EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2) 
/* to bank */ 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml ? [Ecash(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-bank) 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml ? Ecash(fl, f2) -> q-to-bank ! Ecash(fl, f2) 
/* send to MSStcp */ 
nempty(q-to-MSStcp) && nfull(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml) 
q-to-MSStcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
:: (msgtype == abort) -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml !! abort(fl, f2) 





(payment < MINMONEY 11 payment > MAXMONEY) 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnum] ! EcashRejetd(payment, f2) 
else -> 
atomicfMSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ! EcashAccepd(payment, f2) 
assert(payment > LAST-MSGS); 
credit= payment + credit + CreditLeft; 
credit= credit - LAST-MSGS; 
CreditLeft= LAST-MSGSI 
fi 
(msgtype FakeEcash) MSSses-to-tcp[chnum] ! EcashRejetd(fl, f2) 
(msgtype TimeAlert) MSSses_to_tcp[chnum) H TimeAlert(fl, f2) 
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:: (msgtype == TimeFin) -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnum] H TimeFin(fl, f2) 
:: else -> printf("MSSses: tmpId=Yd UNKNOWN msg: PANIC-PANIC-PANIC\n\n", tmpId) 
fi 
/* send to KsTmpIdMan */ 
nempty(q-to-KsTmpIdMan) && nfull(MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[chnuml) 
q-to-KsTmpIdMan ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
:: (msgtype == aborted) -> goto Aborted 
:: (msgtype == ChangeMyKs) -> MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan(chnuml ! ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) 
fi 
:: nempty(q-to-MailSvr) && /* pretend to send msg to MailSvr 
nfull(q-to-MSStcp) && (credit >=1 11 CreditLeft >= 1) 
q-to-MailSvr ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
/* if necessary process the msg 
assert(credit >= 0 &k CreditLeft >= 0); 
printf("MSSses: credit=%d CreditLeft=%d for PDA-tmpId=%d\n\n", credit, 
CreditLeft, tmpId); 
if 
(credit >= 1) -> /* charge to 'credit' account 
/* MSSses_to_MailSvr[chnum] ! EaddrAndTxt(fI, f2); */ skip; 
credit--; 
if 
(credit == 0) -> q-to-MSStcp! TimeAlert(fl, f2); 
else -> skip 
fi 
(credit == 0 && CreditLeft >= 1) -> /* charge to CreditLeft' account 
/* MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnuml ! EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2); */ skip; 
CreditLeft--; 
if 
:: (CreditLeft == 0) -> q-to-MSStcp ! TimeFin(fl, f2) 




nempty(q-to-bank) && nfull(q-to-MSStcp) -> q-to-bank ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype -- Ecash) 
payment= fl; 
printf("MSSses: PDA-tmpId=%d has SNT extra payment=Y. d to bank \n", 
tmpId, payment); 
assert(O <= chnum && chnum < NUMofPDA && 0 <= tmpId && tmpId < NUMofPDA); 
if 
(payment - FAKEMONEY) -> q-to-MSStcp ! FakeEcash(payment, f2); 
printf("BANK: PDA-tmpId=%d chnum= %d SENT FakeCash payment=%d \n", 
tmpId, chnum, payment) 
also -> q-to-MSStcp ! GenuineEcash(payment, f2) -> 
printf("BANK: PDA-tmpId=%d chnum= %d SENT GenuineEcash payment=%d \n", 
tmpId, chnum, payment) 
fi; 
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else -> 







send abort to KsTmpIdMan 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
clear chan to MSStcp 
do 
atomicfnempty(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml) -> 
MSSses_to_tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2)1 /* drop this msg 
empty(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
printf("MSSAnoSes tmpId=%d MyKs=%d ... ABORTED.... BYE-BYE-BYE by KsTmpIdMan \n\n". 
tmpId, MyKs) 
I 
MSStcp process: connection-oriented reliable link between the MSS 
and the PDA. It forwards msg up the protocol stack 
and to the PDA side. The MSStcp initiates an abort procedure that 
propagates up the stack protocol whenever it detects that its remote 
peer (the PDAtcp) is unreachable. 
proctype MSStcp(int tmpId, chnum, Ks) 
f 
chan q-to-PDAtcp= (LOCALQSZ) of fbyte, int, intj; 
chan q-to-MSSses= [LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intj; 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
assert(O <= chnum && chnum <= NUMofPDA && tmpId == chnum); 
do 
nfull(q-to-PDAtcp) && nempty(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml) -> /* recv from MSS 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-PDAtcp ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
:: nfull(q-to-MSSses) && nempty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) -> /* recv from PDA */ 
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PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fi, f2) -> q-to-MSSses ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
nempty(q-to-MSSses) && nfull(MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml) -> /* send to MSS 
q-to-MSSses ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == abort) -> /* abort initiated at PDA site 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId=%d initiated at PDA site going ... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == aborted) -> /* abort initiated at MSS 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnum] H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId=%d initiated at MSS site going ... Aborted ... \n'l, tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
else -> /* PDA sending a routine msg */ 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnum] ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
fi 
/* send to PDA site */ 
nempty(q-to-PDAtcp) && nfull(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chn=]) && nfull(q-to-MSSses) 
q-to-PDAtcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype - abort) -> /* abort initiated by MSS or KsTmpIdMan 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp(chnuml 1! abort(fl, f2); 
q-to-MSSses H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpld=%d aborted by MSS going to ... Aborted... soon \n", tmpId); 
(msgtype == TimeFin) -> /* End of AnosSes initiated by MSS or KsTmpIdMan 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml H TimeFin(fl, f2); 
q-to-MSSses H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId=%d TimeFin by MSS going to ... Aborted... soon \n", tmpId); 
(msgtype == YourNewKs) -> /* MSSman has changed Ks 
Ks= fl; 
MSStcP-to-PDAtcp[chnuml ! YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
:: else -> MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml ! msgtype(fl, f2) /* MSS sent ordinary msg 
fi 
full(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) && 
timeout -> /* PDA not receiving: assume PDA has aborted its session 
if 
nfull(MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml) -> MSStcp-to-ses(chnuml !! aborted(fl, f2); 
goto Aborted 
:: full(MSStcp_to-ses[chnuml) U timeout -> goto ForceAbort 
fi 
ampty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) && 
timeout -> /* PDA not sending: ass=e PDA has aborted its session 
if 
nfull(MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml) -> MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
goto Aborted 
:: full(MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml) U timeout -> goto ForceAbort 
fi 
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od; 
ForceAbort: /* force MSSses to abort (to read 'aborted') from it chan 
do 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml 1! aborted(tmpId, chnum) -> break 
timeout -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
od; 
printf(I'MSStcp tmpId= %d going to ... Aborted ... by KsTmpIdMan \n", tmpId, chnum); 
Aborted: 
if 
atomicýnempty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) && timeout 
do 
nempty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) -> break 
odl 
empty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) -> skip 
fi; 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId= %d chanum-- %d ... ABORTED... BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId, chnum) 
I 
" EscKey process: 
" -the fact that the PDA user can press the ESC keyboard at any time to 
" interrupt his anonymous session is simulated by a Itimeout' 
" which can go off at any time. 
" -interruption of the PDA user anonymous session can be originated at 
" the PDAuser, PDAses, PDAtcp or at the MSS site, if this happens 
" an 'abort' message is received which lead to abort the keyboard pro- 
cess. 
proctype EscKey(chan user-to-EscKey, EscKey-to-user; int tmpId, chnum) 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
if 
user-to-EscKey ? aborted(fi, f2) -> /* abort from PDA or MSS site 
goto Aborted 
timeout -> EscKey-to-user !! abort(tmpId, chn=) 
goto Aborted /* simulates the user pressing ESC 
/* to interrupt his anonymous session 
fi; 
Aborted: 
printf("EscKey: tmpId=%d aborted at PDA or MSS site BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId); 
I 
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PDAuser proce ss: is the interface between the PDA user and the 
anonymous and confidential communication system. 
It receives PDA user's commands typed on the keyboard and display 
messages on the PDA screen. 
proctype PDAuser (int PDAnum) 
f 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
bool KsChanged; /* flag to stop the PDA changing its Ks more than once 
int payment; /* payment for opening or extending an anonymous session 
int MaxExtPay; /* max amount of money a user is allowed to spend in calls 
int ExtPay; /* max amount of money a user hast spent in calls 
int addr; /* e-mail address 
int txt; /* text in e-mail msg 
bool AbortFlag; /* was the process forced to abort YES/NO ? */ 
int i; /* counter of attempts */ 
int NumM; /* number of e-mails to send 
chan ses-to-user-localch=Ell of ýbyte, int, intj; 
chan user-to-esckey=[ll of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan esckey-to-user=[ll of fbyte, int, intl; 
KsChanged= NO; 
AbortFlag= NO; 
* run PDAses process: ses-to-user-localch is used by PDAuser to 
* receive tmpId and from PDAses 
run PDAses(PDAnum, ses-to-user-localch); 
KsNegotiation: 
do 
ses-to-user-localch ? tmpIdRcvd(tmpId, chnum) -> break 
ses-to-user-localch ? aborted(fl, f2) -> 
printf("PDAuser: PDAn==%d pid=%d : My PDAses couldn't get a Ks; 
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fi; 
PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml ! Ecash(payment, tmpId) -> 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? msgtype(payment, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == EcashRejetd) 
i++ /* go back and fetch another coin from PDA memory 
:: (msgtype == EcashAccepd) -> 
NumM=MAXNUMEMAILS_SENT; 
run the EscKey process 
run EscKey(user-to-esckey, esckey-to-user, tmpld, chnum); 
goto AnoSes 
(msgtype == aborted) -> 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId=%d couldn't PAY; aborted by PDAsesIPDAtcpIMSS 
going ... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
fi 
else -> PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml H abort(tmpId. chnum) 
do 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
:: (msgtype != aborted) -> skip /* discard this msg 
(msgtype == aborted) -> 







(NumM >= 1 && nfull(PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml)) 
PDAuser-to-ses[chnum] ! EaddrAndTxt(-pid, 
-pid); 
NumM-- 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? YouHaveMail(addr, txt) -> 
printf("PDAuser tmpId= %d chnum-- %d GOT E-MAIL addr= XX txt= YY\n", tmpId. chnum) 
(KsChanged==ND) -> PDAuser-to-ses(chnural ChangeMyKs(tmpId, chnum); KsChanged= YES 
/* Ks can be changed only once 
PDAses-to-user(chnuml ? YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
printf("PDAuser tmpId= %d has got a new Ks \n", tmpId) 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? TimeAlert(fl, f2) -> 
printf("PDAuser: PDA-tmpld=%d has been TimeAlerted\n", tmpId); 
if 
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:: payment= NOMONEY 
fi; 
PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml ! Ecash(payment, tmpId); 
printf("PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=%d has sent EXTRA payment=7. d\n", tmpId, payment) 
else -> skip /* no more extensions allowed 
fi 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? TimeFin(fl, f2) -> 
printf("PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=%d TimeFin going ... Abort... \n", tmpId); 
user-to-esckey!! aborted(tmpId, chnum); 
goto Aborted 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? EcashAccepd(fl, f2) 
ExtPay= ExtPay + payment; 
NumM= MAXNUMEMAILS-SENT; 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId=%d AnoTime INCRTED msg to send=%d\n", tmpId, NumM); 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? EcashRejetd(fl, f2) -> 
printf("PDAuser: AnoTime NOT incremented for PDA-tmpId= %d chnum= %d \n", tmpId, chnum) 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? aborted(fl, f2) -> 
user-to-esckey!! aborted(tmpld, chnum); 
printf("PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=%d aborted initiated by PDAses I PDAtct 
MSS going ... Abort ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
esckey-to-user ? abort(fl, f2) -> /* user pressed ESC key to interrupt session 








PDAuser-to-ses[chn=l ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
if 
(AbortFlag - NO) 
printf("PDAuser: PDA-tmpId=%d chnum= %d HAPPY END BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId, chnum) 
else -> skip 
fi 
I 
PDAses process: is in charge of learning the Kpu key and negotiating 
a Ks key. It encrypts PDAuser msg before forwarding 
them down the protocol stack; conversely, it decrypts msg coming from 
the underneath layer and forward them to the PDAuser layer. 
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proctype PDAses(byte MyPDAnum; chan ses-to-user-localch) 
f 
chan q-to-tcp=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-user=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
int Ks; /* session key of the PDA 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
int payment; /* payment for an anonymous session 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int addr; /* e-mail address 
int txt; /* text in e-mail msg 
int i; /* i <= MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS: counter number of attempt 
/* to register a session key 
bool AbortFlag; /* was the process forced to abort YESAO ? 








(i <= MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS) 
if /* random selection of Ks 
Ks = KsBlack -> 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
" There may be up to 5 msg in the channel buffer. If there is one 
" (not necessarily at the head of the buffer) with mtype= KsBlack 
" retrieve it. Otherwise block until such a msg appears in the 
" channel or timeout goes off 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsBlack(tmpld, chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
timeout 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MyPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsBlue -> 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsBlue(tmpId, chnum) 




printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
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TIMEOUT \n", MYPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsGreen -> 
PDA-to-KsPort 1 Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsGreen(tmpId, chn=) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
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timeout -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MyPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsPink -> 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsPink(tmpId, chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
timeout -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MYPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsWhite -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d is going to send Ks= %d \n", MyPDAnum, Ks); 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsWhite(tmpId, chn=) 
KsAccepd = YES; /* this should never happen 
break /* this should never happen 
timeout 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 




(i > MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS) -> 
break /* give up registering a Ks 
od; 
communication between the PDAuser and the PDAses 
if 
(KsAccepd == NO) 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum=%d failed to register Ks after i=%d attempts: 
going ... Aborted+++\n", MyPDAnum, i-I); 
ses-to-user-localch H aborted(NEGINT, NEGINT); 
goto Aborted 
else -> 
ses-to-user-localch I tmpIdRcvd(tmpId, chnum); 
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printf("PDAses: PDAnum=%d; pid=%d RgTED Ks=%d (tmpId= %d) after the %dth 




initiating the underneath layer 
run PDAtcp(tmpId, chnum, Ks) 
FirstPayment: 
do 
PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == Ecash) 
/* if necessary do anything to the msg 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == abort) -> PDAses_to_tcp[chnuml !! abort(fl, f2) 
do 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype aborted) skip /* discard the msg 





PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == EcashRejetd) 
/* if necessary do anything to the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
:: (msgtype == EcashAccepd) -> 
od; 
skip; /* if necessary do anything to the msg 
payment= fl; 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! EcashAccepd(payment, tmpId); 
goto AnoSes 
(msgtype == aborted) -> 





/* from user to ses to tcp 
nfull(q-to-tcp) && nempty(PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml) 
PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fi, f2) -> q-to-tcp ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
/* from tcp to ses to user */ 
nfull(q-to-user) && nempty(PDAtcp-to-ses(chnuml) 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-user ! msgtype(fi, f2) 
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/* send to user */ 
nempty(q-to-user) && nfull(PDAses-to-user(chnuml) 
q-to-user ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == YourNewKs) 
printf("PDAses: tmpId=%d GOT new Ks OldKs=%d 
NewKs= %d\n", tmpId, Ks, fl); 
Ks= f 1; 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
:: (msgtype == TimeAlert) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg */ 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! TimeAlert(fl, f2) 
(msgtype EcashAccepd) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! EcashAccepd(fl, f2) 
(msgtype EcashRejetd) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! EcashRejetd(fl, f2) 
(msgtype YouHaveMail) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnum] ! YouHaveMail(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == aborted) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml !! aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAses: tmpId=%d abort initiated by PDAtcp 
or MSS going ... Aborted... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
:: (msgtype == TimeFin) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg */ 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! TimeFin(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAses: tmpId=%d TimeFin MSS going ... Aborted... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
fi; 
nempty(q-to-tcp) && nfull(PDAses_to_tcp[chnuml) -> /* send to tcp 
q-to-tcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == ChangeMyKs) 
printf("PDAses: PDA-tmpId=%d ASKING to change OldKs=7. d \n", tmpId, Ks); 
/* if necessary process the msg */ 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml ! ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) 
(msgtype - EaddrAndTxt) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml I EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2) 
(msgtype -- Ecash) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml ! Ecash(fl, f2) 
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(msgtype == abort) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 









PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2)1 /* drop this msg 
empty(PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
if 




PDAtcp process: connection-oriented reliable link between the PDA 
and the MSS. It forwards msg up the protocol stack 
and to the MSS side. The PDAtcp initiates an abort procedure that 
propagates up the stack protocol whenever it detects that its remote 
peer (the MSStcp) is unreachable. 
proctype PDAtcp(int tmpId, chnum, Ks) 
f 
chan q-to-PDAses= (LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intj; 
chan q-to-MSStcp= [LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intj; 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
assert(O <= chnum && chnum <= NUMofPDA && tmpId == chnum); 
do 
/* from PDAtcp to PDAses 
nfull(q-to-PDAses) && nempty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fi, f2) -> q-to-PDAses ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
/* PDAses to PDAtcp */ 
nfull(q-to-MSStcp) && nempty(PDAses-to-tcp[chnum]) 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
/* send to PDAses */ 
nempty(q-to-PDAses) && nfull(PDAtcp-to_ses[chnuml) 
q-to-PDAses ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
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if 
(msgtype == abort) -> /* abort initiated by MSS 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnum] H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d initiated by MSS going 
... Aborted+++\n", tmpId, chnum); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == TimeFin) -> /* TimeFin initiated by MSS 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chn=l H TimeFin(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d TimeFin initiated by MSS going 
... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == aborted) -> /* abort initiated by PDAuser or PDAses or PDAtcp 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d initiated at PDA side going 
+++Aborted+++\n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == YourNewKs) -> /* MSSman has changed Ks 
Ks= fl; 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml ! YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
else -> /* MSS sending a routine msg */ 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml 1 msgtype(fl, f2) 
fi 
/* send to MSStcP */ 
nempty(q-to-MSStcp) && nfull(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chn=]) 
&& nfull(q-to-PDAses) 
q-to-MSStcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if /* PDA sent ordinary msg */ 
:: (msgtype != abort) -> PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml ! msgtype(fi, f2) 
(msgtype == abort) -> /* abort initiated by PDA 
PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml H abort(fl, f2); 
q-to-PDAses H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d aborted by PDA going to 
... Aborted... soon \n", tmpId) 
fi 
full(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) U 
timeout -> /* MSS not reading: ass=e MSS aborted session 
if 
nfull(q-to-PDAses) -> q-to-PDAses H aborted(fl, f2) 





PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(tmpId, chn=) -> break 




:: atomicfnempty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) && timeout 
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do 
nempty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) 
PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnural) -> break 
odl 
empty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) -> skip 
fi; 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId= %d chanum= %d ... Aborted... BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId, chnum) 
I 
instantiates the participants processes 
init 
f 
int PDAnum; /* number of PDA 
atomicf 
run KsTmpIdManO ; /* instantiate the tmpId and Ks manager process 
1; 
PDAnum-- 0; 
do /* instantiate NUMofPDA processes, one for each PDA 
PDAnum < NUMofPDA -> 
run PDAuser(PDAnum); 
PDAnum++ 
PDAnum >= NUMofPDA -> break 
od 
I 
A. 5 Promela specification of the whole system 
PROGRAMME: Promela validation model for the anonymous and confidential communicator 
AUTHOR: Carlos Molina Jimenez; 
ADDRESS: The University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
DATE OF CREATION: 27 Jul 1999 
DATE OF LAST UPDATE: 11 Nov 1999 
* This code assumes that the Ks negotiation has been verified, so lines related to 
* KpuMan process have been commented 
/* #define CERTIFIED-Kpu 12 Kpu certified by a certification authority 
/* #define UNCERTIFIED-Kpu 10 Kpu not certified by a certification authority 
/* #define INVALID-Kpu 00 Kpu out of domain 













#define YES I 
#define NO 0 
#define ANYINT 1 
#define NEGINT -1 
#define MAXNUMPDA 3 
#define NUMofPDA 3 
#define QSZ 1 
#define LOCALQSZ 3 
#define MAX-Ks 5 
#define MIN-Ks I 
#define MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS 
#define MAXNUMMSGREAD 
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3 /* max num of attempts to pay for an anonymous session 
100 /* max money accepted for opening an anonymous call 
20 /* golden, silver, are genuine and 
15 /* enough money for opening an anonymous call 
15 /* min money accepted for opening an anonymous call 
I /* genuine money but not enough 
0 /* no money 
-1 /* fake money 
40 /* max amount of money for extra payment: the user can 
/* extend his call twice: 20+20 or 15+15 or 20+15 
10 /* Num of msg left after TimeExp alarm goes off 
/* any integer 
/* any negative integer 
/* max number of PDA in the MSS 
/* num of PDA visiting the MSS 
/* num of msgs stored by a channel 
/* num of msgs store by a channel 
/* Valid Ks domain (1... 51 
3 /* max num of attempt to registe r Ks 
4 /* max num of attempt to receive an 
/* answer from the MSS encrypted with 
/* the suggested Ks and containi ng a tmpId 
#define MAXNUMEMAILS-SENT 16 /* temporary restriction for validation purposes */ 
#define KsBlack 1 
#define KsBlue 2 
#define KsGreen 3 
#define KsPink 4 
#define KsRed 5 
#define KsWhite 6 /* <-- invalid key 
mtype= faborted, abort, TimeFin, TimeAlert, YourNewKs, ChangeMyKs, 
tmpIdRcvd, Ecash, EcashRejotd, EcashAccepd, GenuineEcash, 
FakeEcash, EaddrAndTxt, YouHaveMaill; 
/* This is equiv. to YouHaveMail=l, EaddrAndTxt=2, FakeECash=3 
This code assumes that the Ks negotiation has been verified, so lines related to 
KpuMan process have been commented 
/* mtype=fKpu, BogusKpu, KpuRcvdl *//* msg type used by KpuMan 
/* chan KpuPort-to-PDA=[I3 of fbyte, intl; *//* Kpu broadcast channel from MSS to PDAs 
The MSS receives Ks proposals from PDAs at its PDA-to-KsPort channel 
the PDA read the MSS reply from KsPort-to-PDA channel which can 
chan PDA-to-KsPort=[Il of (int); 
chan KsPort-to-PDA=ENUMofPDA] of fint, int, intl 
chan KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of ýbyte, int, intl; 
chan MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of ýbyte, int, intl; 
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chan PDAses-to-tcp[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte. int, intl; 
chan PDAtcp-to-ses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of lbyte. int. intl; 
chan MSSses-to-tcp[MAXNUMPDAI=EQSZ] of fbyte, int, int); 
chan MSStcp-to-ses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[MAXNUMPDAI=EQSZI of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan PDAuser-to-ses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan PDAses-to-user[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan MSSses-to-bank[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan bank-to-MSSses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZ1 of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan MSSses-to-MailSvr[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan MailSvr-to-MSSses[MAXNUMPDAI=[QSZI of fbyte, int, intl; 
* This code assumes that the Ks negotiation has been verified, so lines related to 
* KpuMan process have been commented 
KpuMan process: it places a msg in KpuPort-to-PDA channel. The msg is read by 
PDAs. It contains certified Kpu key, uncertified Kpu key or bogus 
message. When the msg is read, the KpuMan places another one, waits until 
it is read and so on. 














KsTmpIdMan process: it is in charge of managing session keys and temporary 
Id assigned to PDA. It guarantees that tmpIds assigned 
to PDA are unique. Also, it guarantees that session keys are unique and 
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* secret. It asks the PDA to change its Ks when it detects that is has been 
* hit by another PDA. Also, upon request, it provides the PDA with a new Ks. 
proctype KsTmpIdManO 
f 
int tmpIdVec[MAXNUMPDA]; /* vector for storing TmpIds 
int KsVec[MAXNUMPDA], /* vector for storing Ks 
int Ks; /* session key 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
int OldestKs; /* oldest Ks accepted by MSS and sent to KsPort-to-PDA */ 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int fhI; /* scratch field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int fh2; /* scratch field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int NewKey; /* new Ks key 
int count; /* counter 
int n; /* counter 
int i; /* counter 
int j; /* counter 
i=O; /* initialize to 0 and -1 the valid cells in vectors KsVec 
do /* and tmpIdVec, respectively 
i< NUMofPDA -> 




else -> break 
od; 
i= NUMofPDA; /* initialize to -3 the unused cells in the vectors 
do /* KsVec and tmpIdVec respectively 
i< MAXNUMPDA -> 




else -> break 
od; 
TestTmpIdKs: 




(i < MAXNUMPDA) 
if 
:: (tmpIdVoc[il >= 0) -> assert(tmpIdVec[il < NUMofPDA); 
j=O; 
do 
:: < MAXNUMPDA) -> 
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if 
(i P -> j++ 
else -> 
assert(tmpIdVec[i] != tmpIdVec[il); 
j++ 
else -> break /* move to next i 
od 
:: else -> skip /* tmpIdVec[i] <0 are unused elements 
fi; 
i++ 
else -> break /* comparison finished 
odj; 











U == j) j++ 
else -> 
assert(KsVec[i] != KsVec[jl); 
j++ 
fi 
else -> break /* move to next i 
od 
:: else -> skip /* KsVec(i] <0 are unused elements 
fi; 
i++ 
else -> break /* comparison finished 
odj; 
progress-tmpIdKsOK: skip; /* tmpId and Ks are all right, continue */ 
Ks= 0; 
end: do /* valid endstate of this server process 
PDA-to-KsPort ? Ks -> goto KsVerification 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[Ol ? msgtype(ft, f2)-> 
chnum=O; tmpId= 0; goto MSSsesCare 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[l] ? msgtype(fl, f2)-> 
chnum=1; tmpId= 1; goto MSSsesCare 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[21 ? msgtype(fl, f2)-> 
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KsVerification: 
if 
:: (Ks <= MAX-Ks && Ks >= MIN_Ks) -> /* Is Ks within the valid domain? 
i=O; 
do /* is Ks already in use by another PDA? 
(i < NUMofPDA) -> /* valid Ks are (1,2,3,4,51 
if 
(Ks == KsVec[i]) 
printf("KsMan: Ks=%d KsVec[%dl=%d is in use by tmpId[Xdl=%d \n", 
Ks, i, KsVec[il, i, tmpIdVec[il); 
goto KsInuse 
:: (Ks != KsVec[iD -> i++ 
fi; 
else -> goto KsNotInuse 
od; 
else -> /* suggested Ks is incorrect 




/* Find a free tmpId in the tmpIdVec and assign it to the PDA 
/* The values of valid tmpId are [0,1,2,3,41 
/* tmpIdVec[01= 011121314 means tmpld=O already being used by some PDA 
/* tmpIdvec[01= -1 means tmpId=O is free 
/* tmpIdvec[01= -2 means tmpId=O has been used and can't be recycled yet 
/* tmpIdvec[01= -3 means tmpId=O is not in use at all 
/* tmpIdVec[ll= 011121314 means tmpId=l already being used by some PDA 
/* tmpIdvec[ll= -1 means tmpId=l is free 
/* tmpIdvec[ll= -2 means tmpId=l has been used and can't be recycled yet 
/* tmpIdvec[ll= -3 means tmpId=l is not in use at all 
/* tmpIdVec[21- 011121314 means tmpId=2 already being used by some PDA 
/* tmpIdvec[21= -1 means tmpId=2 is free 
/* tmpIdvec[2]= -2 means tmpId=2 has been used and can't be recycled yet 
/* tmpIdvec[21= -3 means tmpId=2 is not in use at all 
i-0; 
do 
(i < NUMofPDA) /* tmpId= -3 not in use at all 
if /* tmpId= -2 not in use: to be recycled later 
(tmpIdVoc[i] -i) -> i++ /* this tmpId already in use, try next one 
else -> break /* this tmpId free, use it 
fi 
else -> /* no more tmpId to be assigned: take this as KsINUSE= YES 
/* and don't reply no anybody 
goto TestTmpIdKs 
od; 
tmpld= i; chnum-i; /* tmpId k chnum assigned to new PDA with session key= Ks 
if 
atomic(nfull(KsPort. to. PDA) -> /* there's space in cha for key(tmpId, chnum) 
KsPort-to-PDA I Ks(tmpId, chnum); 
tmpIdVoc[il= i; 
KsVoc(il- Ks; 
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run MSSses(tmpId, chnum, Ks)l /* initiate MSS session to take care of new PDA */ 
atomicýfull(KsPort-to-PDA) -> /* no space in cha, discharge oldest msg 
KsPort-to-PDA ? OldestKs(fl, f2); 
tmpIdVec[fll= -2; /* empty PDAj from your tables 
KsVec[fl]= -2; /* and terminate MSSses assigned to PDAj 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[fl] H abort(fl, f2); 




KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
printf("KsMan: removed from ch: Ks=%d tmpId=%d chnum=%d \n", OldestKs, fl, f2)1 
fi; 
goto TestTmpIdKs; 
* The Ks suggested by the new PDA is already in use by PDAi with tmpId= i and 
* chnum=i. KsMan has to get a new Ks for PDAi. 
KsInuse: 
printf("KsMan: suggested Ks=%d is already in use by PDA with 
tmpId=%d chnum--%d\nII, Ks, i, i); 
count= 1; 
do 











(n < NUMofPDA) 
assert( 0 <= n && n< NUMofPDA); 
if 
(KsVec[n] NewKey) count++; break 
(KsVec[n] NewKey) n++ 
fi; 
else -> goto NewKsFoundl 
od; 
else -> /* couldn't find any available Ks 
atomicf 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[il H abort(i, Ks) -> /* order MSSses to abort 






KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
printf("KsMan: has SENT ABORT to tmpId= %d \n", i); 
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assert((MIN-Ks <= NewKey)&&(NewKey <= MAX_Ks)&&(O <= i)&&(i < NUMofPDA)); 
if 
atomic(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses(il 1 YourNewKs(NewKey, Ks) 
KsVec[il= NewKey) 
timeout -> printf("KsMan: tmpId=%d chnum--Yd Ks=%d NOT THERE, ignore it\n", 





(msgtype == ChangeMyKs) 
printf("KsMan: tmpId=%d chnum=%d has rcvd ChangeMyKs\n", tmpId, chnum); 
count= 1; 
do 











(n < NUMofPDA) 
assert( 0 <= nn< NUMofPDA); 
if 
(KsVec[n] NewKey) count++; break 
(KsVec[n] NewKey) n++ 
fi; 
else -> goto NewKsFound2 
od; 
else -> /* couldn't find any available Ks 
atomicý 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml H abort(tmpId, chnum); /* order MSSses to abort 
do 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2)-> 
if 
(msgtype aborted) -> skip 






KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chn=]) -> break 
od; 
printf(IlKsMan: has SENT ABORT to tmpId= 7, d \n", tmpId); 
goto TestTmpIdKs 





assert(MIN_Ks <= NewKey && NewKey <= MAX-Ks); 
assert(O <= tmpId && tmpId < NUMofPDA && tmpId == chnum); 
if 
atomicfKsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[tmpIdI ! YourNewKs(NewKey, fl) 
KsVec[tmpId]= NewKeyj 
timeout -> printf("KsMan: tmpId=%d with chnum--%d Ks=%d NOT THERE, 
ignore it\n", tmpId, chnum, fl) 
i; 
(msgtype == aborted) -> /* the PDA side or MSSses wants abort the ano. ses. 
atomicl 






KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses(chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
printf("KsMan: ABORT FOR tmpId= %d \n", tmpId)l 




MSSses process: is in charge of managing the anonymous communication session of 
the PDA. It charges the PDA for the communication, receives the 
payment, forwards it to the bank for verification, accepts or rejects the payment, 
warns the PDA user about the prepaid time expiration and abruptly finishes the 
communication session when the prepaid time expires. Also, it is the link between 
the PDA and the KsTmpIdMan; and the link between the PDA and the mail server. 
proctype MSSses(int tmpId, chnum, Ks) 
chan q-to-MSStcp=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-KsTmpIdMan=[LOCALQSZ) of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-MailSvr=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, int); 
chan q-to-bank=[LOCALQSZ) of fbyte, int, intl; 
197 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
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int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int MYKS; /* a session key 
int addr; /* e-mail address 
int txt; /* text in an e-amil msg 
int payment; /* payment for anonymous session: one unit of money is converted to 
/* one msg to be sent 
int credit; /* prepaid payment: num of msg the PDA user has prepaid for 
int CreditLeft; /* prepaid payment before warning msg: num of msg the user can 
/* send after the expiration time warning and termination of the 
/* session 
run MSStcp(tmpId, chnurn, Ks); 
progress-FirstPayment: do 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == Ecash) 
payment= fl; tmpId= f2; 
MSSses-to-bank[chnuml ! Ecash(payment, tmpId); 
if 
bank-to-MSSses[chnum] ? GenuineEcash(payment, f2) 
if 
(payment < MINMONEY 11 payment > MAXMONEY) 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ! EcashRejetd(payment, tmpId) 
else -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnum] ! EcashAccepd(payment, tmpId) 
assert(payment > LAST-MSGS); 




bank-to-MSSses(chnuml ? FakeEcash(payment, f2) 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnum] ! EcashRejetd(payment, tmpId) 
fi 
(msgtype == aborted) -> goto AbortBank 
fi 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnum] ? abort(fl, f2) -> 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml 11 abort(tmpId, chn=) 
do 
MSStcp-to-ses(chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype 1= aborted) skip /* discard the msg 
(msgtype - aborted) 
printf("MSSses tmpId= %d aborted by KsTmpIdMan; going 





assert( O<= chnum && chn= <= NUMofPDA); 
progress-AnoSes: do 
/* to msstcp */ 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? Eabort(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MSStcp) 
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KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? abort(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp H abort(fl, f2) 
/* to KsTmpIdMan */ 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml ? [aborted(fl, f4l && nfull(q-to-KsTmpIdMan) 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml ? aborted(fl, f2) -> q-to-KsTmpIdMan H aborted(fl, f2) 
/* to msstcp */ 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnuml ? [YourNewKs(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MSStcp) 
KsTmpIdMan-to-MSSses[chnum3 ? YourNewKs(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp ! YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
/* to msstcp */ 
MailSvr-to-MSSses[chnuml ? [YouHaveMail(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MSStcp) 
MailSvr-to-MSSses[chnuml ? YouHaveMail(fl, f2) q-to-MSStcp ! YouHaveMail(fl, f2) 
/* to msstcp */ 
bank-to_MSSses[chnuml ? [GenuineEcash(fl, f2)] nfull(q-to-MSStcp) 
bank-to-MSSses[chnuml ? GenuineEcash(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp ! GenuineEcash(fl, f2) 
/* to msstcp */ 
bank-to-MSSses[chnuml 
bank-to-MSSses[chnuml 
/* to KsTmpIdMan */ 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml 
MSStcp-to-ses [chnwrj 
/* to MailSvr */ 
MSStcp_to_ses[chnum) 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml 
/* to bank */ 
MSStcp_to-ses[chnuml 
MSStcp-to-ses(chnum3 
? [FakeEcash(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MSStcp) -> 
? FakeEcash(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp ! FakeEcash(fl, f2) 
? [ChangeMyKs(fl, f2)1 && nfull(q-to-KsTmpIdMan) -> 
? ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) -> q-to-KsTmpIdMan ! ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) 
? (EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-MailSvr) -> 
? EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2) -> q-to-MailSvr ! EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2) 
? [Ecash(fl, f2)] && nfull(q-to-bank) -> 
? Ecash(fl, f2) -> q-to-bank ! Ecash(fl, f2) 
/* send to MSStcp */ 
nempty(q-to-MSStcp) && nfull(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml) 
q-to-MSStcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
:: (msgtype == abort) -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml !! abort(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == YourNewKs) -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnum) ! YourNewKs(fl, f2); 
MyKs= fl; 
:: (msgtype == YouHaveMail) -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ! YouHaveMail(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == GenuineEcash) 
payment= fl; 
if 
(payment < MINMONEY 11 payment > MAXMONEY) -> 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ! EcashRej etd (payment, f 2) 
else -> 
atomicfMSSses-to-tcp[chnum] ! EcashAccepd(payment, f2) 
assert(payment > LAST-MSGS); 
credit= payment + credit + CreditLeft; 




(msgtype == FakeEcash) -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ! EcashRejetd(fl, f2) 
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:: (msgtype == TimeAlert) -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml !! TimeAlert(fl, f2) 
:: (msgtype == TimeFin) -> MSSses_to_tcp[chnuml H TimeFin(fl, f2) 
:: else -> printf("MSSses: tmpId=%d UNKNOWN msg: PANIC-PANIC-PANIC\n\n", tmpId) 
fi 
/* send to KsTmpIdMan */ 
nempty(q-to-KsTmpIdMan) && nfull(MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[chnuml) 
q-to-KsTmpIdMan ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
:: (msgtype == aborted) -> goto Aborted 
:: (msgtype == ChangeMyKs) -> MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[chnuml 1 ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) 
fi 
/* send to MailSvr */ 
nempty(q-to-MailSvr) && nfull(MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnuml) && 
nfull(q-to-MSStcp) && (credit >=1 11 CreditLeft >= 1) 
q-to-MailSvr ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
/* if necessary process the msg 
assert(credit >= 0 && CreditLeft >= 0); 
printf("MSSses: tmpId=%d credit=%d CreditLeft=%d Wn", 
tmpId, credit, CreditLeft); 
if 
(credit >= 1) -> /* charge to 'credit' account 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnuml ! EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2); 
credit--; 
if 
(credit == 0) -> q-to-MSStcp! TimeAlert(fl, f2); 
else -> skip 
fi 
(credit == 0 && CreditLeft >= 1) -> /* charge to CreditLeftl account 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[chnum] ! EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2); 
CreditLeft--; 
if 
:: (CreditLeft == 0) -> q-to-MSStcp ! TimeFin(fl, f2) 




/* send to bank */ 
nempty(q-to-bank) && nfull(MSSses-to-bank[chnuml) 
q-to-bank ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype -- Ecash) 
MSSses-to-bank(chnuml ! Ecash(fl, f2); 
payment= fl; 
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Aborted: 








send abort to bank 
do 
H aborted(fl, f2); break 
&& full(MailSvr-to-MSSses[chnuml) 
? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
atomicýnfull(MSSses-to-bank[chnuml) -> 
MSSses-to-bank[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); breakl 
full(MSSses_to_bank[chnum]) kk full(bank-to-MSSses[chnuml) 
MSSses-to-bank[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
od; 
send abort to KsTmpIdMan 
MSSses-to-KsTmpIdMan[chnuml 
clear chan to MSStcp 
!! aborted(fl, f2); 
do 
atomic(nempty(MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml) 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2)1 /* drop this msg 
empty(MSSses_to_tcp[chnuml) -> break 
od; 
printf("MSSAnoSes tmpId=%d MyKs=%d ... ABORTED.... BYE-BYE-BYE 
by KsTmpIdMan \n\n", tmpld, MyKs) 
I 
MSStcp process: connection-oriented reliable link between the MSS 
and the PDA. It forwards msg up the protocol stack 
and to the PDA side. The MSStcp initiates an abort procedure that 
propagates up the stack protocol whenever it detects that its remote 
peer (the PDAtcp) is unreachable. 
proctype MSStcp(int tmpId, chnum, Ks) 
f 
chan q-to-PDAtcp= ELOCALQSZ] of (byte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-MSSses= CLCCALqSZ] of ýbyte, int, intl; 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
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assert(O <= chnum && chnum <= NUMofPDA && tmpId == chnum); 
do 
/* recv from MSS site 
nfull(q-to-PDAtcp) && nempty(MSSses-to-tcp(chnum]) 
MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-PDAtcp ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
/* recv from PDA site */ 
nfull(q-to-MSSses) && nempty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnum]) 
PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSSses ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
/* send to MSS site */ 
nempty(q-to-MSSses) && nfull(MSStcp-to-ses[chnum]) 
q-to-MSSses ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == abort) -> /* abort initiated at PDA site 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId=%d initiated at PDA site going 
... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == aborted) -> /* abort initiated at MSS 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId=%d initiated at MSS site going 
... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
else -> /* PDA sending an ordinary msg 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnum] ! msgtype(fi, f2) 
fi 
/* send to PDA site */ 
nempty(q-to-PDAtcp) && nfull(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chn=]) && nfull(q-to-MSSses) 
q-to-PDAtcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == abort) -> /* abort initiated by MSS or MSSksMan 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml 1! abort(fl, f2); 
q-to-MSSses H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId=%d aborted by MSS going to 
... Aborted... soon \n", tmpId); 
(msgtype == TimeFin) -> /* end of AnosSes: initiated by MSS or KsTmpIdMan 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml H TimeFin(fl, f2); 
q-to-MSSses H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId=%d TimeFin by MSS going to 
... Aborted... soon \n", tmpId); 
(msgtype == YourNewKs) -> /* MSSman has changed Ks 
Ks= fl; 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml ! YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
:: else -> MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml 1 msgtype(fi, f2) /* MSS sent routine msg 
fi 
full(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chn=]) kk 
timeout -> /* PDA not receiving: ass=e PDA has aborted its session 
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if 
nfull(MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml) -> MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
goto Aborted 
:: full(MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml) && timeout -> goto ForceAbort 
fi 
empty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) && 
timeout -> /* PDA not sending: assume PDA has aborted its session 
if 
nfull(MSStcp_to_ses[chnuml) -> MSStcp-to-ses[chnum3 !! aborted(fl, f2); 
goto Aborted 
:: full(MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml) && timeout -> goto ForceAbort 
fi 
od; 
ForceAbort: /* force MSSses to abort (to read 'aborted') from it chan 
do 
MSStcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(tmpId, chnum) -> break 
timeout -> MSSses-to-tcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
od; 
printf("MSStcp tmpId= %d going to ... Aborted ... by KsTmpIdM&n \n", tmpId, chnum); 
Aborted: 
if 
atomicfnempty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) && timeout 
do 
nempty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) -> 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp(chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) /* drop this msg 
empty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) -> break 
odl 
empty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) -> skip 
fi; 
printf("MSStcp: tmpId= Yd chanum= 7. d ... ABORTED+++ 
BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId, chnum) 
I 
bank process: receives an e-coin and verify that it is 
genuine and that it has not been spent. 
proctype bankO 
f 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
int payment; /* e-coin 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
203 
chnum= -1; 




MSSses-to-bank(Ol ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
assert(msgtype == Ecash msgtype == aborted); 
if 
:: (msgtype == aborted) 
chnum= 0; tmpId=O; goto ClearChan 
:: (msgtype == Ecash) -> 
payment=fl; chnum= 0; tmpId=O; goto progress-ecashTocheck 
fi 
MSSses-to-bank[l] ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> 
assert(msgtype == Ecash 11 msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype aborted) chnum= 1; tmpId=l; goto ClearChan 
(msgtype Ecash) 
payment=fl; chnum= 1; tmpId=l; goto progress-ecashTocheck 
fi 
MSSses-to-bank[21 ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> 
assert(msgtype == Ecash msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype == aborted) 
chnum= 2; tmpId=2; goto ClearChan 
(msgtype == Ecash) -> 




/* proc with tmpId= 0 has chnum=O, proc with tmpId=l has chnum=2, etc 
assert(O <= chnum && chnum < NUMofPDA && 0 <= tmpId && tmpId < NUMofPDA); 
if 
(payment == FAKEMONEY) -> bank-to-MSSses[chn=l ! FakeEcash(payment, f2); 
printf("BANK: tmpId= %d chnum= %d SENT FakeCash payment= U to PDA \n", 
tmpId, chnum, payment) 
else -> bank-to-MSSses[chnuml ! GenuineEcash(payment, f2) -> 
printf("BANK: tmpId= %d chnum= %d SENT GenuineEcash payment= %d to PDA \n", 
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MailSvr process: receives msg coming from Bob's PDA and simulates that 
they are sent to Alice's (their final destination) 
e-mail address. Alice's computer is connected somewhere to the Internet. 
Similarly, it simulates that it receives replies to Bob's msgs and for- 
wards them to Bob. The decision about replying or not to an e-mail is ta- 
ken randomly. 
proctype MailSvrO 
int ReplyVec[MAXNUMPDA]; /* msg awaiting for replies 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
int addr; /* e-mail address 
int txt; /* text in e-mail msg 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int i; /* counter 
i=O; 
do 
:: i< MAXNUMPDA 
ReplyVec[il= 0; 
i++ 






MSSses-to-MailSvr[Ol ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
assert(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt 11 msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
addr= fl; txt= f2; ReplyVec[01= ReplyVec[Ol + 1; goto progress-mailRcvd 
:: (msgtype == aborted) -> tmpId= 0; chnum= 0; goto ClearChan 
fi 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[l] ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> 
assert(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt 11 msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
addr= fl; txt= f2; ReplyVec[ll= ReplyVec(l] + 1; goto progress-mailRcvd 
:: (msgtype == aborted) -> tmpId= 1; chn== 1; goto ClearChan 
fi 
MSSses-to-MailSvr[21 ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> 
assert(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt 11 msgtype == aborted); 
if 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) 
addr= f 1; txt= f 2; ReplyVec [21 = ReplyVec [21 + 1; goto progress-mailRcvd 
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(ReplyVec[O] >= i) 
if /* Alice doesn't reply to Bob: discharge a msg 
ReplyVec[01= ReplyVec[01 -1 
skip 
fi; 
if /* make chnum--O if there're any reply for channel 0 
(ReplyVec[O] >= 1) -> chnum= 0 
else chnum= -1 /* no replies for channel 0 
fi 
(ReplyVec[l] >= 1) 
if 




(ReplyVec[l] >= 1) -> chnum= 1 
else chnum= -1 
fi 
(ReplyVec(21 >= 1) 
if 




(ReplyVec[21 >= 1) -> chnum= 2 
else -> chnum= -1 
fi 
fi; 
(chnum >= 0 && chnum < NUMofPDA) 
if 
MailSvr-to-MSSses[chnum] ! YouHaveMail(chnum, pid) 
progress-replySent: skip 
timeout-> skip /* PDA is off or has gone away from MSS 
fi; 
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od 
I 
" EscKey process: 
" -the fact that the PDA user can press the ESC keyboard at any time to 
" interrupt his anonymous session is simulated by a Itimeout' 
" which can go off at any time. 
" -interruption of the PDA user anonymous session can be originated at 
" the PDAuser, PDAses, PDAtcp or at the MSS site, if this happens 
" an 'abort' message is received which lead to abort the keyboard pro- 
cess. 
proctype EscKey(chan user-to-EscKey, EscKey-to-user; int tmpId, chnum) 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
if 
user-to-EscKey ? aborted(fl, f2) -> /* abort from PDA or MSS site 
goto Aborted 
timeout -> EscKey-to-user H abort(tmpId, chnum) 
goto Aborted /* simulates the user pressing ESC 
/* to interrupt his anonymous session 
fi; 
Aborted: 
printf("EscKey: tmpId=%d aborted at PDA or MSS site BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId); 
I 
PDAuser proc ess: is the interface between the PDA user and the 
anonymous and confidential conmunications system. 
It receives PDA user's commands typed on the keyboard and display 
messages on the PDA screen. 
proctype PDAuser(int PDAnum) 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int tmpld; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
/* int PuKey; *//* public key of the MSS 
bool KsChanged; /* flag to stop the PDA changing its Ks more than once 
int payment; /* payment for opening or extending an anonymous session 
int MaxExtPay; /* max amount of money a user is allowed to spend in calls 
int ExtPay; /* max amount of money a user hast spent in calls 
int addr; /* e-mail address 
int txt; /* text in e-mail msg 
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bool AbortFlag; /* was the process forced to abort YES/No ? */ 
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int i; /* counter of attempts */ 
int NumM; /* number of e-mails to send 
chan ses-to-user-localch=Ell of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan user-to-esckey=[Il of fbyte, int, intl; 
chan esckey-to-user=Cll of fbyte, int, intl; 
KsChanged= NO; 
AbortFlag= NO; 
Promeld specification of the system 
" run PDAses process: ses-to-user-localch is used by PDAuser to 
" receive tmpId and from PDAses 
run PDAses(PDAnum, ses-to-user-localch); 
* This code assumes that the Ks-negotiation-has been verified, so lines related to 
* Ks negotiation have been commented 
progress-KpuNegotiation: 
/* do 
ses-to-user-localch ? KpuRcvd(fi, f2) 
printf("PDAuser: PDAnum--%d pid=%d : Kpu learnt \n", PDAnum, -pid); break 
ses-to-user-localch ? aborted(fl, f2) 
printf("PDAuser: PDAnum--%d pid=%d : My PDAses couldn't get a Ks; going 





ses-to-user-localch ? tmpIdRcvd(tmpId, chnum) -> break 
ses-to-user-localch ? aborted(fl, f2) -> 
printf("PDAuser: PDAnum=%d pid=%d : My PDAses couldn't get a Ks; going 













PDAuser-to-ses(chnuml I Ecash(payment, tmpId) -> 
,, 
A. 5 Promela specification of the whole system 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? msgtype(payment, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == EcashRejetd) 
i++ /* go back and fetch another coin from PDA memory 
:: (msgtype == EcashAccepd) -> 
NumM=MAXNUMEMAILS-SENT; 
run the EscKey process 
run EscKey(user-to-esckey, esckey-to-user, tmpId, chnum); 
goto progress-AnoSes 
(msgtype == aborted) -> 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId=%d couldn't PAY; aborted by PDAsesIPDAtcpIMSS going 
... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
fi 
else -> PDAuser_to-ses[chnum] !! abort(tmpId, chnum) 
do 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
:: (msgtype != aborted) -> skip /* discard this msg 
(msgtype == aborted) -> 






(NumM >= I && nfull(PDAuser_to-ses(chnuml)) 
PDAuser-to-ses(chnuml 1 EaddrAndTxt(-pid, -pid); NumM-- 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? YouHaveMail(addr, txt) -> 
printf("=== ... >PDAuser tmpId= %d chnum-- %d GOT E-MAIL 
addr= %d txt= %d\n", tmpId, chnum, addr, txt) 
(KsChanged==ND) -> PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml ChangeMyKs(tmpId. chn=); KsChanged= YES 
/* Ks can be changed only once 
PDAses-to-user[chnum] ? YourNewXs(fI, f2) 
printf("PDAuser tmpId= %d has got a new Ks \n", tmpId) 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? TimeAlert(fl, f2) -> 
printf ("$$$>PDAuser tmpId=%d has been TimeAlerted\n", tmpId) 
if 








PDAuser-to-ses(chnuml ! Ecash(payment, tmpId); 
209 
210 Promela specification of the system 
printf("$$$>PDAuser tmpId=%d has sent EXTRA 
payment=%d\n", tmpId, payment) 
else -> skip /* no more extensions allowed 
fi 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? TimeFin(fl, f2) -> 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId=%d TimeFin going ... Abort... \n", tmpId); 
user-to-esckey!! aborted(tmpId, chnum); 
goto Aborted 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? EcashAccepd(fl, f2) -> 
ExtPay= ExtPay + payment; 
NumM= MAXNUMEMAILS-SENT; 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId=%d AnoTime INCRTED msg to send=7. d\n", tmpId, NumM); 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? EcashRejetd(fl, f2) -> 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId= %d chnum-- %d AnoTime NOT incremented\n", tmpId, chnum) 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ? aborted(fl, f2) -> 
user-to-esckey!! aborted(tmpId, chnum); 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId=%d aborted initiated by PDAses I PDAtct I MSS going 
... Abort ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
esckey-to-user ? abort(fl, f2) -> /* user pressed ESC key to interrupt session 













(AbortFlag == NO) 
printf("PDAuser: tmpId= %d chnum= %d HAPPY END BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId, chnum) 
else -> skip 
fi 
I 
PDAses process: is in charge of learning the Kpu key and negotiating 
a Ks key. It encrypts PDAuser msg before forwarding 
them down the protocol stack; conversely, it decrypts msg coming from 
the underneath layer and forward them to the PDAuser layer. 
A. 5 Promela specification of the whole system 
proctype PDAses(byte MyPDAnum; chan ses-to-user-localch) 
f 
chan q-to-tcp=[LOCALQSZ] of (byte, int, intl; 
chan q-to-user=[LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
/* int PuKey; */ 
int Ks; /* session key of the PDA 
int tmpId; /* temporary Id 
int chnum; /* channel number 
int payment; /* payment for an anonymous session 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; / * field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; / * field for receiving the second field of a msg 
int addr; /* e-mail address 
int txt; /* text in e-mail msg 
int i; /* i <= MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS: counter number of attempt 
/* to register a session key 
bool AbortFlag; /* was the process forced to abort YES/NO ? 
bool KsAccepd; /* The suggested Ks was accepted YESAO ? 
" This code assumes that the Ks negotiation has been verified, so lines related to 
" Ks negotiation have been commented 
/* KpuNegotiation: 
* Part of the PDAses process that deals with the Kpu negotiation between the 
* PDA and the MSS. 
* Both the PDAuser and the PDAses end in 'Aborted' if the PDAses fails to 
* get the Kpu after MAXNUM-Kpu-ATTEMPTS. 
/* PuKey= 0; 
* i= 1; 
do 
:: (i <= MAXNUM-Kpu_ATTEMPTS) 
if 
KpuPort-to-PDA ? Kpu(PuKey) Kpu rcvd: now check for authenticity 
if 
(PuKey == CERTIFIED-Kpu) -> 
ses-to-user-localch ! KpuRcvd(ANYINT, ANYINT); 
printf(I'MyPDAnum=%d has learnt Kpu after N= %d; going to 
KsNegotiation\n", MyPDAnum, i-I); 
goto KsNegotiation 
else -> i++ 
fi 
KpuPort-to-PDA ? BogusKpu(PuKey) -> i++ // bogus msg rcvd: ignore it 
timeout couldn't hear any msg from this MSS: move to a new one 




printf(I'MyPDAnum=%d Failed to get Kpu after N= %d; going to 
... Aborted ... W1, MyPDAnum, i-I); 














U <= MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS) 
if /* random selection of Ks 
Promela specification of the system 
Ks = KsBlack -> 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
* There may be up to 5 msg in the channel buffer. If there is one 
* (not necessarily at the head of the buffer) with mtype= KsBlack 
* retrieve it. Otherwise block until such a msg appears in the 
* channel or timeout goes off 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsBIack(tmpId, chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
timeout 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum-- %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MYPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsBlue -> 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsBlue(tmpId. chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
timeout -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MyPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsGreen -> 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsGreen(tmpId, chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
timeout -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MYPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
:: Ks = KsPink -> 
A. 5 Promela specification of the whole system 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsPink(tmpId, chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
timeout -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= Xd NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MyPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsRed 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsRed(tmpId, chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; 
break 
timeout -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 
TIMEOUT \n", MyPDAnum, Ks, i); 
i++ 
fi 
Ks = KsWhite -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d is going to send Ks= %d \n", MyPDAnum, Ks); 
PDA-to-KsPort ! Ks; 
if 
KsPort-to-PDA ?? KsWhite(tmpId. chnum) 
KsAccepd = YES; /* this should never happens 
break /* this should never happens 
timeout -> 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum= %d; sent Ks= %d i= %d NO answer 




U> MAXNUM-Ks-ATTEMPTS) -> 
break /* give up registering a Ks 
od; 
communication between the PDAuser and the PDAses 
if 
(KsAccepd == NO) 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum=%d failed to register Ks after i=%d attempts: going 
... Aborted ... \n", MyPDAnum, i-1); 
ses-to-user-localch aborted(NEGINT, NEGINT); 
goto Aborted 
else -> 
ses-to-user-localch tmpIdRcvd(tmpId, chnum); 
printf("PDAses: PDAnum=%d; pid=%d HAS RgTED Ks=%d (tmpId= %d) after i= %d 
attempts \n", MyPDAnum. -pid, 
Ks, tmpId, i); 
initiating the underneath layer 




Promela specification of the system 
progress-FirstPayment: do /* progress of PDAses proc to FirstPayment state 
PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == Ecash) 
skip /* if necessary do anything to the msg 
(msgtype == abort) -> PDAses_to_tcp[chnuml H abort(fl, f2) 
do 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype aborted) skip /* discard the msg 






:: PDAses-to-tcp[chnum] ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
fi 
PDAtcp_to_ses[chn=l ? msgtype(fl, f2) 
if 
(msgtype == EcashRejetd) 
skip /* if necessary do anything to the msg 
:: (msgtype == EcashAccepd) -> 
skip; /* if necessary do anything to the msg 
payment= fl; 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! EcashAccepd(payment, tmpId); 
goto progress-AnoSes 
(msgtype == aborted) -> 








/* from user to ses to tcp 
nfull(q-to-tcp) && nempty(PDAuser-to-ses[chnuml) 
PDAuser-to-ses(chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-tcp ! msgtype(fi, f2) 
/* from tcp to ses to user */ 
nfull(q-to-user) && nempty(PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml) 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-user ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
/* send to user */ 
nempty(q-to-user) && nfull(PDAses_to_user[chnuml) 
A. 5 Promela specification of the whole system 
q-to-user ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == YourNewKs) 
printf("PDAses: tmpId=%d GOT new Ks DldKs=%d NewKs= %d\n", 
tmpId, Ks, fl); 
Ks= fl; 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == TimeAlert) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! TimeAlert(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == EcashAccepd) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! EcashAccepd(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == EcashRejetd) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! EcashRejetd(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == YouHaveMail) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! YouHaveMail(fl, f2) 
:: (msgtype == aborted) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg */ 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml !! aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAses: tmpId=%d abort initiated by PDAtcp or MSS going 
... Aborted... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
:: (msgtype == TimeFin) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg */ 
PDAses-to-user[chnuml ! TimeFin(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAses: tmpId=%d TimeFin MSS going 
... Aborted... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
fi; 
/* send to tcp */ 
nempty(q-to-tcp) && nfull(PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml) 
q-to-tcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
(msgtype == ChangeMyKs) -> 
printf("PDAses: tmpId=%d user ASKING to change OldKs=%d \n", tmpId, Ks); 
/* if necessary process the msg */ 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnum3 ! ChangeMyKs(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == EaddrAndTxt) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml ! EaddrAndTxt(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == Ecash) -> 
/* if necessary process the msg 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml ! Ecash(fl, f2) 
215 
:: (msgtype - abort) -> 
216 
/* if necessary process the msg */ 





printf("PDAses: ... ABORTED... BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n"); 













PDAtcp process: connection-oriented reliable link between the PDA 
and the MSS. It forwards msg up the protocol stack 
and to the MSS side. The PDAtcp initiates an abort procedure that 
propagates up the stack protocol whenever it detects that its remote 
peer (the MSStcp) is unreachable. 
proctype PDAtcp(int tmpId, chnum, Ks) 
f 
chan q-to-PDAses= [LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intj; 
chan q-to-MSStcp= [LOCALQSZ] of fbyte, int, intl; 
byte msgtype; /* type of msg received 
int fl; /* field for receiving the first field of a msg 
int f2; /* field for receiving the second field of a msg 
assert(O <= chnum && chnum <= NUMofPDA && tmpId == chnum); 
do 
/* from PDAtcp to PDAses 
nfull(q-to-PDAses) && nempty(MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml) 
MSStcp-to-PDAtcp[chnuml ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-PDAses ! msgtype(fi, f2) 
/* PDAses to PDAtcp */ 
nfull(q-to-MSStcp) && nempty(PDAses-to-tcp[chnuml) 
PDAses-to-tcp[chnum] ? msgtype(fl, f2) -> q-to-MSStcp ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
/* send to PDAses */ 
nempty(q-to-PDAses) && nfull(PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml) 
q-to-PDAses ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if 
A. 5 Promela specification of the whole system 
(msgtype == abort) -> /* abort initiated by MSS */ 
PDAtcp_to_ses[chnuml H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d initiated by MSS going 
... Aborted ... \n", tmpId, chnum); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == TimeFin) -> /* TimeFin initiated by MSS 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml H TimeFin(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d TimeFin initiated by MSS going 
... Aborted ... \n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == aborted) -> /* abort initiated by PDAuser or PDAses or PDAtcp 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml !! aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d initiated at PDA side going 
... Aborted ... %n", tmpId); 
goto Aborted 
(msgtype == YourNewKs) -> /* MSSman has changed Ks 
Ks= fl; 
PDAtcp-to_ses[chnuml ! YourNewKs(fl, f2) 
else -> /* MSS sending a routine msg */ 
PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
fi 
/* send to MSStcp */ 
nempty(q-to-MSStcp) && nfull(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) 
&& nfull(q-to-PDAses) 
q-to-MSStcp ? msgtype(fl, f2); 
if /* PDA sent ordinary msg 
:: (msgtype != abort) -> PDAtcp_to_MSStcp[chnuml ! msgtype(fl, f2) 
(msgtype == abort) -> /* abort initiated by PDA 
PDAtcp-to_MSStcp[chnum] !! abort(fi, f2); 
q-to-PDAses H aborted(fl, f2); 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId=%d aborted by PDA going to ... Aborted 
soon \n", tmpId) 
fi 
full(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) && 
timeout -> /* MSS not reading: assume MSS aborted session 
if 
nfull(q-to-PDAses) -> q-to-PDAses H aborted(fl, f2) 





PDAtcp-to-ses[chnuml H aborted(tmpId. chnum) -> break 





:: atomicfnempty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) && timeout 
218 Promela specification of the system 
do 
nempty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) 




empty(PDAtcp-to-MSStcp[chnuml) -> skip 
fi; 
printf("PDAtcp: tmpId= Y. d chanum= 7. d ... Aborted... BYE-BYE-BYE\n\n", tmpId, chnum) 
I 
instantiates the participants processes 
init 
I 
int PDAnum; /* n=ber of PDA 
* This code assumes that the Ks negotiation has been verified, so lines related to 
* Ks negotiation have been commented 
/* run KpuManO create the Kpu manager process 
atomicf 
run KsTmpIdManO; /* instantiate the tmpId and Ks manager process 
run banko; /* instantiate the bank process 
run MailSvrO /* instantiate the MailSvr process 
1; 
PDAnum= 0; 
do /* instantiate NUMofPDA processes, one for each PDA 
:: PDAnum < NUMofPDA -> 
run PDAuser(PDAnum); 
PDAnum++ 
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